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Abstract 
The growing use of Information Technology (IT) in daily operations of enterprises 
requires an ever-increasing level of protection over organization’s assets and in-
formation from unauthorised access, data leakage or any other type of information 
security breach. Because of that, it becomes vital to ensure the necessary level of 
protection. One of the best ways to achieve this goal is to implement controls 
defined in Information security documents. The problems faced by different 
organizations are related to the fact that often, organizations are required to be 
aligned with multiple Information security documents and their requirements.  
Currently, the organization’s assets and information protection are based on 
Information security specialist’s knowledge, skills and experience. Lack of auto-
mated tools for multiple Information security documents and their requirements 
harmonization, analysis and visualization lead to the situation when Information 
security is implemented by organizations in ineffective ways, causing controls 
duplication or increased cost of security implementation. An automated approach 
for Information security documents analysis, mapping and visualization would 
contribute to solving this issue. 
The dissertation consists of an introduction, three main chapters and general 
conclusions. The first chapter introduces existing Information security regulatory 
documents, current harmonization techniques, information security implemen-
tation cost evaluation methods and ways to analyse Information security require-
ments by applying graph theory optimisation algorithms (Vertex cover and Graph 
isomorphism). 
The second chapter proposes ways to evaluate information security imple-
mentation and costs through a controls-based approach. The effectiveness of this 
method could be improved by implementing automated initial data gathering from 
Business processes diagrams. In the third chapter, adaptive mapping on the basis 
of Security ontology is introduced for harmonization of different security docu-
ments; such an approach also allows to apply visualization techniques for 
harmonization results presentation. Graph optimization algorithms (vertex cover 
algorithm and graph isomorphism algorithm) for Minimum Security Baseline 
identification and verification of achieved results against controls implemented in 
small and medium-sized enterprises were proposed.  
It was concluded that the proposed methods provide sufficient data for ad-
justment and verification of security controls applicable by multiple Information 
security documents. 
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Reziumė 
Padidėjus informacinių technologijų (IT) taikymui kasdieninėje organizacijų 
veikloje, atitinkamai išaugo informacijos ir jos apsaugos įtaka organizacijos veik-
lai. Dėl šios priežasties informacija, techninė įranga, kuri naudojama jai apdoroti, 
ir jų apsauga yra itin svarbūs komponentai organizacijų veiklos tęstinumo bei 
veiklos atstatymo procesų užtikrinimui. Tai galima pasiekti įgyvendinant reikala-
vimus aprašytus informacijos saugą reglamentuojančiuose dokumentuose. Pag-
rindinis iššūkis, yra tai kad šiuolaikiniame pasaulyje iš organizacijų dažnai reika-
laujama atitikti kelis informacijos saugos dokumentų reikalavimus. 
Informacijos saugos užtikrinimas ir valdymas reikalauja nuodugnių žinių      
apie turimą informaciją, organizacijos turtą bei technologijas. Šiuo metu informa-
cijos saugos įgyvendinimas priklauso nuo informacijos saugos specialistų, jų ži-
nių ir patirties. Toks požiūris į informacijos saugos užtikrinimą įtakoja, kad infor-
macijos saugos užtikrinimas remiasi subjektyviais kriterijais, ko pasekoje 
organizacijos gali įgyvendinti besidubliuojančias rizikos mažinimo priemones, o 
saugos užtikrinimo kaštai gali būti neadekvačiai dideli. 
Disertaciją sudaro įvadas, trys pagrindiniai skyriai ir bendrosios išvados. Pir-
majame skyriuje analizuojami informacijos saugą reglamentuojantys dokumentai, 
apibrėžiamos harmonizacijos metodikos, įvertinami esami informacijos saugos 
kaštų vertinimo metodai ir aptariami grafų teorijos algoritmai, kurie yra naudo-
jami grafų pavidalu pateiktos informacijos analizei.  
Antrajame skyriuje pristatomas patobulintas kaštų vertinimo metodas, kuris 
yra orientuotas į rizikos mažinimo priemonių įgyvendinimą. Pateikiami šio me-
todo automatizavimo būdai, pritaikant automatinius informacijos surinkimo me-
chanizmus. Taip pat siūlomi būdai, kaip harmonizuota informacija gali būti efek-
tyviai reprezentuota, naudojant egzistuojančias vizualizacijos priemones. Trečiam 
skyriuje siūlomi metodai leidžiantys automatizuoti kelių Informacijos saugos do-
kumentų analizę, siekiant suformuoti minimalias saugos gaires ir palyginti gautus 
rezultatus su organizacijoje įgyvendintais sprendimais. Pateikti metodai grin-
džiami grafų teorija ir realizuojami naudojant jų padengiamumo algoritmus ir 
subgrafų izomorfizmo nustatymo algoritmus.  
Eksperimentinio tyrimo metu nustatyta, kad siūlomi metodai leidžia automa-
tizuoti kelių informacijos saugos dokumentų analizę, susiejimą, palyginimą ir vi-
zualizavimą.
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Notations 
Symbols 
B – the “Gain of investment”; 
Bt – the present value of net benefits of period t; 
C – the “Cost of Investment”; 
C𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  – additional specific tools cost; 
C𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 – costs related to critical asset analysis; 
C𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  – configuration costs; 
C𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) – Security consultant costs; 
C𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) – are project deployment costs; 
C𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 – are hardware and software procurement costs; 
C𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 – environment support costs; 
C𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑_𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 – costs related to gap analysis; 
C𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  – costs related to impact evaluation; 
C𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) – is action implementation costs; 
C𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  – cost of insurance, according to the signed off contract with the 3rd party (in-
surance company); 
Complexity level – digital value from 1 to 5; 
C𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎 – cost of metrics control operations; 
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Introduction 
Problem Formulation 
Given the increasing amount of cyber attack, the pressure imposed by government 
regulatory authorities is accumulating since they are concerned with the current 
situation of information and personal data protection. The main issue in such a 
case is related to the fact that applied security controls have different effectiveness 
and cost, and from an organization’s point of view, it is critical to ensure that 
implemented security controls are cost-effective and guarantee the needed level 
of protection (Correia, Gonçalves and Teodoro 2017).  
Another problem, which is common to all organizations, is related to the fact 
that competitive advantage could be achieved if an organization is aligned with 
more than one security document (Daud, et al. 2018). For example, financial 
organizations must be compliant with PCI DSS standard requirements (in case 
they process cardholder data) (PCI 2016) and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002), 
which is applicable for all organizations providing financial services in the United 
States of America. The fact that SOX and other security controls can be covered 
by implementing different frameworks, such as COBIT (ISACA 2013) or COSO 
(COSO 2013) complicates the situation even more.  
Harmonization techniques would help to map multiple security documents 
and their requirements (Haufea, et al. 2016). Such an approach allows us to 
 1 
 
Introduction 
Problem Formulation 
Given the increasing amount of cyber attack, the pressure imposed by government 
regulatory authorities is accumulating since they are concerned with the current 
situation of information and personal data protection. The main issue in such a 
case is related to the fact that applied security controls have different effectiveness 
and cost, and from an organization’s point of view, it is critical to ensure that 
implemented security controls are cost-effective and guarantee the needed level 
of protection (Correia, Gonçalves and Teodoro 2017).  
Another problem, which is common to all organizations, is related to the fact 
that competitive advantage could be achieved if an organization is aligned with 
more than one security document (Daud, et al. 2018). For example, financial 
organizations must be compliant with PCI DSS standard requirements (in case 
they process cardholder data) (PCI 2016) and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002), 
which is applicable for all organizations providing financial services in the United 
States of America. The fact that SOX and other security controls can be covered 
by implementing different frameworks, such as COBIT (ISACA 2013) or COSO 
(COSO 2013) complicates the situation even more.  
Harmonization techniques would help to map multiple security documents 
and their requirements (Haufea, et al. 2016). Such an approach allows us to 
2 INTRODUCTION 
 
understand the links between different documents. However, identification of 
mandatory requirements, needed to ensure sufficient information and data protec-
tion, still requires manual review of the harmonized information.  
To solve this problem, security documents adaptive mapping through secu-
rity ontology was proposed. Further security requirements presentation as graph 
vertices allows the application of graph theory, such as vertex cover and graph 
isomorphism properties. Vertex cover algorithms enable identification of dupli-
cated requirements (Nirmala, Lekshmi and Nadarajan 2016), whereas subgraph 
isomorphism allows comparing minimum security baseline requirements with se-
curity controls implemented in the organization.  
Relevance of the Thesis 
Many researches concentrate more on the implementation of Security require-
ments in narrow areas, rather than reviewing Information security and security 
controls implementation in symbiosis with already existing processes and con-
trols. Such an approach contributes to ensuring an organization’s protection and 
improving security solution in all its complexity. However, it increases security 
implementation costs. 
To solve this issue, information security specialists need to understand the 
requirements applicable to their organization by different Information security 
documents and best practices. It is imperative to understand how implemented 
controls are related one to another and to what extent they cover the required 
requirements. The automatic approach, which would allow to automatically har-
monize different documents on the basis of already existing knowledge and tech-
niques allowing the comparison of existing controls with the required one, would 
reduce the subjectivity presented in this process and increase its efficiency. 
One of the best ways to do that is to apply graph theory, which makes it 
possible to effectively visualize existing Information security documents and also 
enable the use of the graph theory algorithms, such as vertex cover and subgraph 
isomorphism properties, aimed at analyzing and evaluating information security 
documents. 
The Object of Research  
The object of the present study is method for information security documents re-
quirements harmonization and analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 3 
 
The Aim of the Thesis 
The aim of this research is to help to identify minimum security baseline for the 
cases when information security requirements of multiple information security 
documents or regulations are applied. The proposed solution concentrates on au-
tomation of harmonization, analysis, and verification of information security doc-
uments and regulations.  
The Tasks of the Thesis 
To achieve the aim of the thesis, the following tasks had to be accomplished: 
1. To review existing information security documents and their require-
ments and identify methods and techniques for their requirements har-
monization, analysis and verification. 
2. To propose a method for improvement of evaluating security require-
ments implementation costs.  
3. To propose an improved method for automating harmonization, analysis 
and verification of multiple information security documents and their re-
quirements. 
4. To perform experimental validation of the improved method for auto-
mating harmonization, analysis and verification, consisting of Minimum 
Security Baseline identification and security controls matching pro-
cesses. 
Research Methodology 
For the object investigation, the following research methods are chosen: 
− Action: theoretical (analysis and synthesis) study has been performed to 
improve the strategies aimed at finding a solution to the problem. 
− Classification: strength, weaknesses and existing gaps presented in the 
literature have been summarised: the dissertation research object has 
been recognised and understood. 
− Experience: the solution to the problem has been found by intuition and 
experience. 
− Experimental: the hypothesis has been tested by taking a practical test. 
− Statistical: conclusions have been drawn collecting, analyzing and ex-
plaining the statistical data. 
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Scientific Novelty of the Thesis 
The scientific novelty of this study is specified as follows:  
1. A novel control-based method is developed for implementation of in-
formation security cost. It includes an extensive definition of the secu-
rity implementation components and their impact on the organiza-
tion’s overall security landscape.  
2. A novel method, based on graph theory and vertex cover algorithm, is 
used for the analysis of existing Information security documents and 
ways to identify critical security requirements covered in the set of 
different documents and best practices. 
3. A novel method, based on graph theory, optimisation algorithms and 
subgraph isomorphism properties,was proposed and used for 
comparing security requirements of different Information security 
documents. The proposed method allows identifying how specific 
requirements are represented and covered in other security documents  
Practical Values of the Research Findings 
The achieved results are important both from the theoretical and practical points 
of view for the dynamic and rapidly changing area of information security 
management, which integrates technological, organizational and physical security 
measures for information security insurance.  
The proposed methods for control-based security implementation costs eval-
uation, adaptive mapping of security regulatory documents through the proposed 
security ontology and graph theory based method for Minimum security baseline 
identification and verification against existing documents demonstrate an inter-
disciplinary approach, combining both informatics engineering and managerial 
methods aimed at solving information security insurance tasks. Exceptionally 
unique is the proposed Minimum security baseline identification method that sug-
gests using graphs for the representation of regulatory documents, which allows 
utilizing a well-known vertex cover algorithm and graph isomorphism features for 
automating the task at a later time. The developed tool for visualization of mapped 
security documents can be directly used by companies for managing the complex-
ity issue and user-friendly representation of the relationship between documents.  
Part of the results of the research was financed, implemented and validated 
as a part of the project “Virtualization, visualization and security in e-service tech-
nologies” 2012–2014 program (project code: VP1-3.1-ŠMM-08-K-01-012).   
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The Defended Statements  
The defended statements of this doctoral thesis are as follows: 
1. The controls-based cost evaluation approach has to incorporate organ-
ization maturity and organization systems complexity levels into the 
calculation because it allows taking in account organization size and 
evaluate additional costs, common for the organizations of different 
sizes. 
2. Adaptive mapping through security ontology, incorporating security 
frameworks and methodologies, allows harmonization of multiple se-
curity documents requirements without the need to re-evaluate previ-
ously linked data and allows link security requirements from different 
security areas. 
3. Minimum Security Baseline identification from the set of previously 
harmonized security documents and its verification against imple-
mented controls within an organization could be automated by using 
Vertex cover algorithm and Graph isomorphism properties.  
Approval of the Research Findings  
The results of the dissertation were published in 8 scientific publications. 3 of 
them are published in reviewed scientific journals indexed in Clarivate Analytics 
(also referred to as Thomson Reuters) Science Citation Index, and 5 are published 
in conference proceedings. The author has also made 3 presentations at interna-
tional scientific conferences: 
− Business Process Management conference 2017: Business Process Man-
agement Workshops. September 10–11, 2017, Barcelona, Spain,  
− Electrical, Electronic and Information Sciences (eStream): proceedings of 
the 2015 Open conference. April 21, 2015, Vilnius, Lithuania.  
− 2nd International conference on Information Technology and Science 
(ICITS 2014). March 27–28, 2014, Shanghai, China.  
Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertations consist of an introduction, three main chapters, general conclu-
sions, references, a list of publications by the author on the topic of the dissertation 
and a summary in Lithuanian. The total scope of the dissertation is 138 pages and 
includes 35 figures and 22 tables. 
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1 
Information Security Requirements 
Harmonization, Analysis and 
Evaluation Methods  
This Chapter provides the analysis of published information security documents, 
frameworks, best practices and other security assurance documentation. Primary 
attention is dedicated to security controls implementation and assurance for or-
ganizations without having a dedicated information security specialist. Organiza-
tions are made to seek compliance with a set of applicable security regulations. 
However, identification of security requirements mandatory for the organizations 
and decision about how to satisfy them is mostly based on expert knowledge, 
skills and experience. To ensure cost-effective security implementation, organi-
zations must be able to identify security requirements applicable to them from the 
set of various security documents, identify existing non-compliances with these 
requirements and calculate the cost of implemented and missing controls 
(Sugiura, Suwa and Ohta 2015).  
The performed analysis covers existing security costs implementation verifi-
cation methods. Analysis has been conducted on the principal components of 
these methods. Their advantages and disadvantages are identified, and their ap-
plicability to solving raised problems is validated. 
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The information provided in is Chapter 1 analyzes existing harmonization 
techniques, validating their possibility to be used for multiple security documents 
linking and analysis at a later time. The techniques need to ensure a flexible ap-
proach for the increasing set of harmonized documents and re-usage of the previ-
ous results. As part of the analysis, visualization of achieved results was reviewed. 
Visualized information allows quickly and effectively representing information 
about harmonized documents and highlighting the level of documents, similarity 
and differences. 
A harmonized set of security documents provide a list of all possible require-
ments; however, they are not suitable for identification of mandatory security re-
quirements, which would allow the organization to be compliant with security 
requirements without paying extra costs. In this chapter, Minimum security base-
line identification methods were analyzed and presented. 
Researches provided in the chapter 1 were published in (Ramanauskaite, 
Olifer, et al. 2013) and (Ramanauskaite, Goranin, et al. 2013).     
1.1. Information Security Documents and 
Requirements 
During the last ten years, the importance of information and data protection in-
creased exponentially and has evolved into a vital organizational process. Security 
management and organization assets protection are perceived today as one of the 
key points of an organization’s success. According to Dhillon et al. (Dhillon and 
Backhouse 2000), security has become fundamental in our society, and the sur-
vival of organizations depends on the correct management of modern security el-
ements. According to the technical report (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2015), aver-
age costs of single Information security and Data protection breaches increased 
twice during the last year, from 600 000 £ in 2014 to 1 460 000 £ in 2015. The 
results of such analysis explain why the implementation of Information security 
requirements is so important nowadays. The complexity of this problem creates a 
situation in which the same data and information could be protected in different 
ways (Lee, Geng and Raghunathan 2016). From the organization’s point of view, 
it is imperative to make certain that organizations apply “security-in-depth” prin-
ciples and ensure “due diligence”. 
One of the best ways to achieve this result is to apply best security practices 
defined in the different types of security documentation, starting from security 
methodologies, frameworks and finishing with specific security documents and 
procedures (Ahanger and Aljumah 2018). 
During the analysis, a lot of attention was dedicated to security documenta-
tion, which defines security requirements for small and medium-sized enterprises 
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(hereinafter SME). Information security documentation aims to solve critical 
organizational issues such as: 
− Identification of organization maturity level in the security area; 
− Recommendation and roadmap for the organization, which seeks to im-
prove organization maturity level in the security area. 
Security documentation is trying to cover all main security areas and provide 
a solution to how one or another security issue or problem could be solved (Lee, 
Geng and Raghunathan 2012). Document applicability indirectly impacts the level 
of details defined in information security documents. Because of that some 
information security documents provide abstract security requirements (for 
example – “Organization must ensure users credentials and password 
management”), and at the same time other documents define requirements with 
high level of details (for example – “Organization password length must be at 
least 8 symbols and must consist at least one Uppercase symbols, one Lowercase 
symbol, one number and one special symbol”). During this analysis, different 
types of security documentation were identified:  
− International standards: ISO 27001 / ISO 27002 (ISO/IEC:27001 2013);  
PCI DSS – Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI 2016); 
FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS 200 2006); 
− Information security acts: HIPAA – Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPAA 1996); FISMA – Federal Information Security 
Management Act (E-Government Act 2002); SOX – Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX 2002); 
− Methodologies: COBIT – Control Objectives for Information and related 
Technology (ISACA 2013); COSO Internal Control – The Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO 2013);  
− Laws: GDPR – General Data Protection regulation (EU regulation 2016); 
− Information security publications: NIST SP 800-53 – Security and Pri-
vacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations (NIST 
SP 800-53 2012); NISTIR 7621 – Small Business Information Security 
– The Fundamentals (NISTIR 7621 2016); 
− Security documentation in development: ISSA 5173 – The Security 
Standard for SME‘s (Information Systems Security Association 2011). 
1.1.1. International Standards for Information Security 
Some International organizations, such as ISO/IEC, Visa, Mastercard developed 
and presented information security regulatory documents, which apply to the or-
ganization working in the area of their responsibility.  
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International Organization for Standardization and International 
Electrotechnical Commission published ISO27000 standards series. This series is 
also known as the “ISMS Family of standards”. ISO27000 standards series is 
broad in scope and provides best practice recommendations for information secu-
rity management. This series consists of 46 different standards covering all as-
pects of information securities starting from privacy, confidentiality and finishing 
with processes dedicated to solving IT/technical/cyberissues. 
The British standard BS7799 was taken as a foundation for ISO27001 and 
ISO27702 standards. The British standard was reviewed by security experts and 
published as international standard applicable to organizations working in differ-
ent industries and having different sizes. ISO27001 standard defines an 
Information security management system (hereinafter ISMS) and requirements 
applicable to such a system. ISMS must help the organization to adequately ensure 
the necessary level of protection, by applying security requirements to different 
organization processes and procedures (Haufe, et al. 2016). ISO27002 standard is 
named as “Code of practice for information security controls” In principle, it is a 
detailed catalogue of information security controls, which would help to develop 
and maintain effective ISMS. 
To prove the alignment of an organization’s processes and controls with ISO 
27001 and ISO 27002, an organization could seek ISO/IEC certification. Certifi-
cation decision is made on the basis of results of the independent audit, performed 
to verify an organization’s ISMS and controls implemented to protect organiza-
tion environment.  
Last time ISO27001 and ISO27002 standards were reviewed in 2013. In 2017 
standards were republished (ISO27001 2017). However, the new version didn’t 
define new requirements, and all changes were related to a few minor cosmetic 
amendments and a slight modification of defined names. 
Standards implementation principle is based on Plan–Do–Check–Act (here-
inafter PDCA) management method (Fig. 1.1). 
 
Fig. 1.1. Plan–Do–Check–Act management method (ISO/IEC:27001 2013) 
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Any changes in ISMS are implemented according to the PDCA management 
method and must go through the four steps defined below:  
− Plan – this step is dedicated to defining policies, procedures and guide-
lines. Roles and responsibilities are assigned;  
− Do – controls, resources and communication routes are defined during 
this step; 
− Check – this step is dedicated to verify implemented controls, check their 
alignment with requirements; internal audits are performed if needed;  
− Act – verification results are presented to management, and improvement 
priorities and routes are defined.  
From a security implementation point of view, ISO27002 is the most relevant 
standard in ISO27000 standards series. It was slightly amended during 2013 re-
viewal. The main changes were related to the number of application areas. The 
previous version of this standard (ISO27002:2005) defined 11 security areas, 
whereas the new standard defined “Cryptography” and “Supplier management” 
as independent chapters and the divided chapter “Communications and network 
management” into 2 separate chapters. The previous version of the standard 
consists of 133 controls, whereas the new one includes only 114 controls. During 
the review process, some controls were merged because they covered the same 
aspect of information security; the others were removed as not relevant anymore. 
ISO27002:2013 applicability areas: security policy, an organization of infor-
mation security; human resources security; asset management; access control; 
cryptography; physical and environmental security; operations security; commu-
nications security; systems acquisition, development and maintenance; supplier 
relationships; information security incident management; information security as-
pects of business continuity management; compliance. 
ISO 27002 series comprises the most detailed information security standards 
used for data and the organization’s environment protection. Standard 
requirements apply to all organizations and all industrial sectors (Shojaie 2018). 
However, each organization must adopt the standards and conditions defined in 
these standards according to their needs.  
Payment card industry data security standard (hereinafter – PCI DSS) (PCI 
2016) is an international standard applicable to the payment card industry. This 
standard was developed by “Visa”, “MasterCard”, “American Express”, “JCB” 
and “Discover”. The primary goal was to standardise security requirements appli-
cable to merchants, acquirers and payment systems and safeguard customer’s per-
sonal information, including personal confidential information, protection against 
unauthorized usage, data leakage and data destruction.  
PCI DSS defines two types of account data. Cardholder Data includes pri-
mary account number (PAN); cardholder name; expiration date and service code. 
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2016) is an international standard applicable to the payment card industry. This 
standard was developed by “Visa”, “MasterCard”, “American Express”, “JCB” 
and “Discover”. The primary goal was to standardise security requirements appli-
cable to merchants, acquirers and payment systems and safeguard customer’s per-
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unauthorized usage, data leakage and data destruction.  
PCI DSS defines two types of account data. Cardholder Data includes pri-
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Sensitive Authentication Data includes full track data (magnetic-stripe or equiva-
lent on a chip); CAV2/CVC2/CVV2/CID; PINs/Pin blocks. 
Requirements of this standard are mandatory for organizations (merchants, 
cards issuers and acquirers) which have interaction with card payment systems. 
An organization must complete a security self-assessment or security audit pro-
cess to satisfy licencing requirements. Both methods are helping to verify the 
security controls implemented in the organization. The decision regarding con-
trols evaluation (self-assessment or external audit) depends on the level of inter-
action with the payment system. Overall, PCI DSS defines 12 High-level require-
ments from 6 main security areas: build and maintain a secure network and 
systems (2 controls); protect cardholder data (2 controls); maintain a vulnerability 
management program (2 controls); implement strong access control measures       
(3 controls); regular monitor and test networks (2 controls); maintain an infor-
mation security policy (1 control). 
PCI DSS standard covers fewer security areas compared to ISO27001 series 
standards. This difference could be explained by standards applicability scopes. 
PCI DSS is oriented to payment card system customers and their data protection, 
and all attention is concentrated on the areas which are directly related to payment 
card systems.  
PCI DSS certification is much more rigorous and does not allow free inter-
pretation of existing requirements. One of the main requirements is related to the 
continuous monitoring of existing controls and continuous security improvement 
where needed. 
Federal Information Processing Standards (hereinafter – FIPS) series stand-
ards are publicly available. These standards apply to the United States of America 
government organizations and in principle are developed by accumulating secu-
rity requirements defined and published by such well-known organizations as 
ANSI, IEEE and ISO/IEC. 
FIPS standards are aligned with the Federal Information Security Manage-
ment Act and are mandatory for the United States of America Government and 
Federal Institutions. The FISMA law mandated the development of federal stand-
ards for (i) the security categorisation of federal information and information sys-
tems based on their risk levels to provide the appropriate level of security for each 
system, and (ii) the minimum security requirements for each category. 
FIPS 200 (FIPS 200 2006) addresses the specification of minimum security 
requirements for federal information and information systems. FIPS 199 (FIPS 
199 2004) addresses the classification used for systems segregation. It divides the 
systems into high, moderate, and low impact systems based on their impact on 
individuals and organizations. 
From Security implementation and Assurance point of view, the  most inter-
esting are FIPS 200: Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information 
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and Information Systems and NIST 800-53 (NIST 800-53 2012), which define 
security requirements and the ways of their implementation. 
FIPS 200 highlighted 17 main security areas: access control; awareness and 
training; audit and accountability; certification, accreditation, and security assess-
ments; configuration management; contingency planning; identification and au-
thentication; incident response; maintenance; media protection; physical and en-
vironmental protection; planning; personnel security; risk assessment; system and 
services acquisition; system and communications protection; system and infor-
mation integrity. 
A lot of security areas are similar to the security areas defined by ISO27001 
and ISO27002 standards. It is even more important that ISO27000 series standards 
apply to all industry sectors, and FIPS series standards are dedicated to the USA 
government.  
1.1.2. Information Security Regulating Acts 
Some governments, concerned with the challenge of information security regula-
tion, propose to enforce controls applicable to the information security protection. 
Such security requirements were defined as support documents for the signed acts 
(Srinivas, Das and Kumar 2019). Acts define high-level requirements and fines, 
which will be applied if the organization breach these rules. 
The Federal Information Security Management Act (hereinafter – FISMA) is 
United States legislation that defines a comprehensive framework to protect gov-
ernment information, operations and assets against natural or human-made 
threats. FISMA was signed into law as part of the Electronic Government Act of 
2002 (E-Government Act 2002). In 2014 it was reviewed and renamed to the Fed-
eral Information Security Modernization Act (E-government Act 2014).  
Main requirements are to: ensure that security implementation is a 
continuous process; define the roles and responsibilities of accountable security 
persons; and ensure continuous Governance, Risk and Compliance process, which 
would ensure security controls alignment with defined patterns.  
FISMA is a high-level document defining high-level security requirements. 
Detailed requirements are developed and maintained by the National Institute of 
Standards and technology (hereinafter NIST) organization, and one of such regu-
lation documents would be Federal Information Processing Standard (hereinafter 
FIPS) 200 standard which is presented below. According to NIST documentation, 
the organization needs to implement nine steps to comply with FISMA high-level 
requirements: Categorise the information to be protected; Select minimum base-
line controls; Refine controls using a risk assessment procedure; Document the 
controls in the system security plan; Implement security controls for applicable 
information systems; Assess the effectiveness of the security controls once they 
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have been implemented; Determine agency-level risk to the mission or business 
case; Authorise the information system for processing; Monitor the security con-
trols on a continuous basis. 
 The above defined nine steps are the main actions, which would ensure 
alignment with FISMA requirements. However, a specific list of NIST recom-
mendations strongly depends on organizational goals and processes. Depending 
on the organization’s demands, this list could be expanded by other specific re-
quirements important within this particular case. 
Some information security documents are dedicated to cover information se-
curity for a narrow industry cluster or cover a specific area. We have previously 
presented documents devoted to the payment system (for example, PCI DSS) and 
the United States of America government institutions (for example, FIPS 200). 
Another specific area is Healthcare (Langer 2017). In the United States of Amer-
ica, patient personal data protection is ensured by the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (hereinafter – HIPAA) (HIPAA 1996), (HIPAA 2013). 
HIPAA defines requirements applicable to all medical institutions and ensures 
patient privacy, personally identifiable information protection and overall security 
assurance provided by healthcare institutions.   
Although HIPAA document covers a lot of different areas of security assur-
ance and security implementation is defined in below mentioned documents: 
HIPAA Privacy rule is composed of national regulations for the use and disclosure 
of Protected Health Information (PHI) in healthcare treatment, payment and op-
erations by covered entities; HIPAA Security rule defines administrative, physical 
and technical safeguards required to ensure needed level of data protection.  
According to HIPAA, the appropriate level of security could be achieved by 
covering three main areas: Administrative Safeguards (security management pro-
cess; security personnel; information access management; workforce training and 
management; evaluation); Physical Safeguards (facility access and control; work-
station and device security); Technical Safeguards (access control; audit controls; 
integrity controls; transmission security). 
HIPAA security rules also cover security policies and Security procedures 
management requirements. However, they are separated from controls mecha-
nisms.  
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereinafter – SOX) (SOX 2002) is a United States of 
America federal law, which defines new and expanded requirements for all United 
States of America public company boards, management and public accounting 
firms. From the Security point of view, it requires organizations to implement 
internal control mechanisms, which would ensure the necessary level of security 
protection.  
The Act obligates all companies to implement internal control verification 
process and to ensure that the internal controls audit report is shared with the 
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government controlling organization. Internal controls report must consist of in-
formation about the adequacy of the company’s internal control on financial re-
porting (ICFR). 
Due to the fact that the Act requirements and definition are high levels and 
abstract, re a set of supporting documents and frameworks were developed. Such 
organizations as Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) 
and Committee of sponsoring organizations of the Treadway Commission devel-
oped their frameworks COBIT v.5 and COSO Enterprise Risk Management – an 
Integrated framework to help the organization to meet SOX requirements and be 
aligned with them. 
From the Information security implementation point of view, the frameworks 
developed by ISACA and COSO were chosen, because they cover detailed re-
quirements applicable for organization security implementation. However, secu-
rity requirements are a small part of conditions defined by these frameworks.  
1.1.3.  Laws and Methodologies 
Security requirements could be defined and forced by regulations or law. The most 
famous example of regulation related to information security area is the General 
Data Protection Regulation (EU regulation 2016). 
Some international associations proposed methodologies and framework, 
which would help an organization to satisfy the requirements defined by infor-
mation security defined documents.  
Trying to protect the personal information of a European Union citizen, the 
European Union published the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter 
GDPR). This document is a data protection law, which in high level, defines how 
EU residents’ personal information must be stored, handled and processed. From 
the 25th of May 2018, this law is mandatory for all organizations working with 
EU citizens’ and EU residents’ data. GDPR has superseded the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC.  
According to the GDPR, any organization is obligated to apply a risk-based 
approach and ensure a sufficient level of protection for EU residents’ personal 
data. GDPR “personal data” definition states that: “any information relating to an 
person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to 
an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, online iden-
tifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that person”. 
GDPR separated the responsibilities and duties of data Controllers and Pro-
cessors. Controllers are defined as “the natural or legal person, public authority, 
agency or another body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the pur-
poses and means of the processing of personal data;” and Processors means:           
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“a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or another body which pro-
cesses personal data on behalf of the controller”. Controllers and Processors are 
required to “implement appropriate technical and organizational measures” taking 
into account “the state of the art and the costs of implementation” and “the nature, 
scope, context, and purposes of the processing as well as the risk of varying like-
lihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of individuals” (EU regulation 
2016). 
From the Security point of view for data protection, GDPR requires to apply 
controls appropriate to the risk. The Law itself suggests: The pseudonymization 
and/or encryption of personal data; The ability to ensure ongoing confidentiality, 
integrity, availability and resilience of systems and services processing personal 
data; The ability to restore the availability and access to data in a timely manner 
in the event of a physical or technical incident; A process for regularly testing, 
assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of technical and organizational 
measures for ensuring the security of the processing. 
Organizations need to implement controls, which would cover below-
highlighted security areas, to achieve the following: identity and access manage-
ment; data loss prevention; encryption & pseudonymization; incident response 
plan; 3rd party risk management; policy management. 
GDPR breach could lead to the financial fines equal to the greater of 10 mil-
lion € or 2% of the entity's global gross revenue for violations of record-keeping, 
security, breach notification, and privacy impact assessment obligations. Obliga-
tions related to the legal justification for processing data subject rights, and cross-
border data transfers may result in penalties of the greater of 20 million € or 4% 
of the entity's global gross revenue. 
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (hereinafter – 
COBIT) (ISACA 2013) is the methodology developed by the Information Sys-
tems Audit and Control Association and defining Information technology man-
agement, Information technology security and Information technology audit prin-
ciples. COBIT v5 was released in 2012. At the end of 2018, COBIT presented a 
new version of COBIT framework – COBIT 2019. According to ISACA COBIT 
2019, based on COBIT 5 and other authoritative sources. COBIT aligned with 
many related documents and frameworks. From a Security implementation point 
of view it should be  highlighted that COBIT 2019 is aligned with such documents 
as ISO27000 standards series, The CIS Critical Security Controls for Effective 
Cyber Defence (Center for Information Security 2018), COSO framework, NIST 
special publications (800-37 and 800-53), HITRUST Common Security Frame-
work v. 9 (HITRUST 2018). According to COBIT 2019 (ISACA 2019), the gov-
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fundamental purpose and areas of Governance objectives arranged in the:         
(Fig. 1.2): 
− Evaluate, Direct and Monitor (EDM) domain. In this domain, the govern-
ing body evaluates strategic options, directs senior management on the 
chosen strategic options and monitors the achievement of the strategy. 
Management objectives grouped into four domains: 
− Align, Plan and Organize (APO) addresses the overall organization, strat-
egy and supporting activities for I&T; 
− Build, Acquire and Implement (BAI) treats the definition, acquisition and 
implementation of I&T solutions and their integration in business pro-
cesses; 
− Deliver, Service and Support (DSS) addresses the operational delivery 
and support of I&T services, including security; 
− Monitor, Evaluate and Assess (MEA) addresses performance monitoring 
and conformance of I&T with internal performance targets, internal con-
trol objectives and external requirements. 
EDM processes are owned by senior management and related to 
organizational strategy and developmental direction.   
Other four processes are supportive processes, which allow achieving an 
organization’s goals and strategies. Each group defines subgroups, which are re-
sponsible for specific process implementation, and each subgroup establishes a 
list of IT controls used to obtain and evaluate requirements outlined and applicable 
for this group. 
Such an approach allows COBIT methodology to interpret and assess all IT 
processes within an organization and ensure that information security impact on 
IT processes is within the scope and analyzed during implementation. 
Trying to make COBIT framework more attractive to small/medium sized 
business COBIT 2019 added to scope such new focus areas as CyberSecurity, 
Digital transformation, Cloud computing, Privacy and DevOps. Also, COBIT 
2019 highlights new factors that can influence the design of an enterprise’s gov-
ernance system and position organizations for success in the use of information 
and technology (ISACA 2013). These include enterprise strategy; enterprise 
goals; risk profile; enterprise size; threat landscape; compliance requirements; 
role of IT; sourcing model for IT; IT implementation methods; technology adop-
tion strategy. 
These design factors take into account enterprise strategy and allow users to 
better customise COBIT to a specific organizational structure. 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(hereinafter COSO) Internal Control – Integrated Framework (COSO 2013) and 
COSO Enterprise Risk Management Framework (COSO 2004) were developed 
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to help organizations to verify the effectiveness of their internal controls and, if  
needed, to improve them. COSO framework orientation to internal controls allows 
the organization to use them to satisfy SOX requirements.  
According to COSO, all organization employees, including senior manage-
ment, are responsible for internal controls implementation. COSO defines 3 main 
areas which are impacting overall internal control effectiveness (Fig. 1.3): opera-
tions; reporting and compliance. 
 
Fig. 1.3. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
framework approach (COSO 2013) 
COSO methodology defines five key components, which allow ensuring the 
appropriate level of effectiveness: control environment; risk assessment; control 
activities; information and communication; monitoring. 
COSO methodology is more oriented to the organization’s processes and im-
plemented internal controls. However, information security is only a small part of 
all controls which are implemented and processes which are running in the organ-
ization. Because of that, COSO frameworks are much broader, and from the per-
spective of security controls, implementation is not so detailed. 
1.1.4. Information Security Special Publications 
Many different associations declare information security implementation 
guidelines. These documents are dedicated to  different types of organization and 
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provide advice and recommendations on how one or another security area could 
be covered or a certain problem solved. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology developed NIST SP 800-53 
special publication (NIST 800-53 2012). As was stated above, this special publi-
cation is FISMA requirements implementation guidance and provides detailed in-
formation about controls and ways how they could be applied to reduce identified 
risk or existing gap.  
The document divides all existing controls into three main categories: Low-
Impact (115 controls), Medium-Impact (159 controls) and High-Impact (170 
controls). It needs to be mentioned that the same control could be exerted in all 
three categories; it means that control impact level will depend on control applica-
bility scope. 
Special publication controls apply to such security areas as access control; 
awareness and training; audit and accountability; security assessment and 
authorization; configuration management; contingency planning; identification 
and authentication; incident response; maintenance; media protection; physical 
and environmental protection; planning; personnel security; risk assessment; sys-
tem and service acquisition; system and communications protection; system and 
information integrity.     
Revision 4 of the last publication was released on February 28, 2012. NIST 
SP 800-53revision 5 was developed, and according to existing plans it will be 
published in March 2019. Annex D. of this document provides a list of all possible 
controls, Annex F. defines recommendation how this control could be imple-
mented, and Annex H. links existing controls with ISO 27001(ISO/IEC:27001 
2013) and ISO 15408 standards. This information allows for developing security 
implementation roadmap. 
Security standard ISSA 5173 (Information Systems Security Association 
2011) was developed by the Information Systems Security Association in the 
United Kingdom in 2011. This Standard is dedicated to SME organizations and 
specifies minimum security requirements applicable to them.  
The Standard highlights three security levels which could be compared with 
Organization maturity levels, and defines mandatory requirements for each level: 
− Basic Security measures (owner/director commitment; understanding ob-
ligations; responding to security risks; essential security countermeas-
ures); 
− Defined security regime (security rules; security responsibilities; disaster 
survival plan; security oversight); 
− Managed security system (policies and procedures; management system; 
security technology; security education). 
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Even though the levels defined and requirements specified in the Standard 
are abstract and could consist of different aspects of information security, overall, 
they are in alignment with international standards presented earlier. 
NISTIR 7621 rev. 1 publication (NISTIR 7621 2016) was developed by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology and dedicated to Small Business. 
Applicability scope is similar to ISSA 5173 standard presented earlier. Small 
Business Information Security: The Fundamentals define the following six key 
components of Information: cybersecurity; privacy; physical security; contin-
gency planning & disaster; operational security; personnel security. 
A revised version of this publication provides five main security steps for 
Cybersecurity assurance; each step has a list of controls which enable to achieve 
these goals: identify (4 controls); protect (9 controls); detect (2 controls); respond 
(1 control); detect (4 controls). 
Regarding the fact, that this publication is dedicated to small business, 
requirements defined in it are granulated and assigned to the organization without 
dedicated security professionals. 
To evaluate above defined security documents, we are proposing to use such 
criteria: Document type; Industry, where security documents requirements are ap-
plicable; Amount of covered security areas; level of requirements details defined 
in the security document; Amount of separate requirements; Security documents 
requirements applicability to the SME; Security documents requirements applica-
bility to the Enterprises; Possibility to be certified, accredited regarding security 
document requirements; Obligation from regulatory to apply security document 
requirements. These criteria were chosen because they allow to  present main se-
curity documents characteristics and compare them.  
This analysis does not include Regional laws and regulations, which are dif-
ferent in each EU country and could have specific requirements applicable in the   
separate geographical region. 
The performed analysis allows concluding, that between security documents 
criteria exist direct dependencies. Like example, all acts are mandatory and define 
high-level security principles. Recommendation how defined high-level 
principles could be meet is provided in the security frameworks or low-level 
security documents, such as procedures or guidelines. In the same time could be 
concluded, that healthcare (HIPAA) and financial sectors (PCI DSS) are highly 
oriented on countermeasures related to the customer's personal data protection, 
and standards (ISO27001/ISO27002, FIPS) are more oriented on covering all 
security areas. Security documents dedicated to SME, define high-level security 
principles, however without explaining how these principles could be 
implemented (Table 1.1). 
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Organizations, which must be aligned with more than two different security 
documents, must deal with this inconsistency, if want to ensure the needed level 
of security. In SME case, it even harder, because a lot of SME do not have an 
information security department or information security expert, who would be 
able to solve such issues.    
1.2. Methods of Security Requirements 
Harmonization 
Usage of security documents is one way to enhance the security level in a com-
pany. Some documents must be met in the company to be certified and acquire 
additional possibilities (for example, if a company wants to work with payment 
cards it has to be compliant with PCI DSS standard) while the other documents 
can be used as advisory to improve the security level in the company. However, 
use of more than one document at the same time (which becomes very common 
at present) may result in duplication or even conflicts between the requirements 
of different documents (Gaşpar and Popescu 2018). Such a situation in the com-
pany can lead to inefficient use of the company’s resources during the implemen-
tation of security requirements, while the applicable components of ISMS can be 
redundant as well. Therefore, it’s imperative to ensure a clear understanding of 
requirement relations in the applicable documents to optimise the process of its 
implementation and maintenance. 
For the purpose of optimising the use of multiple security documents at the 
same time, harmonization of these documents has to be sought (Armstrong,            
et al. 2015). Harmonization is an activity that seeks to define and configure the 
most suitable harmonization strategy for achieving the strategic goals of an organ-
ization where two or more models are involved (Siviy, et al. 2008). However, it 
is noticeable that different terminology is used to address the harmonization of 
different documents in related works: harmonization, synergy, compatibility, etc. 
(Pardo, et al. 2012). All these terms are related. Nevertheless, they have a specific 
meaning in this context. Four different techniques can be identified to  associate 
controls of different documents, which imply the use of different terms (Souag,  
et al. 2012): 
− Semantic compatibility means achieving document harmonization 
through the same terminology. These methods attempt to unify the ter-
minology in different documents eliminating any misunderstanding and 
establishing the relations between separate controls by the same terms 
(Aviad, Wecel and Abramowicz 2015). It can be a difficult task to asso-
ciate controls of documents by terminology because the analysis must 
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take into account both terminology and context it is used in, while differ-
ent document structure and other properties in documents require more 
advantaged technologies to do it in a right way;  
− Mapping is one of the most popular techniques used to harmonize differ-
ent documents. It attempts to compare different documents and make 
links between different concepts, controls, structures, etc. The result of 
mapping two documents usually are shown in a table of matches between 
these documents, which indicates which parts of these documents match 
and which parts are unique just in a certain document (Gaynor, Bass and 
Duepner 2015). However, to map more than two documents at the same 
time can be tricky and sometimes ineffective; 
− Adaptive mapping integrates selected documents automatically by using 
mapping documents for the selected document. To reduce the complexity 
and necessity of many mapping documents, one basis ontology is used 
to map all the other documents. Such an approach would require just as 
many mapping documents as there are documents that have to be inte-
grated; 
− Integration technique is used to combine a few documents into one. While 
mapping document supplies just links between documents, the 
integration creates a new document, which combines all information 
from used documents making no difference, which parts match between 
documents and which are unique for one of the documents. A user gets 
one combined document, which matches the usage of few documents in 
conjunction. However, this solution requires additional work to create it 
comparing to the document mapping. It is because elements of different 
documents must be identified as in the document mapping, while a new 
document structure and control formulations must be reasonably created 
as well. Removal or addition of the new document is difficult using this 
technique and requires an overall revision of the document. 
To achieve harmonization goals different operations could be used. Cesar 
Pardo highlights 4 main operations between models or documents in our case: 
union, intersection, difference and complement (C. Pardo, et al. 2012). 
According to author intersection is the identification process of the common 
elements between two models. In other words, identification of the similarities 
which are presented in both models or documents. The union is the process of the 
merging two models or documents. Union allows us to ensure, that the union of 
sets consist of all the elements of two models or documents. Differences are the 
process of identification of the elements, which are presented only in the one 
model or document. The complement is the list of all differences between models 
or documents (Fig. 1.4).  
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Fig. 1.4. Relationship between the set of operations, methods and technique 
harmonization (C. Pardo, et al. 2012)  
As we can see, different techniques are using a different set of operations. 
Like example, mapping is oriented on intersections (similarities) and difference 
identification, and Integration is more oriented on union operation. 
Table 1.2. Comparison of properties of different document harmonization techniques 
(Created by author) 
Technique 
Number of 
documents for 
harmonising n 
documents 
Number of records for 
harmonizing n documents 
in one document 
Usage examples 
Semantic 
compati-
bility 
From 1 to  
n(n-1)/2 
Same as the number of 
synonyms in these docu-
ments 
ISO standard family 
(ISO/IEC:27001 2013) 
Mapping From 1 to  n(n-1) 
Up to m1+m2, where m1 is 
a number of controls in the 
first document and m2 – in 
second 
(Hofherr 2011), (Pardo, 
et al. 2012) 
Adaptive 
mapping N 
Up to m, where m is a 
number of controls in the 
document 
(Ramanauskaite, Olifer, 
et al. 2013) 
Integration 1 
Up to ∑mi, where mi is a 
number of controls in the 
i-th document 
(Ahuja, Goldman 
2009), (IT Governance 
Institute 2008) 
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All mentioned harmonization techniques have different properties and usage 
area (see Table 1.2 and Table 1.3). However, the adaptive mapping solution com-
bines all other harmonization techniques and allows using all the benefits it gives: 
− harmonizing n documents exactly n mapping documents have to be cre-
ated (less than in mapping technique); 
− the integrated document can be regenerated automatically changing the 
list of harmonizing documents and the base of view (more flexible than 
integration technique); 
− mapping document to ontology context of the class can be represented 
(this task for semantic analysis can be more difficult to achieve). 
1.3. Existing Security Ontologies  
Security becomes fundamental in our society, and the survival of organizations 
depends on the correct management of modern security elements (Dhillon and 
Backhouse 2000). As the security area is extensive and has many relations be-
tween its concepts, usage of security ontology could improve unambiguity of se-
curity knowledge description in information systems (Kim and Lee 2016), (Kim, 
et al. 2016). The necessity of security ontology can be noticed in various security 
communities and considered as a significant challenge and a research branch 
(Mouratidis and Giorgini, Integrating Security and Software Engineering: 
Advances and Future Visions 2006), (Donner 2003), (Tsoumas and Gritzalis 
2006), (Wang, Wang and Wang 2016). 
In small and medium enterprises, the knowledge database of the security area 
and its unambiguity is critical in formal or legal activities, such as certification, 
standard compliance, etc. In many cases, organizations have to meet specific se-
curity requirements from different sources, which may be redundant or overlap-
ping by simultaneous usage . Therefore, security document mapping should be 
put into practice in cases where more than one security document has to be met. 
The mapping of security documents allows the optimisation of resources by indi-
cating matching elements of documents and by eliminating duplicated activities 
and security measures to achieve it (Guan, Yang and Wang 2016). However, 
mapping of security documents can be complicated if more than two documents 
have to be mapped. 
An ontology defines the basic terms and relations compromising the vocab-
ulary of a topic area as well as the rules for combining terms and relations to 
identify extensions to the glossary (Gomez-Perez, Fernandez-Lopez and Corcho 
2004). By decreasing language ambiguity and structuring transferred data, the 
ontology provides better communication, reusability and organization of 
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All mentioned harmonization techniques have different properties and usage 
area (see Table 1.2 and Table 1.3). However, the adaptive mapping solution com-
bines all other harmonization techniques and allows using all the benefits it gives: 
− harmonizing n documents exactly n mapping documents have to be cre-
ated (less than in mapping technique); 
− the integrated document can be regenerated automatically changing the 
list of harmonizing documents and the base of view (more flexible than 
integration technique); 
− mapping document to ontology context of the class can be represented 
(this task for semantic analysis can be more difficult to achieve). 
1.3. Existing Security Ontologies  
Security becomes fundamental in our society, and the survival of organizations 
depends on the correct management of modern security elements (Dhillon and 
Backhouse 2000). As the security area is extensive and has many relations be-
tween its concepts, usage of security ontology could improve unambiguity of se-
curity knowledge description in information systems (Kim and Lee 2016), (Kim, 
et al. 2016). The necessity of security ontology can be noticed in various security 
communities and considered as a significant challenge and a research branch 
(Mouratidis and Giorgini, Integrating Security and Software Engineering: 
Advances and Future Visions 2006), (Donner 2003), (Tsoumas and Gritzalis 
2006), (Wang, Wang and Wang 2016). 
In small and medium enterprises, the knowledge database of the security area 
and its unambiguity is critical in formal or legal activities, such as certification, 
standard compliance, etc. In many cases, organizations have to meet specific se-
curity requirements from different sources, which may be redundant or overlap-
ping by simultaneous usage . Therefore, security document mapping should be 
put into practice in cases where more than one security document has to be met. 
The mapping of security documents allows the optimisation of resources by indi-
cating matching elements of documents and by eliminating duplicated activities 
and security measures to achieve it (Guan, Yang and Wang 2016). However, 
mapping of security documents can be complicated if more than two documents 
have to be mapped. 
An ontology defines the basic terms and relations compromising the vocab-
ulary of a topic area as well as the rules for combining terms and relations to 
identify extensions to the glossary (Gomez-Perez, Fernandez-Lopez and Corcho 
2004). By decreasing language ambiguity and structuring transferred data, the 
ontology provides better communication, reusability and organization of 
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knowledge (Gruber 1995), (Dobson and Sawyer 2006), (Fernandez-Breis and 
Martiinez-Bejar 2002), (Gruninger and Lee 2002). 
Security ontology can be used to simplify the mapping of more than two se-
curity documents (Ramanauskaite, Goranin, et al. 2013). The ontology could act 
as a basis for document knowledge formalisation and would allow adaptive map-
ping of any documents, mapped to the ontology.  
Existing security ontologies vary according to the described area and level of 
detail (Karande 2015). One of the first works mentioning information system 
knowledge concepts concerning security was published in 1990 by J. Mylopoulos 
et al. The paper “Telos: Representing Knowledge about Information Systems” 
(Mylopoulos, et al. 1990) describes a Telos language to describe the knowledge 
about information systems and suggests it can be employed for security specifica-
tion as well. C. E. Landwehr et al. in 1994 published a paper called “A taxonomy 
of computer program security flaws “ (Landwehr, et al. 1994) where types of 
computer program security flaws were summarised and claimed it could be used 
for an introduction to the characteristics of security flaws and their origins              
A. Avizienis et al. also proposed a taxonomy, concerning security concepts 
(Avizienis, et al. 2004). This taxonomy describes more abstract and full concepts 
than C. E. Landwehr et al. provided; however, clear relationships between cate-
gories of taxonomy are missing too.  
The need for ontology rather than taxonomy was indicated in the paper “To-
ward a Security Ontology” by M. Donner (Donner 2003). In the same year              
G. Denker et. al. presented security-related ontologies for web services and pub-
lished it in the paper “Security in the Semantic Web using OWL” (Denker, Kagalb 
and Finin 2005) while H. Mouratidis el al. published work “An Ontology for Mod-
elling Security: The Tropos Approach” (Mouratidis, Giorgini and Manson 2003) 
presenting ontology for security modelling in agent-based information systems. 
H. Mouratidis provided more works concerning security ontologies (Giorgini, 
Manson and Mouratidis 2004), (Mouratidis and Giorgini 2006) where clear ori-
entation to the use of security ontologies in software developments is noticed. Han 
presented Security vulnerability ontology used for organization issues data mining 
(Han and Yali 2015) . Venkata ontology is dedicated for security and resilience in 
the cyber-physical systems (Venkata, Kamongi and Kavi 2018). Wang and his 
colleagues proposed ontology for a defensive strategy for mobile security (Wang, 
et al. 2017). Veloudis proposed to use ontology-driven attribute-based access 
control for cloud environment and in such way ensure security-by-design 
principles (Veloudis, et al. 2019). Therefore these ontologies are meant more for 
system requirement representation rather than for basic security concepts. 
There are ontologies concentrated specifically on security requirements only. 
One of such ontologies was presented by F. Massacci (Massacci, et al. 2011). 
Other specific security ontologies are proposed by D. Geneiatakis et al. 
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(Geneiatakis and Lambrinoudakis 2007) (designed for describing Session Initia-
tion Protocol security flaws), by M. Karyda (Karyda, et al. 2006) (dedicated for 
describing applications of e-government), by J. Undercoffer et al. (Undercoffer, 
Joshi and Pinkston 2003) (designed for describing computer attacks), by A. Souag 
(Souag 2012) (designed for requirements engineering process) and by other au-
thors. A. Kim extended specific ontologies and created one which can be applied 
to any electronic resource (Kim, Lou and Kang 2005). However, this ontology 
does not overlay all the concepts of information security. More detailed general 
security ontologies were proposed by A. Herzog et al. (Herzog, Shahmehri and 
Duma 2007) and S. Fenz et al. (Fenz and Ekelhart 2009). 
Security ontology, proposed by Herzog et al., represents the information se-
curity domain that includes both general concepts and specific vocabulary of the 
domain. The proposed ontology has four high-level concepts: assets, threats, vul-
nerabilities and countermeasures. The ontology overviews and analyses the infor-
mation security domain in a context-independent and application neutral manner. 
Similar properties apply to security ontology proposed by S. Fenz et al. however, 
it covers more concepts, including non-core concepts such as the infrastructure of 
organizations. The main top-level concepts in this ontology are assets, control, 
organization, threat and vulnerability. 
While S. Fenz security ontology includes concepts of several security docu-
ments (ISO 27001, Grundschutz (Federal Office for Information Security 2005)), 
one more version of S. Fenz’s security ontology will be analysed in this study 
(hereinafter S. Fenz (raw)). All classes and elements of security documents will 
be excluded from S. Fenz’s ontology, relying solely on raw concepts of ontology 
security.  
The general comparison of security ontologies, the total number of different 
ontology elements, the depth and branching metric of the ontology tree are put 
into contrast. These metrics were gathered by an OWL ontology editor SWOOP 
(University of Maryland 2009). The data obtained using this tool are presented in 
Table 1.4. 
The purpose of ontology usage inflicts on the number of individuals as well-
wider scope ontologies have more individuals to allow the user to choose from; 
specific purpose ontologies have less or no individuals as all individuals should 
be known or unnecessary to the user. Another important metric is the depth and 
branching factor of the ontology class tree. It defines the main properties of the 
tree structure of the ontology and can be exercised to determine how intuitive the 
ontology should be for individual users. Analysis displays that the security ontol-
ogy by A. Herzog has the most profound class structure and the most substantial 
detailing level. However, the maximum branching factor of the class tree is equal 
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knowledge (Gruber 1995), (Dobson and Sawyer 2006), (Fernandez-Breis and 
Martiinez-Bejar 2002), (Gruninger and Lee 2002). 
Security ontology can be used to simplify the mapping of more than two se-
curity documents (Ramanauskaite, Goranin, et al. 2013). The ontology could act 
as a basis for document knowledge formalisation and would allow adaptive map-
ping of any documents, mapped to the ontology.  
Existing security ontologies vary according to the described area and level of 
detail (Karande 2015). One of the first works mentioning information system 
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et al. The paper “Telos: Representing Knowledge about Information Systems” 
(Mylopoulos, et al. 1990) describes a Telos language to describe the knowledge 
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of computer program security flaws “ (Landwehr, et al. 1994) where types of 
computer program security flaws were summarised and claimed it could be used 
for an introduction to the characteristics of security flaws and their origins              
A. Avizienis et al. also proposed a taxonomy, concerning security concepts 
(Avizienis, et al. 2004). This taxonomy describes more abstract and full concepts 
than C. E. Landwehr et al. provided; however, clear relationships between cate-
gories of taxonomy are missing too.  
The need for ontology rather than taxonomy was indicated in the paper “To-
ward a Security Ontology” by M. Donner (Donner 2003). In the same year              
G. Denker et. al. presented security-related ontologies for web services and pub-
lished it in the paper “Security in the Semantic Web using OWL” (Denker, Kagalb 
and Finin 2005) while H. Mouratidis el al. published work “An Ontology for Mod-
elling Security: The Tropos Approach” (Mouratidis, Giorgini and Manson 2003) 
presenting ontology for security modelling in agent-based information systems. 
H. Mouratidis provided more works concerning security ontologies (Giorgini, 
Manson and Mouratidis 2004), (Mouratidis and Giorgini 2006) where clear ori-
entation to the use of security ontologies in software developments is noticed. Han 
presented Security vulnerability ontology used for organization issues data mining 
(Han and Yali 2015) . Venkata ontology is dedicated for security and resilience in 
the cyber-physical systems (Venkata, Kamongi and Kavi 2018). Wang and his 
colleagues proposed ontology for a defensive strategy for mobile security (Wang, 
et al. 2017). Veloudis proposed to use ontology-driven attribute-based access 
control for cloud environment and in such way ensure security-by-design 
principles (Veloudis, et al. 2019). Therefore these ontologies are meant more for 
system requirement representation rather than for basic security concepts. 
There are ontologies concentrated specifically on security requirements only. 
One of such ontologies was presented by F. Massacci (Massacci, et al. 2011). 
Other specific security ontologies are proposed by D. Geneiatakis et al. 
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(Geneiatakis and Lambrinoudakis 2007) (designed for describing Session Initia-
tion Protocol security flaws), by M. Karyda (Karyda, et al. 2006) (dedicated for 
describing applications of e-government), by J. Undercoffer et al. (Undercoffer, 
Joshi and Pinkston 2003) (designed for describing computer attacks), by A. Souag 
(Souag 2012) (designed for requirements engineering process) and by other au-
thors. A. Kim extended specific ontologies and created one which can be applied 
to any electronic resource (Kim, Lou and Kang 2005). However, this ontology 
does not overlay all the concepts of information security. More detailed general 
security ontologies were proposed by A. Herzog et al. (Herzog, Shahmehri and 
Duma 2007) and S. Fenz et al. (Fenz and Ekelhart 2009). 
Security ontology, proposed by Herzog et al., represents the information se-
curity domain that includes both general concepts and specific vocabulary of the 
domain. The proposed ontology has four high-level concepts: assets, threats, vul-
nerabilities and countermeasures. The ontology overviews and analyses the infor-
mation security domain in a context-independent and application neutral manner. 
Similar properties apply to security ontology proposed by S. Fenz et al. however, 
it covers more concepts, including non-core concepts such as the infrastructure of 
organizations. The main top-level concepts in this ontology are assets, control, 
organization, threat and vulnerability. 
While S. Fenz security ontology includes concepts of several security docu-
ments (ISO 27001, Grundschutz (Federal Office for Information Security 2005)), 
one more version of S. Fenz’s security ontology will be analysed in this study 
(hereinafter S. Fenz (raw)). All classes and elements of security documents will 
be excluded from S. Fenz’s ontology, relying solely on raw concepts of ontology 
security.  
The general comparison of security ontologies, the total number of different 
ontology elements, the depth and branching metric of the ontology tree are put 
into contrast. These metrics were gathered by an OWL ontology editor SWOOP 
(University of Maryland 2009). The data obtained using this tool are presented in 
Table 1.4. 
The purpose of ontology usage inflicts on the number of individuals as well-
wider scope ontologies have more individuals to allow the user to choose from; 
specific purpose ontologies have less or no individuals as all individuals should 
be known or unnecessary to the user. Another important metric is the depth and 
branching factor of the ontology class tree. It defines the main properties of the 
tree structure of the ontology and can be exercised to determine how intuitive the 
ontology should be for individual users. Analysis displays that the security ontol-
ogy by A. Herzog has the most profound class structure and the most substantial 
detailing level. However, the maximum branching factor of the class tree is equal 
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to 83, which may result in human users facing difficulties while viewing the on-
tology. Ontology by S. Fenz should be difficult to visualize as well because of its 
branching factor. 
Table 1.4. Data of general comparison of security ontologies (Created by author) 
Property 
Ontology 
G. Denker A. Herzog S. Fenz 
S. 
Fenz 
(raw) 
Total number of classes 39 460 641 311 
Total number of data types properties 0 7 16 14 
Total number of object properties 12 30 58 58 
Total number of annotation properties 2 4 10 10 
Total number of individuals 117 211 486 478 
Number of sub-classes 11 571 1051 409 
Max. depth of the class tree 4 8 6 6 
Min. depth of the class tree 1 1 1 1 
Avg. depth of the class tree 1.4 4.1 3.0 3.2 
Max. branching factor of the class 
tree 27 83 199 114 
Min. branching factor of the class 
tree 1 1 1 1 
Avg. branching factor of the class 
tree 7.6 3.2 3.9 14.5 
 
As it was mentioned, S. Fenz, G. Denker and A. Herzog ontologies have dif-
ferent goals and are oriented on different information security aspects. However, 
from an analysis point of view, it is important to understand how dissimilar they 
are. To do that, we will be using the Jaccard distance metric (Table 1.5). 
Table 1.5. Ontologies similarity verification results (Created by author) 
Ontologies Jaccard index Jaccard distance 
S. Fenz (raw) and G. Denker 4.77 95.23 
A. Herzog and G. Denker 8.16 91.83 
S. Fenz (raw) and A. Herzog 33.26 66.74 
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  Analysis showing that the lowest similarity levels are between G. Denker 
and other authors ontologies. Such results are predictable, because of specific of 
G. Denker ontology. This ontology has the lowest amount of ontology compo-
nents (classes, individuals) and is oriented to the interface between various nota-
tions of security documents. S. Fenz and A. Herzog ontologies are oriented on 
overall security assurance. However A. Herzog ontology with a high level of de-
tails define network security and data encryption components.   
A general comparison of security ontologies gives just some key quantitative 
metrics, while the quality of ontology is not taken into account. OntoMetric 
(Lozano-Tello and Gomez-Perez 2004) is a method for ontology quality measure-
ment. This method compares ontologies into five dimensions: 
− the ontologies content and the contents of the organization;  
− the language in which it is implemented;  
− the methodology that has been followed to develop it;  
− the software tools used to build and edit the ontology;  
− the costs that the ontology will require in an individual project and 
measures all the characteristics from 1 to 5 according to their low or high 
degree of accomplishment. 
While all ontologies studied are written in the same file format, the content 
metrics were analyzed separately (metric of language, tools and costs should be 
equal, because all the ontologies studied are written in OWL files, while the 
development process of ontology does not have significant influence on its usage 
and is  unknown to us). According to OntoMetric, the content of ontology can be 
defined by four factors: concepts; relations; taxonomy; axioms. 
OntoMetric evaluation is qualitative by nature. All mentioned security 
ontologies were analysed for presenting the broadest security area possible. The 
imagination of ideal security ontology is vital to evaluate the concept factor in 
OntoMetric analysis as this measurement should provide information on how well 
the ontology covers the security area. 
Other factors in OntoMetric analysis are more relative and describe how well 
the relations, taxonomy and axioms are defined in the ontology, not the whole 
security area.  
The OntoMetrix analysis shows that G. Danker’s ontology has the lowest 
scores, while S. Fenz’s and A. Herzog’s ontologies have similar scores. The anal-
ysis also reveals the level of detail and provides a wide range of security concepts. 
However, the data of OntoMetric analysis does not show differences between       
S. Fenz and A. Herzog. 
All data of our OntoMetrix analysis are presented in Table 1.6. 
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overall security assurance. However A. Herzog ontology with a high level of de-
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− the language in which it is implemented;  
− the methodology that has been followed to develop it;  
− the software tools used to build and edit the ontology;  
− the costs that the ontology will require in an individual project and 
measures all the characteristics from 1 to 5 according to their low or high 
degree of accomplishment. 
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and is  unknown to us). According to OntoMetric, the content of ontology can be 
defined by four factors: concepts; relations; taxonomy; axioms. 
OntoMetric evaluation is qualitative by nature. All mentioned security 
ontologies were analysed for presenting the broadest security area possible. The 
imagination of ideal security ontology is vital to evaluate the concept factor in 
OntoMetric analysis as this measurement should provide information on how well 
the ontology covers the security area. 
Other factors in OntoMetric analysis are more relative and describe how well 
the relations, taxonomy and axioms are defined in the ontology, not the whole 
security area.  
The OntoMetrix analysis shows that G. Danker’s ontology has the lowest 
scores, while S. Fenz’s and A. Herzog’s ontologies have similar scores. The anal-
ysis also reveals the level of detail and provides a wide range of security concepts. 
However, the data of OntoMetric analysis does not show differences between       
S. Fenz and A. Herzog. 
All data of our OntoMetrix analysis are presented in Table 1.6. 
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Table 1.6. OntoMetric analysis data of the ontologies content and the contents of the   
organization (Created by author) 
Characteristic 
Ontology 
G. Denker A. Herzog S. Fenz S. Fenz (raw) 
Concepts (factor) 2 4 4 4 
Relations (factor) 3 3 3 3 
Taxonomy (factor) 2 3 3 3 
Axioms (factor) 2 4 4 4 
 
While comparing the differences in S. Fenz’s and A. Herzog’s ontologies, it 
can be noticed that the ontology created by A. Herzog has more of a theoretical 
approach compared to the ontology of S. Fenz and describes more definitions, 
formal concepts of the information security area. S. Fenz’s ontology provides 
more information on the practical side of information security, by listing basic 
controls as a guide for security administrators for system security assurance. How-
ever, it does not mention concepts related to organizational security. 
1.4. Security Ontologies as Foundation for Mapping 
Techniques 
To ensure security in an organization, security documents or best practices can be 
employed. In some cases, compliance with a particular security document is even 
required to obtain privileges to supply or to get different services (Guan, Yang 
and Wang 2016).  
However, when an organization uses more than one security document, map-
ping or integration of security document usage should be done to avoid redundant 
activities, not optimal resource management, unnecessary outlays, etc. Integration 
or direct mapping of security documents are  both time and knowledge consuming 
endeavour as well as a very static activity (everything has to be redone when a 
document has to be removed or added) (Souag, Salinesi and Isabelle 2015).  
Adaptive mapping of security documents provides more flexibility to change the 
list of used documents as well as requires less work to map a more significant 
number of documents as each document has to be allocated to ontology only 
(Fenz, Plieschnegger and Hobel 2019). Therefore, n mapping activities have to be 
done to map n documents instead of n×(n – 1) mappings for direct mapping. The 
process of adaptive mapping and integrated document generation is presented in 
Fig. 1.5. 
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In this example (Fig. 1.6), a control in ISO 27001 (A.8.3.3_Removal_of_ac-
cess_righ...) and control in PCI DSS (PCI_DSS_8_5_4) standards are mapped 
with the same links to the security ontology (control in one document has the same 
relations to concepts of security document as a control in another document). As 
these two controls have no differences in mapping, the full match relation between 
these two controls of different documents can be generated. One more control of 
ISO 27001 standard (A.11.2.1_User_registration) is presented in this example to 
illustrate relevantly (not matching) controls. These two controls of ISO 27001 se-
curity standard define situations where the vulnerability of non-blocked unneces-
sary accounts or terminals can be exploited. However, both ISO 27001 controls 
have more links to different concepts of security ontology. Therefore, these two 
ISO 27001 controls cannot be treated as equal, but are still relevant on certain 
levels. This kind of information can be used to analyze security documents and to 
optimise resource usage when multiple security documents have to be met in an 
organization. 
 
Fig. 1.6. Example of document mapping trough ontology (Created by author) 
The ontology and standards concept coverage were analysed to compare 
which security ontology is more suitable for adaptive security documents mapping 
and adaptive mapping. A. Herzog’s and S. Fenz’s ontologies (Fenz and Neubauer 
2018) were mapped with: 
− ISO27001 (ISO/IEC:27001 2013) – the most popular security standard, 
which was created according to the British Security standard BS7799. 
This standard practically covers all security areas, provides certification 
opportunity and is widely recognised; 
− PCI DSS (PCI 2016) – security standard developed by such worldwide 
organizations as Visa, MasterCard, American Express, Discover and 
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JCB. This standard has been developed to ensure cardholder information 
protection and is a “Must-have” for all organizations who handle debit, 
credit, prepaid and other cards. Otherwise, these organizations are for-
bidden to use Visa, MasterCard, American Express and other cards; 
− ISSA 5173 (Information Systems Security Association 2011) – security 
standard for SME (Small Medium Enterprise). Although this standard 
has not been approved or officially recognised, it describes the main se-
curity requirements which need to be implemented in any organization; 
− NISTIR 7621 (NIST, NISTIR 7621 Rev. 1, Small Business Information 
Security 2016) – special publication, developed by the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology. The document clearly defines which ac-
tions are “necessary” for information, systems and networks protection. 
It also provides best practices on the needed security level implementa-
tion. 
Data on links between these security standards are presented in a static form 
for two specific standards (as a table with matching controls between two security 
documents (Ramanauskaite, Goranin, et al. 2013)) mostly. S. Fenz was the first 
to have mapped ISO 27001 and Grundschutz (Federal Office for Information 
Security 2005) security standards to his ontology. He used this mapping for pur-
poses of automated risk and utility management (Fenz 2010). However, this in-
formation can also be used for document adaptive mapping. S. Fenz mapped two 
standards only. Therefore links can only be generated between ISO 27001 and 
Grundschutz security. 
All controls in all four chosen standards were analysed and mapped to related 
concepts in S. Fenz’s and A. Herzog’s security ontologies. The mapping of secu-
rity standards was performed by mapping the lowest level concepts (usually it 
precise control, which is the requirement for the organization), while the classes 
in security standards, used for the presentation of the class hierarchy were not 
accounted for as mapping objects. 
The process of security standard mapping to security ontologies revealed dif-
ferences between the analysed ontologies as well. The biggest part of mapping 
links in S. Fenz’s ontology is straightforward – one requirement of the standard 
has an equal or very similar control in S. Fenz’s ontology. This type of mapping 
links is direct and easy to understand for individual users. However, the controls 
have to be detailed by other relationships between different concepts of the ontol-
ogy. Otherwise, it will be challenging to define relations between standards con-
trols, clustering, etc. 
Meanwhile, mapping security standards according to A. Herzog’s ontology 
was done from logical structure standpoint – one requirement of security standard 
is to have several links to ontology, by describing which concepts of ontology are 
related to this requirement (by defining what and how one has to do or use to 
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is to have several links to ontology, by describing which concepts of ontology are 
related to this requirement (by defining what and how one has to do or use to 
38 1. INFORMATION SECURITY REQUIREMENTS HARMONIZATION, ANALYSIS…  
 
protect against specific threat or vulnerability). This type of mapping requires 
more mapping links and has the potential to be easier to cluster controls of security 
standards into relevant groups. This type of mapping would be more understand-
able to information systems; however, it would require more analysis or 
visualizing tools for people to understand links between two security standards, 
mapped through ontology this way. 
Summarizing the security document mapping process to security ontologies:  
S. Fenz’s ontology can be used to simplify the mapping of security standards 
because all the most critical concepts for mapping are described as a list of classes, 
while in A. Herzog’s ontology mapped classes have more links to ontology and 
provide more analysis and application possibilities after the mapping is 
accomplished. 
Table 1.7. Amount and percentage of security ontology entities mapped with security re-
quirements of the standards (Covered) and amount and percentage of security require-
ments of the standard mapped to the security ontology (Covers) (Created by author) 
Standard 
Ontology / Standard coverage 
S. Fenz A. Herzog 
Covered Covers Covered Covers 
ISO27001 35/311 (11%) 
23/133 
(17%) 
26/460 
(6%) 
19/133 
(14%) 
PCI DSS 42/311 (14%) 
48/165 
(29%) 
25/460 
(5%) 
32/165 
(19%) 
ISSA 5173 31/311 (10%) 
7/12 
(58%) 
29/460 
(6%) 
6/12 
(50%) 
NISTIR 
7621 
14/311 
(5%) 
8/10 
(80%) 
21/460 
(5%) 
8/10 
(80%) 
 
Analyzed ontologies and security documents mapped to them were verified 
to identify how they are covering each other requirements. To do that, two addi-
tional metrics “Covered” and “Covers” were calculated. “Covered” metrics show-
ing the amount of ontology entities which could be linked with a specific standard. 
Like example, S. Fenz ontology has 311 entities. Only 35 of them could be linked 
with ISO 27001 standard and with PCI DSS standard could be linked 42 of             
S. Fenz ontology entities. “Covers” metrics showing the amount of security doc-
uments requirements which could be linked with specific ontology. Like example, 
ISO 27001 standard has 133 requirements, and only 23 of them could be linked 
with S. Fenz ontology entities. Form PCI DSS point of view only 48 requirements 
could be linked with S. Fenz entities. Amount of “Covered” and “Covers” are 
different, because of the level of details in ontology and security documents. It 
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leads to the situation when a few requirements, could be linked to the same ontol-
ogy entity and vice versus a few ontology entities are linked to the same security 
document requirement In Table 1.7, data on ontology coverage by standard (cov-
ered) and standard coverage by ontology (covers) are provided. The column “cov-
ered” defines what part of security ontology was used to map a certain standard 
while the column “covers” defines what percentage of security standard was 
mapped to the security ontology. The property “covers” is more important in this 
research as it provides information on how well the ontology is capable of 
presenting certain security standards in the knowledge database. 
The analysis of security ontology and standard coverage revealed that 
ontologies of A. Herzog and S. Fenz are not capable to fully cover any of the 
analyzed security standards: only security standards with a small number of 
controls or requirements can be mapped with security ontology to include more 
than 50% of standard controls; security standards with more than 100 controls or 
requirements cannot be mapped to A. Herzog’s and S. Fenz’s security ontologies 
to cover more than 30% of standard controls or requirements. It shows the fact 
that these two security ontologies do not have all the necessary concepts to be 
fully mapped to security standards. 
The analysis of concepts of security ontologies to be employed to map secu-
rity standard has revealed that just a small part (5 – 18%) of classes from A. Her-
zog’s and S. Fenz’s ontologies are mapped directly to security standards. This 
number could be improved by providing a more detailed concept of relationship. 
However, it allows defining what part of ontology is directly related to concepts, 
mentioned in security standards. 
Security ontology created by S. Fenz was able to cover a more substantial 
part of analysed security standards compared to A. Harz’s ontology. The most 
significant difference (29% and 19%) was noticed in the PCI DSS standard. It 
could be an argument to choose S. Fenz’s security ontology if a company is work-
ing with PCI DSS standards, while coverage differences for other analysed 
standards are minor. However, covering 29% of the PCI DSS standard is not 
enough to represent it. A new security ontology with more security concepts could 
help to improve the situation and would allow mapping of more prominent parts 
of security standards. 
1.5. Visualization of Harmonized Security 
Documents for Further Analysis  
Usage of mapped security documents can be simplified if the intuitive and in-
formative graphical user interface is designed to analyse mapped documents. 
Visualizations are tools used to express both the structure of the data and cognitive 
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Visualizations are tools used to express both the structure of the data and cognitive 
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mapping of the user observing and interacting with this data (Tversky and 
Simonson 1993). By default, one security document is usually presented as a 
graph or tree structure, and in some cases, cliques are derived from these graphs 
(networks or subnetworks). While mapping information between two or more 
documents is presented as a table, where controls of one document are shown in 
one column, and controls of other document are given in another column. The 
mapping information is obtained by identifying rows with controls in both docu-
ments. Any methods or tools for graphical presentation of mapped security docu-
ments were found. However, some visualization ideas for overlapping or similar 
networks in other areas than document mapping exists, which can be adopted for 
the visualization of document mapping (Wielebski and Medynska-Gulij 2018).  
David C. Y. Fung et al. proposed to use 2.5D visualization of overlapping 
biological networks (Fung, et al. 2008) where three parallel two dimensional 
planes are placed in three dimensions to represent overlapping networks: one for 
each network (the top and the bottom planes) and one for the overlapping part (in 
the middle plane) see Fig. 1.7. This approach allows identifying overlapped nodes 
very visually but has some limitations – it would be difficult to visualize more 
than two networks or documents as links from one document to another can cross 
other documents and be confused with document nodes between these two. 
 
 
Fig. 1.7. The idea of 2.5D visualization of overlapping biological networks             
(Fung, et al. 2008) 
Patrick M. Dudas et al. proposes a semi-supervised approach for visualizing 
and manipulating overlapping communities, where the 3D model is used (Dudas, 
de Jongh and Brusilovsky 2013). This model takes into account the potential num-
ber of edges between nodes. Therefore they reduced overlap and the number of 
connections by creating a single vertex for each clique as a marker for the entire 
clique. This idea was used for visualization of mapped security documents. 
Mapped nodes would be presented in the smaller group as one, combined node. 
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This solution helps to observe similar controls in different documents. However, 
document node hierarchy is not shown in this solution (see Fig. 1.8). 
 
       
Fig. 1.8. Example of 3D visualization of overlapping communities by reducing the  
number of connections between document nodes                                                       
(Dudas, de Jongh and Brusilovsky 2013) 
There are some examples, were overlapping in the network is presented by 
other structures rather than graph or tree. For visualization of gene networks, 
Steve Horvath and Peter Langfelder use a heatmap plot of the topological overlap 
matrix (Horvath and Langfelder 2009). In the heatmap, rows and columns corre-
spond to nodes, light colours represent low topological overlap, and progressively 
darker orange and red colours represent higher topological overlap (see Fig. 1.9). 
 
 
Fig. 1.9. Example of the heatmap plot usage for overlapping matrix                         
(Horvath and Langfelder 2011). 
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This solution helps to observe similar controls in different documents. However, 
document node hierarchy is not shown in this solution (see Fig. 1.8). 
 
       
Fig. 1.8. Example of 3D visualization of overlapping communities by reducing the  
number of connections between document nodes                                                       
(Dudas, de Jongh and Brusilovsky 2013) 
There are some examples, were overlapping in the network is presented by 
other structures rather than graph or tree. For visualization of gene networks, 
Steve Horvath and Peter Langfelder use a heatmap plot of the topological overlap 
matrix (Horvath and Langfelder 2009). In the heatmap, rows and columns corre-
spond to nodes, light colours represent low topological overlap, and progressively 
darker orange and red colours represent higher topological overlap (see Fig. 1.9). 
 
 
Fig. 1.9. Example of the heatmap plot usage for overlapping matrix                         
(Horvath and Langfelder 2011). 
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This visualization method can be used to present mapping information of se-
curity documents; however, the heatmap plot can only visualize overlapping of 
two documents. 
 
Fig. 1.10. Example of Chord diagram (Telea and Ersoy 2010). 
Another idea which could be adapted for visualization of more than two doc-
uments is described in A. Telea and O. Ersoy paper “Image-Based Edge Bundles: 
Simplified Visualization of Large Graphs” (Telea and Ersoy 2010). These authors 
combine the advantages of edge bundles with a bundle-centric simplified visual 
representation of a graph’s structure. In Fig. 1.10. a simple list of nodes is 
presented; however, the required number of documents can be placed around the 
circle with all the nodes. 
1.6. Evaluation of Information Security Documents 
Implementation Costs 
From an Information security point of view, it is impossible to ensure absolute 
protection of an organization’s assets or information. Because of that, each organ-
ization must define the needed level of information and assets protection, which 
would satisfy their risk appetite, and implement security management controls, 
which would ensure such level of protection (Solic, Ocevcic and Golub 2015). 
Existing Security documents and requirements defined in such documents help to 
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achieve such a goal and ensure that an organization is implementing due diligence 
principles (Schilling, et al. 2017). 
It was already highlighted that the Information security requirements could 
be implemented in different ways, starting from the implementation of additional 
organizational controls (procedures, policies implementation) and finishing with 
complex technical solutions deployment. Li et al. (Li and Tang 2013) proposed 
four main contents of Information security Engineering, Security management; 
Communication Security; Access of Information Systems and Secure IS develop-
ment). Wangwe et al. (Wangwe, Eloff and Venter 2012) proposed to concentrate 
on the other three areas (Governance, Operational; Technical) to ensure effective 
Information security management. Some authors were focused on specific Infor-
mation security areas, starting from network security and finishing with cloud se-
curity. To protect data during client/server operation on the network, Kuo (Kuo 
2007) proposed an intelligent agent-based collaborative information security 
framework. Tsalis et al. (Tsalis, Theoharidou and Gritzalis 2013) came up with a 
suggestion on how the return of Security investments for Cloud platforms could 
be calculated. 
From a business perspective, it is essential to ensure that cost-benefit justifi-
cation for Information security investments is in focus. Such an approach allows 
organizations to provide effective and efficient IT Security budget management. 
It is imperative to ensure that incident losses, together with countermeasures/con-
trols deployment costs are lower than incident losses without countermeas-
ures/controls in place (Ungureanu 2015). Deployed controls and countermeasures 
should reduce an organization’s incident/risk probability to an acceptable level 
and appropriate cost.       
However, Information security cost-benefits assessment is complicated, be-
cause of the lack of structured cost-benefit methods and problems with comparing 
IT security solutions in light of prevailing uncertainties. This problem became 
even greater for organizations which try to implement the requirements of more 
than one Information security document. Such a situation is typical for bank sector 
organizations when they are trying to fulfil Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) re-
quirements, ISO27001 (ISO/IEC:27001 2013) and PCI DSS security standards 
(PCI 2016)  and HIPAA requirements (Mohaghegh, et al. 2018).   
An organization which is trying to implement more than two Security docu-
ments requirements is challenged to solve such issues as duplication of 
requirements in different Security documents and inefficient usage of organiza-
tion’s resources when similar security requirements are implemented in a separate 
way for each Security document. Because of that, Security cost-benefits evalua-
tion, used by such organizations, must take into account these additional re-
strictions.    
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Use of cost-benefit evaluation and Information security cost evaluation meth-
ods would let an organization identify how effective countermeasure/controls de-
ployment would be and how it would help the said organization to reduce potential 
losses in case of incident or breach. Unfortunately, the amount of cost-benefits 
evaluation and Information security evaluation methods is limited, and the 
majority of methods concentrate on processes, lifecycle steps and specific require-
ments of separate IT Security documents. Due to this reason, the existing methods 
do not cover all Information security areas and could not be easily re-used for new 
document re-evaluation.    
The primary purpose of the cost-benefits evaluation is to ensure that the costs 
spent on Information security are lower than the benefits provided by them. In our 
case, it means that Information security requirements implementation costs are 
lower than the damage caused by lack of protection. Unfortunately, Information 
security does not generate direct profits for the business. In an attempt to assess 
the benefits, organizations calculate potential losses, that could be incurred if ex-
isting controls were not in place. Cost-benefits calculation is a complicated pro-
cess. However, calculation results could be presented as a difference between the 
expected losses before countermeasures/controls deployment and after. 
Currently, there exist different proposals on how Information security cost-
benefits could be calculated. Lubich (Lubich 2006) and Mercuri (Mercuri 2003) 
propose to use the Return on Security Investments (hereinafter – ROSI) metric. 
Similar metric, Return on Investments (Eq. 1.1), is used in business to evaluate 
the benefits of the taken business solution. 
  B CROI
C
, (1.1) 
where B denotes the “Gain of investment” and C denotes the “Cost of Invest-
ment”. Information security solution returns on investments are distributed over 
time and therefore, do not provide objective value. Another metric, Net Present 
Value (Eq. 1.2), which allows comparing benefits and costs over different time 
periods, was used to solve this issue.  
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where Bt denotes the present value of net benefits of period t, Ct denotes all costs, 
I indicate the discount rate and n means the time period.  
As it was mentioned previously, Information security does not generate di-
rect benefits, because of that, this formula for Information security was modified 
by adding additional criteria (Eq. 1.3): 
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where I0 denotes the initial investment for security measure, ΔE(Lt) denotes the 
reduction in the expected loss in t, ΔOCCt denotes the decrease of opportunity 
costs in t, Ct denotes the cost of security measure in t and icalc denotes the discount 
rate. The presented model returns a positive or negative value. Investments are 
economically useful when NPV is positive and does not equal to 0.  
From the Information security point of view, some of information security 
solutions still have to be implemented even if their Net present value is negative; 
it is mostly related to implementation controls which are mandatory for accredi-
tations according to the Information security requirements. Another disadvantage 
of such calculation methods is the metric scope. Unfortunately, this metric is ap-
plied to a separate solution, requirement implementation or control implementa-
tion.  
Arora et al. (Arora et al. 2004) have proposed another framework for cost-
benefit evaluation. Their structure is more related to the organization’s risk man-
agement evaluation and costs related to it. To evaluate the cost-benefits from the 
Information security implementation, they propose calculating the Risk-based Re-
turn on Investments (Eq. 1.4): 
 (sec  ) B R C
C
R R IRROI urity solution
I
 
 , (1.4) 
where RB denotes the Baseline Risk, RR denotes the residual risk, and IC denotes 
the Implementation cost. Such calculation is closely related to the evaluation of 
security incidents and the possibility of their occurrence. The advantage of such 
methods is that it lets calculating metrics for the overall Information security area. 
The main disadvantage is that it concentrates on incidents and because of that 
could not take into account some controls which are mandatory from the regula-
tory point of view but are not closely related to the root cause of incidents           
(e.g., lack of documentation). 
As it could be seen from Return on Security Investments, Net Present value 
and Risk-based Return on Investments methods, critical points in all calculation 
are Investment costs and Implementation costs, in other words, budgets related to 
countermeasures/controls deployment. Cost-benefit methods use this component, 
however, without offering an explanation of how they should be calculated. The 
major problem with Investment costs and Implementation costs calculation meth-
ods is related to the complexity of countermeasures/controls deployment.  
Countermeasures/Controls deployment is a complex process, which involves 
the organization’s different sub-processes and their implementation, controlled by 
different teams within an organization. Security countermeasures/controls deploy-
ment is even more complicated since identified risk could be reduced in different 
ways, starting from applying organizational procedures and finishing with deploy-
ing complex technical solutions (Ivkic, Mauthe and Tauber 2019). 
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where I0 denotes the initial investment for security measure, ΔE(Lt) denotes the 
reduction in the expected loss in t, ΔOCCt denotes the decrease of opportunity 
costs in t, Ct denotes the cost of security measure in t and icalc denotes the discount 
rate. The presented model returns a positive or negative value. Investments are 
economically useful when NPV is positive and does not equal to 0.  
From the Information security point of view, some of information security 
solutions still have to be implemented even if their Net present value is negative; 
it is mostly related to implementation controls which are mandatory for accredi-
tations according to the Information security requirements. Another disadvantage 
of such calculation methods is the metric scope. Unfortunately, this metric is ap-
plied to a separate solution, requirement implementation or control implementa-
tion.  
Arora et al. (Arora et al. 2004) have proposed another framework for cost-
benefit evaluation. Their structure is more related to the organization’s risk man-
agement evaluation and costs related to it. To evaluate the cost-benefits from the 
Information security implementation, they propose calculating the Risk-based Re-
turn on Investments (Eq. 1.4): 
 (sec  ) B R C
C
R R IRROI urity solution
I
 
 , (1.4) 
where RB denotes the Baseline Risk, RR denotes the residual risk, and IC denotes 
the Implementation cost. Such calculation is closely related to the evaluation of 
security incidents and the possibility of their occurrence. The advantage of such 
methods is that it lets calculating metrics for the overall Information security area. 
The main disadvantage is that it concentrates on incidents and because of that 
could not take into account some controls which are mandatory from the regula-
tory point of view but are not closely related to the root cause of incidents           
(e.g., lack of documentation). 
As it could be seen from Return on Security Investments, Net Present value 
and Risk-based Return on Investments methods, critical points in all calculation 
are Investment costs and Implementation costs, in other words, budgets related to 
countermeasures/controls deployment. Cost-benefit methods use this component, 
however, without offering an explanation of how they should be calculated. The 
major problem with Investment costs and Implementation costs calculation meth-
ods is related to the complexity of countermeasures/controls deployment.  
Countermeasures/Controls deployment is a complex process, which involves 
the organization’s different sub-processes and their implementation, controlled by 
different teams within an organization. Security countermeasures/controls deploy-
ment is even more complicated since identified risk could be reduced in different 
ways, starting from applying organizational procedures and finishing with deploy-
ing complex technical solutions (Ivkic, Mauthe and Tauber 2019). 
46 1. INFORMATION SECURITY REQUIREMENTS HARMONIZATION, ANALYSIS…  
 
Information security costs evaluation methods directly depend on significant 
cost factors, which are involved in Information security requirements implemen-
tation. de Brujin et al. (de Bruijn and Spruit 2010) separate information security 
costs to 2 categories: One-off costs and Recurring costs. Table 1.8 presents sub-
groups of One-off and Recurring costs. 
Table 1.8. Information Security implementation costs (de Bruijn and Spruit 2010) 
Description 
One-off costs Recurring costs 
License 
Licensing cost of tool or 
product. Only applied to 
vendor-based solutions.  
Support 
Support cost from the ven-
dor. With some licensing 
schemes, a yearly fee has 
to be paid as well. 
Policies 
Policies and plans developed 
by to ensure organization in-
formation security require-
ments implementation and 
maintenance.  
Admin-
istration 
Costs for updating and 
configuring the solution. 
Reflecting changes in the 
business in the policies. 
User support (help desk) 
Hardware Hardware procurement, in-stallation and configuration.  
Monitor-
ing Monitoring the system 
Implemen-
tation 
The full process of imple-
menting the security meas-
ure. Usually, this has an 
impact on the infrastructure 
and the organization. The 
application of the security 
measure is often phased and 
can require a long term. Auditing 
Audits and tests performed 
to ensure the correct im-
plementation and workings 
of the system. 
Embed-
ding 
The embedding of the imple-
mentation in the organiza-
tion. Employees are needed 
to be hired or get training. 
Other employees might also 
need training or at least be 
notified about the changes. 
 
One-off costs generated in the planning, design and implementation stage 
and recurring costs created yearly during maintenance and support phases. Sepa-
rate costs factor calculation could be different, and some of them could be 
calculated quantitatively, whereas others would require qualitative techniques. 
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However, all below provided Information security costs evaluation methods em-
bed these costs factors during evaluation. 
Brecht et al. (Brecht and Nowey 2013) proposed information security cost 
categorisation approaches from a different Information security perspective. The 
authors categorise information security costs for such methods: 
− The Balance Sheet Oriented approach. This approach is understandable 
for management because it provides information security implementa-
tion costs in the way of IT-related budget planning. Gartner (Gartner 
2011) proposed to use four categories: Personnel Costs; Hardware; Soft-
ware and Outsourcing / Managed Security Services. Such an approach, 
even it is understandable to organization management, has some disad-
vantages. Classification of security costs into hardware and software is 
problematic because often they are part of the same solution. This ap-
proach more oriented to IT security rather than on information security; 
− The Security measure life-cycle approach. Information security solutions 
evaluated according to the Information technology lifecycle. Such ap-
proach separates information security costs between Lifecycle phases: 
costs of purchase, costs of setup, costs of operation and costs of change. 
Advantages of such a view are that every single control could be easily 
evaluated according to expenses related to it. However, such an approach 
does not involve an organizational part of information security, such as 
policies, procedures and guidelines; 
− IT-security process-oriented approach. Humpert-Vrielink et al. (Hum-
pert-Vrielink and Vrielink 2012) proposed to view the information secu-
rity costs from IT and Security points of view. The said authors categorise 
expenses into four groups such as costs for the tool; consulting costs; costs 
for operation and costs of risk. This method concentrates on a single in-
formation security requirement or control evaluation. However, it could 
be easily applied to cover requirements or controls in all needed infor-
mation security areas. The Security measure life-cycle approach, de-
scribed above, could be embedded into this method and will provide in-
come for tool costs evaluation. The proposed model is not compatible 
with standard cost account models, used by business, and because of that 
information gathering could be complicated;  
− The ISO/IEC 27001 oriented approach. The international standard ISO 
27001 is widely used around the world. Brecht and Nowey (Brecht and 
Nowey 2013) proposed to look on information security implementation 
through ISO 27001 (ISO/IEC:27001 2013) controls point of view. The 
authors separated costs into 12 controls areas defined in the standard. If 
needed, each area could be divided into sub-costs. The authors proposed 
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two additional metrics: determinability, which describes how grim the de-
termination of the related costs is in practice, and the information security 
cost ratio, which explains the real percentage of the values that may be 
accounted to information security. This standard is covering a full range 
of controls and is not only related to information security, but that is also 
why it is difficult to evaluate what part of implementation cost is related 
to information security and which is not (Sirisom, Payakpate and 
Wongthai 2017); 
− The Information Security Management System – Layers approach. For 
accreditation, according to one of the existing Information security stand-
ards, the organization has to prove that it ensures effective Organization 
Security management. It could be done by implementing the organiza-
tion an Information Security Management system. The approach is eval-
uating information security implementation through such categories as 
Management System; People and processes; Architecture and concepts; 
Operational Measures and Prerequisites (e.g. Inventory of assets or in-
troduction of information ownership). The advantage of such an 
approach is that the area with high information security costs ratio is sep-
arated from an area with low prices. The disadvantage is that for each 
area, evaluation of implementation must be carried out separately. 
This analysis is concentrated on information security implementation costs 
evaluation methods. It would be most useful for the organization which is required 
to implement two or more Information security documents and their requirements 
(Holik, et al. 2015). 
As it was defined by Jacobson et al. (Jacobson, Griss and P. 1997) and Griss 
(Griss 2001) the main obstacles for effective component reuse are coming from 
the following areas: Business, Process, Organization, Engineering and Infrastruc-
ture. According to Zavadskas (Zavadskas and Vilutiene 2006), the analysis of the 
purpose is to be achieved by using attributes of effectiveness, which have different 
dimensions, different weight as well as different directions of optimisation In our 
case, for methods evaluation five criteria were chosen, covering 4 out of 5 Jacob-
son defined areas (Intelligibility for Senior management; Links with existing In-
formation security documents and information security aspect coverage for Pro-
cess area; Calculation complexity for Engineering; Reusability for Organization).  
The above-mentioned information security costs methods were evaluated by 
seven Information security experts working in the Information security area. All 
the specialists represent the educational sector. The  number of Information secu-
rity specialists was chosen based on the analysis performed by Clemen et al. 
(Clemen and Winkler 1999) and Hora (Hora 2009). Both authors highlighted that 
differences among experts could be very important in determining the total uncer-
tainty expressed about a question. Clemen and Winkler examine the impact of 
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dependence among experts using a typical model and conclude that three to ﬁve 
experts are an adequate number. Hora created synthetic groups from the responses 
of real experts and found that three to six or seven experts would suffice the pur-
pose, with little beneﬁt from additional experts beyond that point. To verify ex-
perts knowledge was used Cooke’s classical model.  
1.7. Business Processes Models as a Data Source 
for Security Cost Implementation 
Security implementation cost evaluation highly depends on the initial data. Con-
sidering the fact that often, data need to be gathered manually or require expert 
input, such an approach is complicated and time-consuming. If it could be 
automized by re-using information already known to the organization or extract-
ing needed information from existing processes and procedure, it would help to 
simplify the organization security cost evaluation process. One of the ways to do 
that verifies the information presented in organizational Business processes mod-
els and diagrams.   
There exist a set of different business process definitions. However, they 
commonly state that the business process is a collection/set of linked activities or 
tasks, that, once completed, will accomplish an organizational goal (Appian 
2017). It is crucial to have clearly defined inputs and a single output for the busi-
ness process model. In our case, the business process model would be a source to 
extract information about the main processes, stakeholders and related data of the 
organization. From the security point of view, it is very important to understand 
the infrastructure, which was used to manage these business processes. 
Business processes could be presented in different ways. Johansson et al. 
(Johansson, Warja and Carlsson 2012) highlighted four graphical process-
oriented modelling techniques: Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN), 
UML-activity diagrams, Event-Driven Process Chains (EPC) and flowchart/nodes 
maps. Aldin et al. present a comparative analysis of business process modelling 
techniques. Their study involves flowchart, Petri Net, Data Flow Diagram (DFD), 
Role Activity Diagram (RAD), BPMN, business use case, and business object 
interaction diagram. These seven techniques for business process modelling were 
evaluated against flexibility, ease of use, understandability, simulation, and scope. 
It is important to note that Aldin et al. (Aldin and de Cesare 2009) extract ele-
ments, which are common and generally accepted by the business modelling com-
munity. These elements are process, activity, service and product, role, goal, event 
and rule. 
The Unified Modeling Language could be used to describe business pro-
cesses. UML has many types of diagrams, which could be divided into two main 
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two additional metrics: determinability, which describes how grim the de-
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cesses. UML has many types of diagrams, which could be divided into two main 
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categories: Behavior diagram (Activity diagram, Communication diagram, Inter-
action overview diagram, Sequence diagram, State diagram, Timing diagram and 
Use case diagram) and Structure diagram (Class diagram, Component diagram, 
Composite diagram, Deployment diagram, Object diagram, Package diagram and 
Profile diagram). For security requirements presentation in UML business pro-
cesses researchers proposing to use UML-class and UML-activity diagrams 
(Rodriguez, et al. 2011), (Zapata-Barra, et al. 2018). 
From the critical assets and environment identification point of view, it is 
essential to identify the vital data, which will be involved in the business pro-
cesses, and infrastructure/environment which will be handling this process. From 
the provided list of business process modelling techniques commonly used nota-
tions, listed in Table 1.9, could be evaluated. 
Table 1.9. Business process components, which can provide the information needed for    
security costs evaluation (Created by author) 
Business process 
model techniques 
Components, which could be used to present critical assets, 
stakeholders and infrastructure 
BPMN artefacts (data object, groups and annotations) 
EPC process owner, organization unit, information, material or re-
source object  
Flowchart an abstract or detailed description of units of work (rectan-
gles), annotations 
DFD entity and data storage components 
UML active diagram activity, note, decision component 
 
The market provides a number of different tools for business processes rep-
resentation (e.g., Microsoft Visio, SmartDraw, ConceptDraw, Luchicart, and 
other). These tools have a predefined list of objects, which are later used to present 
the business process. The main disadvantages identified during the evaluation of 
these tools is a lack of libraries or classes for representation of 
infrastructure/environment components. This information can be presented in di-
agrams; however, it has to be entered manually by the diagram creator through 
annotation, notes or other objects. 
1.8. Minimum Security Baseline and Usage of 
Graph Theory for its Analysis   
As was explained previously, one of the main problems arise from the fact that 
organizations are required to be aligned with more than one security document or 
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another regulating document. In many cases, organizations decide to implement 
only mandatory security document requirements that are named as a Minimum 
Security Baseline (MSB). MSB is a set of primary security objectives which must 
be met by any given service or system (CERN Computer Security 2018). In other 
words, the Baseline would be a subset of information security document and could 
be represented as its subpart. The conventional approach for Minimum Security 
Baseline identification is the use of expert knowledge (Bartens, et al. 2015). In-
formation security specialists review the document or framework and identify 
which requirements are mandatory and are a part of MSB. Some researchers pro-
pose the use of Delphi method research for IT Governance MSB identification  
(de Haes and van Grembergen 2008). The main disadvantages of these methods 
are related to the fact that they are: based on expert knowledge; could be influ-
enced by subjective opinion; are not affordable for SMEs; could not be easily 
adapted for dynamic changes in the information security area. 
Another way for MSB identification is to present information security docu-
ments and their requirements as undirected graphs, where the graph is defined as 
a pair of sets (V, E),  V is the set of vertices, E is the set of edges, formed by pairs 
of vertices. Security requirements would be graph nodes, and edges between graph 
nodes would show the links between these requirements. To achieve this, vertex 
cover and graph isomorphism algorithms could be used, where vertex cover algo-
rithm is used for MSB generation, and graph isomorphism is used for organization 
implemented controls verification against MSB identified controls. 
A vertex cover is one of the graphs related problems, where the primary ob-
jective is to extract a set of vertices of a specific graph, which covers all graph 
edges (Fig. 1.11). A vertex cover in an undirected graph G = (V, E) is the subset 
of vertices S ⊆ V such that every edge (u, v) in the graph G is connected to at least 
one vertex of S, in another word edge (u, v) is an edge of G, then either u in V or 
v in S or both. The size of a vertex cover is the number of vertices it contains 
(Eshtay, Sliet and Sharieh 2016). A minimum vertex cover is a vertex cover hav-
ing the smallest possible number of vertices for a given graph. There also exist 
minimum weighted vertex cover algorithms with a weight function R associated 
with each vertex (Cai, et al. 2013).  
 
 
a)                  b)                  c) 
Fig. 1.11. Vertex cover: a) Graph G, b) Vertex cover of G, c) Minimum vertex cover of 
G (Created by author) 
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Vertex cover problems are widely used in the information technology area 
(Patel and Patel 2017), for example in solving network base routing delays (Ding, 
et al. 2009) or network traffic measurements (Zeng, et al. 2009). Some researchers 
proposed to use vertex cover algorithm for prediction of potential malicious at-
tacks (Pushpam and Suseendran 2018), (Pushpam and Suseendran 2017). This 
algorithm is also used in biology for analysis of population-based evolutionary 
(Oliveto, Yao and He 2008) and many other areas. A vertex cover is an NP-
complete problem. This statement was proved by R. Karp in 1972 (Karp 1972). 
Chvatal (Chvatal 1979) has proposed the use of approximation algorithm “Maxi-
mum degree Greedy”, Clarkson has modified this approach and offered to perform 
a selection based on the degree (Clarkson 1983), Balaji, (Balaji, Swaminathan and 
Kannan 2010) have recommended an approach based on new criteria, which was 
named support of vertex. There exist other vertex cover algorithms, such as Nearly 
Optimal Vertex Cover NOVAC-1 (Gajurel and Bielefeld 2012), Advanced vertex 
Support Algorithm AVSA (Khan, Ahmad and Khan 2014) and Modified Vertex 
Support Algorithm MVSA (Khan and Khan 2013), heuristic algorithms ListLeft 
and ListRight (Delbot and Laforest 2008). Some researches (Khan and Khan 
2014) performed a comparison of existing Minimum vertex cover algorithms.  
For MSB graph verification against organization implemented requirements, 
Subgraph isomorphism algorithm could be used (Mishra, et al. 2017). Graphs G 
and G′ are said to be isomorphic if there exists a pair of functions f :V →V ′ and 
g : E → E′ such that f associates each element in V with exactly one element in  
V′ and vice versa; g associates each element in E with exactly one element in E′ 
and vice versa, and for each v ∈V , and each e ∈ E , if v is an endpoint of the edge 
e, then ) f (v) is an endpoint of the edge g(e). Subgraph isomorphism from H to G 
is a function f : VH → V such that if (u, v) ∈ EH, then (f(u), f(v)) ∈ E. f is an 
induced subgraph isomorphism if in addition (u, v) ∉ EH, then (f(u), f(v)) ∉  E. In 
other words, Graph isomorphism helps in verifying exact structural matching be-
tween 2 different graphs, even if they are represented in different ways. Graph 
Matching is the process of comparing two graphs to ﬁnd an appropriate corre-
spondence between their vertexes and edges. It refers to finding mapping solution 
S from the nodes of one graph G to the nodes of other graph G’ that satisfies 
predefined criteria and ensure that the structure of one graph is similar to substruc-
tures of another graph. Subgraph isomorphism helps to verify structural matching 
between the graph and part of another graph (Fig. 1.12).  
This property is widely used to analyze information and search similar pat-
terns in different structures which are presented as graph, e.g. Image processing 
(Sanfeliua, et al. 2002), (Conte et al. 2003), where graph isomorphism is used to 
match two different images, social networks (Wenfei 2012), (Raymond and 
Willett 2002), where it is used for pattern analysis. However, the main area of 
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isomorphism applicability is Biology and Chemistry, where subgraph isomor-
phism is used for Chemical bond structure (Balaban 1985) and Protein structure 
analysis (Elmsallati, Clark and Kalita 2007). It is necessary to mention that this 
problem could be solved in polynomial time. However, it was not proved that this 
problem is NP-complete and different researchers propose two main ways on sub-
graph isomorphism problem solving: try to identify exact subgraph matching 
identification or the use of approximate subgraph matching. 
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Fig. 1.12. Graph Isomorphism and Subgraph Isomorphism (Created by author):             
a) Graph G1, b) Graph G2 – isomorph of graph G1, c) Subgraph for graphs matching 
process, d) Two graphs (G2 and subgraph) matching results  
Generic subgraph isomorphism identification algorithm is presented in (Lee, 
et al. 2012). Other examples of exact matching algorithms are GraphGrep 
(Shasha, Wang and Giugno 2002), FG-Index (Cheng, et al. 2007). These algo-
rithms use indexes, which allow to reduce the number of candidates for the 
potential solution and later verification of chosen candidates. Other algorithms 
like Ullmann (Ullmann 1976), VF2 (Cordella, et al. 2004), QuickSI (Shang,           
et al. 2008), SPath (Zhao and Han 2010), K+ (Rong, et al. 2018) find all embed-
ding for the given query and original graph. Approximate algorithms, such as 
SIGMA (Mongiovi, et al. 2010), and Ness (Khan, et al. 2011) are defined approx-
imate embedding and verify isomorphism through similarity measures. 
1.9. Conclusions of Chapter 1 and Formulation of 
Tasks 
1. External regulators and existing laws and regulations are forcing 
organizations to seek compliance. Minimum security baseline would help 
the organization to identify a list of mandatory controls required to ensure 
“due diligence” principles and guarantee cost-effective security 
implementation.  
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Tasks 
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“due diligence” principles and guarantee cost-effective security 
implementation.  
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2. There are no effective ways to measure the influence of deploying a 
separate security document or control on the company’s security 
expenditures. The existing methods for calculating security implementation 
costs are not oriented to security controls implementation of multiple 
security documents. Neither do they take into account the complexity and 
maturity levels of a company.  
3. All existing harmonization approaches, except adaptive mapping, do not 
allow to re-use results of the previous harmonization. The performed 
attempts to harmonize multiple security documents by applying adaptive 
mapping through security ontology reveal that existing security ontologies 
are not oriented to security documents and their requirements. The verified 
ontologies (by A. Herzog and S. Fenz) covered less than 50% of 4 security 
documents harmonized with them and their graphical visualization, and 
quick knowledge search is complicated.  
4. Minimum Security Baseline is a set of compulsory requirements for all sys-
tems and presents a subset of information security documents requirements. 
Formation of such a set of sets in cases of multiple security documents is 
complicated. Graph theory optimization algorithms, such as vertex cover 
algorithm and subgraph isomorphism property, allow to remove duplicated 
requirements and identify similar structures in different graphs.  
Based on the conclusions, the following tasks are formulated: 
1. Propose a method for improvement of evaluating security requirements im-
plementation costs; 
2. Propose method for harmonization of multiple information security docu-
ments and their requirements. 
3. Propose method for minimums security requirement identification, analysis 
and verification.   
 
55 
2 
Controls-Based Approach for 
Information Security Documents 
Requirements Implementation Cost 
Evaluation  
As it was stated, there are no effective ways to measure the influence of deploying 
a separate security document or control on the company’s security expenditures. 
The existing security implementation cost calculation methods are not oriented to 
security controls implementation of multiple security documents and present a 
complicated process for new security processes integration into the current 
calculation (W. Zeng 2019). 
From an organization’s point of view, an organization needs to ensure that 
security implementation is cost-effective, and the chosen controls satisfy 
regulatory requirements, provide the required level of protection and are not 
overpaid. According to the best security practices, control costs should not be 
higher than the cost of a potential security incident.  
In an attempt to solve this problem, a new control-based security 
implementation costs evaluation method was proposed. Chapter 2 provides a 
theoretical and practical explanation of the proposed method. It also highlights 
identified advantages and disadvantages of this method and compares it with the 
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expenditures. The existing methods for calculating security implementation 
costs are not oriented to security controls implementation of multiple 
security documents. Neither do they take into account the complexity and 
maturity levels of a company.  
3. All existing harmonization approaches, except adaptive mapping, do not 
allow to re-use results of the previous harmonization. The performed 
attempts to harmonize multiple security documents by applying adaptive 
mapping through security ontology reveal that existing security ontologies 
are not oriented to security documents and their requirements. The verified 
ontologies (by A. Herzog and S. Fenz) covered less than 50% of 4 security 
documents harmonized with them and their graphical visualization, and 
quick knowledge search is complicated.  
4. Minimum Security Baseline is a set of compulsory requirements for all sys-
tems and presents a subset of information security documents requirements. 
Formation of such a set of sets in cases of multiple security documents is 
complicated. Graph theory optimization algorithms, such as vertex cover 
algorithm and subgraph isomorphism property, allow to remove duplicated 
requirements and identify similar structures in different graphs.  
Based on the conclusions, the following tasks are formulated: 
1. Propose a method for improvement of evaluating security requirements im-
plementation costs; 
2. Propose method for harmonization of multiple information security docu-
ments and their requirements. 
3. Propose method for minimums security requirement identification, analysis 
and verification.   
 
55 
2 
Controls-Based Approach for 
Information Security Documents 
Requirements Implementation Cost 
Evaluation  
As it was stated, there are no effective ways to measure the influence of deploying 
a separate security document or control on the company’s security expenditures. 
The existing security implementation cost calculation methods are not oriented to 
security controls implementation of multiple security documents and present a 
complicated process for new security processes integration into the current 
calculation (W. Zeng 2019). 
From an organization’s point of view, an organization needs to ensure that 
security implementation is cost-effective, and the chosen controls satisfy 
regulatory requirements, provide the required level of protection and are not 
overpaid. According to the best security practices, control costs should not be 
higher than the cost of a potential security incident.  
In an attempt to solve this problem, a new control-based security 
implementation costs evaluation method was proposed. Chapter 2 provides a 
theoretical and practical explanation of the proposed method. It also highlights 
identified advantages and disadvantages of this method and compares it with the 
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existing security costs evaluation methods. Furthermore, it proposes and validates 
an automated initial data gathering process, which allows improving the method 
proposed and reduce the amount of time required for calculation.  
The proposed methods were published in (Olifer, Goranin and Kaceniauskas, 
et al. 2017) and control-based security cost evaluation method improvements 
were published in the (Olifer, Goranin and Janulevicius, et al. 2017).  
2.1. Controls-Based Approach for Evaluation of 
Information Security Documents 
As it was defined in the chapter “Tasks of the Thesis”, one of our goals is to iden-
tify information security implementation cost/benefits evaluation method, which 
would let us calculate information security implementation costs/benefits for or-
ganizations which use two or more different Security documents. The proposed 
method and calculation results must be: 
− Understandable for Senior management;  
− The method must be easily reusable for new Security documents 
implementation costs calculations;  
− The method must cover all Security areas and control types (Administra-
tive, Technical, Physical); 
− Industry-independent; 
− Applicable for the organizations of different sizes, starting from SME and 
finishing Enterprises.  
Given the disadvantages of the existing methods identified in the first part of 
this thesis and taking into consideration the fact that the existing Security 
implementation costs evaluation methods are not oriented to security controls, de-
fined by security documents, the new cost evaluation method was proposed. As a 
foundation for information security document evaluation costs, the IT Security 
process-oriented approach was taken. However, this approach was amended by 
adding components related to Risk evaluation, which is mandatory in the Security 
Assurance process. Regarding the fact, that proposed method is oriented on costs 
calculation, it is a quantitative way of security verification. However, some com-
ponents or components used during evaluation could consist of qualitative tech-
niques. Like example, complexity and maturity levels could be defined by apply-
ing qualitative techniques. Moreover, mitigation cost calculation requires define 
action cost boundaries, which are presented in the formula as “High” and “Ac-
ceptable” level.  
The information security document costs evaluation involves two main 
processes: 
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− Risk assessment process; 
− Security Control implementation process. 
The risk assessment process is a mandatory process in any information secu-
rity activities, starting from information security management and finishing with 
Information Security Audits. This process allows evaluation of the current situa-
tion and identification of missing gaps and probability of their exposure. Agrawal 
(Agrawal 2017) performed a comparative study on Information Security Risk 
Analysis methods and evaluated four different risk analysis methods (CIRA 
(Rajbhandari and Snekkenes 2013), CORAS (Stolen, et al. 2002), ISRAM 
(Karabacak and Sogukpinar 2005) and IS method (Suh and Han 2003)).  
As it was stated above, the proposed information security costs evaluation 
method should be applicable for organizations of different size. Because of that, 
it was suggested to include into information security costs evaluation formula an 
additional coefficient 𝜑𝜑. This coefficient allows to evaluate the organization’s 
complexity, maturity and correlating information security costs. The proposed in-
formation security costs evaluation equation (Eq. 2.1) is the following:  
 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝜑𝜑(𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠))
𝐶𝐶
𝑆𝑆=1 ,        (2.1) 
 
where  𝜑𝜑 is the complexity and maturity coefficient; 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 – Risk assess-
ment costs, which explanation will be defined and described below (Eq. 2.3); 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) – security control implementation (Eq. 2.11).   
Complexity and maturity coefficient depends on two factors: Complexity 
level and Maturity level 
 𝜑𝜑 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶
. (2.2) 
Complexity level defines Overall Organization systems complexity and var-
ies in the range from 1 to 5, where: 1 is Simple systems; 2 is Somewhat Complex 
systems; 3 is Complex systems; 4 is Very Complex systems; 5 is Highly Complex 
systems. The complexity level is evaluated and defined by the organization and is 
directly related to the number of existing systems, systems interconnections, 
amount of processes maintained by these systems, amount of authorised users, 
amount of different roles and privileges, etc. The complexity level is evaluated in 
a Qualitative way by experts. 
Maturity level defines the Overall organizations’ maturity. For maturity level 
evaluation Capability Maturity Model (CMM 1995) is used. Maturity levels are 
distributed in the range from 1 to 5, where: Level 1 is Initial (Chaotic); Level 2 is 
Repeatable; Level 3 means Defined; Level 4 – Managed; Level 5 – Optimizing.  
Interdependency of complexity level and maturity level dependency ensures 
that costs of Information Security Assurance in organizations with low maturity 
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existing security costs evaluation methods. Furthermore, it proposes and validates 
an automated initial data gathering process, which allows improving the method 
proposed and reduce the amount of time required for calculation.  
The proposed methods were published in (Olifer, Goranin and Kaceniauskas, 
et al. 2017) and control-based security cost evaluation method improvements 
were published in the (Olifer, Goranin and Janulevicius, et al. 2017).  
2.1. Controls-Based Approach for Evaluation of 
Information Security Documents 
As it was defined in the chapter “Tasks of the Thesis”, one of our goals is to iden-
tify information security implementation cost/benefits evaluation method, which 
would let us calculate information security implementation costs/benefits for or-
ganizations which use two or more different Security documents. The proposed 
method and calculation results must be: 
− Understandable for Senior management;  
− The method must be easily reusable for new Security documents 
implementation costs calculations;  
− The method must cover all Security areas and control types (Administra-
tive, Technical, Physical); 
− Industry-independent; 
− Applicable for the organizations of different sizes, starting from SME and 
finishing Enterprises.  
Given the disadvantages of the existing methods identified in the first part of 
this thesis and taking into consideration the fact that the existing Security 
implementation costs evaluation methods are not oriented to security controls, de-
fined by security documents, the new cost evaluation method was proposed. As a 
foundation for information security document evaluation costs, the IT Security 
process-oriented approach was taken. However, this approach was amended by 
adding components related to Risk evaluation, which is mandatory in the Security 
Assurance process. Regarding the fact, that proposed method is oriented on costs 
calculation, it is a quantitative way of security verification. However, some com-
ponents or components used during evaluation could consist of qualitative tech-
niques. Like example, complexity and maturity levels could be defined by apply-
ing qualitative techniques. Moreover, mitigation cost calculation requires define 
action cost boundaries, which are presented in the formula as “High” and “Ac-
ceptable” level.  
The information security document costs evaluation involves two main 
processes: 
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− Risk assessment process; 
− Security Control implementation process. 
The risk assessment process is a mandatory process in any information secu-
rity activities, starting from information security management and finishing with 
Information Security Audits. This process allows evaluation of the current situa-
tion and identification of missing gaps and probability of their exposure. Agrawal 
(Agrawal 2017) performed a comparative study on Information Security Risk 
Analysis methods and evaluated four different risk analysis methods (CIRA 
(Rajbhandari and Snekkenes 2013), CORAS (Stolen, et al. 2002), ISRAM 
(Karabacak and Sogukpinar 2005) and IS method (Suh and Han 2003)).  
As it was stated above, the proposed information security costs evaluation 
method should be applicable for organizations of different size. Because of that, 
it was suggested to include into information security costs evaluation formula an 
additional coefficient 𝜑𝜑. This coefficient allows to evaluate the organization’s 
complexity, maturity and correlating information security costs. The proposed in-
formation security costs evaluation equation (Eq. 2.1) is the following:  
 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝜑𝜑(𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠))
𝐶𝐶
𝑆𝑆=1 ,        (2.1) 
 
where  𝜑𝜑 is the complexity and maturity coefficient; 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 – Risk assess-
ment costs, which explanation will be defined and described below (Eq. 2.3); 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) – security control implementation (Eq. 2.11).   
Complexity and maturity coefficient depends on two factors: Complexity 
level and Maturity level 
 𝜑𝜑 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶
. (2.2) 
Complexity level defines Overall Organization systems complexity and var-
ies in the range from 1 to 5, where: 1 is Simple systems; 2 is Somewhat Complex 
systems; 3 is Complex systems; 4 is Very Complex systems; 5 is Highly Complex 
systems. The complexity level is evaluated and defined by the organization and is 
directly related to the number of existing systems, systems interconnections, 
amount of processes maintained by these systems, amount of authorised users, 
amount of different roles and privileges, etc. The complexity level is evaluated in 
a Qualitative way by experts. 
Maturity level defines the Overall organizations’ maturity. For maturity level 
evaluation Capability Maturity Model (CMM 1995) is used. Maturity levels are 
distributed in the range from 1 to 5, where: Level 1 is Initial (Chaotic); Level 2 is 
Repeatable; Level 3 means Defined; Level 4 – Managed; Level 5 – Optimizing.  
Interdependency of complexity level and maturity level dependency ensures 
that costs of Information Security Assurance in organizations with low maturity 
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level and high systems complexity level will be higher than in organizations with 
high maturity level, i.e., maturity is decreasing the information security imple-
mentation and Assurance costs, while the use of complex systems will increase 
them. 
Risk assessment is a well-known process, where all components could be 
evaluated from the costs point of view. According to the common practice, de-
fined in different documents (NIST SP 800-30 2012), the Risk assessment process 
must involve such steps as:  
− Critical asset analysis. Such analysis involves assets identification, eval-
uation of their importance and impact to organizational functionality 
− Vulnerability analysis (Identify vulnerabilities within organizations that 
could be exploited by threat sources through specific threat events and 
the predisposing conditions that could affect successful exploitation) 
− Threat analysis (Identify threat sources that are relevant to organizations; 
Identify threat events that could be produced by those sources; Determine 
the likelihood that the identified threat sources would initiate specific 
threat events and the likelihood that the threat events would be success-
ful) 
− Impact evaluation (Determine the adverse impacts to organizational op-
erations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the overall re-
sulting from the exploitation of vulnerabilities by threat sources (through 
specific threat events))  
− Penetration testing (Attempt to evaluate the security of an IT infrastruc-
ture by safely trying to exploit vulnerabilities).  
− Gap analysis (Existing situation comparing with Information security 
documents requirements and identifying controls or implementations 
which are not aligned with mandatory security document requirements) 
2.1.1. Risk Assessment Costs Evaluation Formula  
Risk assessment costs are calculated according to the following equation:  
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 +
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡(𝑁𝑁) +   𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ,                (2.3) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 – costs related to Critical asset analysis, 
𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 – costs related to Vulnerabilities analysis, 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 – costs related to Threat analysis, 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 – costs related to 
gap analysis and 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡(𝑁𝑁) – costs related to Penetration testing 
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needed for Risk assessment, where N is the amount of different organization sys-
tems, which have to be tested, 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 – the costs related to the Impact evaluation. 
In the critical asset analysis process, two parties are involved: a consultant 
performing a Risk assessment and Organization’s employees). These two parties 
are working together to gather the needed information.  It means that the overall 
costs of critical asset analysis will be the total costs of Consultant and organization 
employees who are involved in this process.  
These costs depend on the time needed for consultant and employee conver-
sations, discussions and information sharing. Additional time spent on the analysis 
process will increase the overall Critical asset analysis costs.  
According to the provided statement, the Critical asset cost calculation is 
performed according to the Eq. 2.4: 
 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼_𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴 = 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎=1 (𝑡𝑡), (2.4) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) is Security consultant costs, 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) – Organization’s 
employee costs and t is time spent to perform the analysis. 
Although more than one consultant can participate in risk assessment, for 
model simplification consultant costs were combined into one by increasing the 
price-per-hour.  
Information security consultant (Eq. 2.5) and organization employee           
(Eq. 2.6) costs can be calculated by multiplying time t by hour costs, defined by 
their contracts. 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻_𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑡𝑡; (2.5) 
 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻_𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ∗  𝑡𝑡, (2.6) 
where Hour_price consultant is consultant price per hour and Hour_price per-
sonal average employee time price. 
Vulnerability analysis process implementation is similar to the Critical Asset 
analysis process. It means that information security consultant performs vulnera-
bility assessment and has to identify and review the list of vulnerabilities which 
are the most common for such type of organization, environment, etc.  An infor-
mation security consultant has to evaluate which vulnerabilities are relevant in 
this particular case. 
Because of that, it could be stated that Vulnerability analysis process also 
involves two main parts: the 1st is conversation and discussion with organization 
employees to gather information related to such analysis; the 2nd part is gathering 
information for evaluation. 
According to this vulnerability analysis costs could be calculated according 
to Equation 2.7: 
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level and high systems complexity level will be higher than in organizations with 
high maturity level, i.e., maturity is decreasing the information security imple-
mentation and Assurance costs, while the use of complex systems will increase 
them. 
Risk assessment is a well-known process, where all components could be 
evaluated from the costs point of view. According to the common practice, de-
fined in different documents (NIST SP 800-30 2012), the Risk assessment process 
must involve such steps as:  
− Critical asset analysis. Such analysis involves assets identification, eval-
uation of their importance and impact to organizational functionality 
− Vulnerability analysis (Identify vulnerabilities within organizations that 
could be exploited by threat sources through specific threat events and 
the predisposing conditions that could affect successful exploitation) 
− Threat analysis (Identify threat sources that are relevant to organizations; 
Identify threat events that could be produced by those sources; Determine 
the likelihood that the identified threat sources would initiate specific 
threat events and the likelihood that the threat events would be success-
ful) 
− Impact evaluation (Determine the adverse impacts to organizational op-
erations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the overall re-
sulting from the exploitation of vulnerabilities by threat sources (through 
specific threat events))  
− Penetration testing (Attempt to evaluate the security of an IT infrastruc-
ture by safely trying to exploit vulnerabilities).  
− Gap analysis (Existing situation comparing with Information security 
documents requirements and identifying controls or implementations 
which are not aligned with mandatory security document requirements) 
2.1.1. Risk Assessment Costs Evaluation Formula  
Risk assessment costs are calculated according to the following equation:  
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 +
𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡(𝑁𝑁) +   𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ,                (2.3) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 – costs related to Critical asset analysis, 
𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 – costs related to Vulnerabilities analysis, 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 – costs related to Threat analysis, 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 – costs related to 
gap analysis and 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎_𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡(𝑁𝑁) – costs related to Penetration testing 
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needed for Risk assessment, where N is the amount of different organization sys-
tems, which have to be tested, 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 – the costs related to the Impact evaluation. 
In the critical asset analysis process, two parties are involved: a consultant 
performing a Risk assessment and Organization’s employees). These two parties 
are working together to gather the needed information.  It means that the overall 
costs of critical asset analysis will be the total costs of Consultant and organization 
employees who are involved in this process.  
These costs depend on the time needed for consultant and employee conver-
sations, discussions and information sharing. Additional time spent on the analysis 
process will increase the overall Critical asset analysis costs.  
According to the provided statement, the Critical asset cost calculation is 
performed according to the Eq. 2.4: 
 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼_𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴 = 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎=1 (𝑡𝑡), (2.4) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) is Security consultant costs, 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) – Organization’s 
employee costs and t is time spent to perform the analysis. 
Although more than one consultant can participate in risk assessment, for 
model simplification consultant costs were combined into one by increasing the 
price-per-hour.  
Information security consultant (Eq. 2.5) and organization employee           
(Eq. 2.6) costs can be calculated by multiplying time t by hour costs, defined by 
their contracts. 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻_𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝑡𝑡; (2.5) 
 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻_𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ∗  𝑡𝑡, (2.6) 
where Hour_price consultant is consultant price per hour and Hour_price per-
sonal average employee time price. 
Vulnerability analysis process implementation is similar to the Critical Asset 
analysis process. It means that information security consultant performs vulnera-
bility assessment and has to identify and review the list of vulnerabilities which 
are the most common for such type of organization, environment, etc.  An infor-
mation security consultant has to evaluate which vulnerabilities are relevant in 
this particular case. 
Because of that, it could be stated that Vulnerability analysis process also 
involves two main parts: the 1st is conversation and discussion with organization 
employees to gather information related to such analysis; the 2nd part is gathering 
information for evaluation. 
According to this vulnerability analysis costs could be calculated according 
to Equation 2.7: 
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𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛_𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) + (𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) +
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛=1 (𝑡𝑡)),  (2.7) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) is Security consultant costs and 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) is Organiza-
tion employee costs. 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 are coefficients which define percentage of the time 
spthe ent the for discussion with organization employees and information evalua-
tion. Consultant and employee costs calculation is defined in Eq. 2.5 and Eq. 2.6. 
During the Risk assessment, the existing threats have to be evaluated. Infor-
mation security consultant fully implements this part of the risk assessment pro-
cess and because of that cost calculation for this process directly depends on the 
time needed for an information security consultant to evaluate the existing threats 
and is calculated according to equation 3.12: 
 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛_𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡), (2.8) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) is Security consultant costs, calculated by equation (2.5). 
One of the fundamental principles in information security is to ensure that 
information security costs are not higher than the potential impact on the organi-
zation. Because of that, an essential step in Information Risk evaluation process 
is related to Impact analysis. This process involves two main participants: infor-
mation security consultant, who is responsible for explaining to organizations em-
ployees what can happen with critical organization assets if identified threats ex-
ploit a vulnerability and organization’s employees who are responsible for 
evaluating the potential impact and defining it financially. 
Impact analysis is to be calculated according to equation 2.9.: 
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 = 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛=1 (𝑡𝑡), (2.9) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) is Security consultant costs and 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) is Organiza-
tion employee costs. Consultant and employee costs calculation are defined in 
equation Eq. 2.5 and Eq. 2.6.  
Impact costs require inputs from the organization’s management. Due to this 
factor, the cost of such evaluation is higher than other calculation steps. 
In some cases, information security consultant and organization employee 
are not able to identify all existing vulnerabilities that can be exploited. In such a 
case, the organization is recommended to perform penetration testing. Before per-
forming penetration testing, an information security consultant has to define pen-
etration testing scope and identify technical teams which will be involved in it. 
Penetration testing is performed by a specialist who has the appropriate 
knowledge level and experience in ethical hacking. The cost of such experts is 
usually defined in contracts. 
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Because of that, penetration testing costs could be calculated according to the 
equation: 
  𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(𝑁𝑁) = 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃=1 (𝑡𝑡) +
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,  (2.10) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) are Security consultant costs and 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) are Organi-
zation employee costs. Consultant and employee costs calculation is defined in 
equation Eq. 2.5 and Eq. 2.6, N is the amount of different organization systems, 
that have to be tested 
After collecting the required information, the information security consultant 
has to analyse it and verify from the Information security document point of view. 
Any requirements which are mandatory according to the Information security doc-
ument and not implemented in the organization have to be identified and listed. 
This process involves results from all previous steps. However, it is performed 
only by the information security consultant. Consequently, t costs calculations for 
such a process could be done in the same way as Threats analysis costs calcula-
tions (Eq. 2.8). 
2.1.2. Security Control Implementation Costs 
The next step in Information security documents requirements implementation is 
the identification of Security Controls, which have to be implemented by the 
organization. To identify the list of necessary controls, an information security 
consultant has to identify critical assets, evaluate the related risk and choose the 
appropriate mitigation strategy. 
The overall Security controls implementation costs will be the aggregated 
sum of separate control implementation costs. To highlight the Security controls 
that are related to critical assets, a new Control criticality coefficient mi(𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃) 
was proposed, which depends on the Risk identified for Critical asset and varies 
from 0 to 1, i.e., if the risk that the critical asset will be exploited is higher, then 
the cost the of such control will increase. 
Security control implementation is directly linked with the chosen Mitigation 
strategy and action needed to implement it. According to such a statement, Secu-
rity control implementation costs couldd be calculated in the following way, as 
shown in (Eq. 2.11): 
 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛_𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = ∑ (𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃=1 (𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃) ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖)),  (2.11) 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃(𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃) is Control criticality coefficient and Riski is calculated accord-
ing to (Eq.2.12): 
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𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛_𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) + (𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) +
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛=1 (𝑡𝑡)),  (2.7) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) is Security consultant costs and 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) is Organiza-
tion employee costs. 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 are coefficients which define percentage of the time 
spthe ent the for discussion with organization employees and information evalua-
tion. Consultant and employee costs calculation is defined in Eq. 2.5 and Eq. 2.6. 
During the Risk assessment, the existing threats have to be evaluated. Infor-
mation security consultant fully implements this part of the risk assessment pro-
cess and because of that cost calculation for this process directly depends on the 
time needed for an information security consultant to evaluate the existing threats 
and is calculated according to equation 3.12: 
 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛_𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡), (2.8) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) is Security consultant costs, calculated by equation (2.5). 
One of the fundamental principles in information security is to ensure that 
information security costs are not higher than the potential impact on the organi-
zation. Because of that, an essential step in Information Risk evaluation process 
is related to Impact analysis. This process involves two main participants: infor-
mation security consultant, who is responsible for explaining to organizations em-
ployees what can happen with critical organization assets if identified threats ex-
ploit a vulnerability and organization’s employees who are responsible for 
evaluating the potential impact and defining it financially. 
Impact analysis is to be calculated according to equation 2.9.: 
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 = 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛=1 (𝑡𝑡), (2.9) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) is Security consultant costs and 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) is Organiza-
tion employee costs. Consultant and employee costs calculation are defined in 
equation Eq. 2.5 and Eq. 2.6.  
Impact costs require inputs from the organization’s management. Due to this 
factor, the cost of such evaluation is higher than other calculation steps. 
In some cases, information security consultant and organization employee 
are not able to identify all existing vulnerabilities that can be exploited. In such a 
case, the organization is recommended to perform penetration testing. Before per-
forming penetration testing, an information security consultant has to define pen-
etration testing scope and identify technical teams which will be involved in it. 
Penetration testing is performed by a specialist who has the appropriate 
knowledge level and experience in ethical hacking. The cost of such experts is 
usually defined in contracts. 
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Because of that, penetration testing costs could be calculated according to the 
equation: 
  𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(𝑁𝑁) = 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃=1 (𝑡𝑡) +
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,  (2.10) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) are Security consultant costs and 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) are Organi-
zation employee costs. Consultant and employee costs calculation is defined in 
equation Eq. 2.5 and Eq. 2.6, N is the amount of different organization systems, 
that have to be tested 
After collecting the required information, the information security consultant 
has to analyse it and verify from the Information security document point of view. 
Any requirements which are mandatory according to the Information security doc-
ument and not implemented in the organization have to be identified and listed. 
This process involves results from all previous steps. However, it is performed 
only by the information security consultant. Consequently, t costs calculations for 
such a process could be done in the same way as Threats analysis costs calcula-
tions (Eq. 2.8). 
2.1.2. Security Control Implementation Costs 
The next step in Information security documents requirements implementation is 
the identification of Security Controls, which have to be implemented by the 
organization. To identify the list of necessary controls, an information security 
consultant has to identify critical assets, evaluate the related risk and choose the 
appropriate mitigation strategy. 
The overall Security controls implementation costs will be the aggregated 
sum of separate control implementation costs. To highlight the Security controls 
that are related to critical assets, a new Control criticality coefficient mi(𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃) 
was proposed, which depends on the Risk identified for Critical asset and varies 
from 0 to 1, i.e., if the risk that the critical asset will be exploited is higher, then 
the cost the of such control will increase. 
Security control implementation is directly linked with the chosen Mitigation 
strategy and action needed to implement it. According to such a statement, Secu-
rity control implementation costs couldd be calculated in the following way, as 
shown in (Eq. 2.11): 
 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛_𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = ∑ (𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃=1 (𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃) ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖)),  (2.11) 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃(𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃) is Control criticality coefficient and Riski is calculated accord-
ing to (Eq.2.12): 
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where Vulnerabilityi is the vulnerability identified for asset i, Threati is the threat 
identified for asset i, Impacti is impact recognized for asset i.  
Mitigation strategy depends on management risk appetite and information 
about historical issues, something that has happened to specific critical assets in 
the past. Historical data could be gathered by the organization individually, or it 
could be statistical data characteristic of a particular area (financial, infrastructure 
or government organization). 
Usually, four main mitigation strategies are defined: 
−  Risk accepted – when the organization management understands the 
existing risk but because of the low probability of negative events or be-
cause of the high price of mitigation controls decides not to take any ac-
tions to reduce it; 
−  Risk avoided – when the organization management understands the 
existing risk and decides to remove the risk source;  
−  Risk remediated – when the organization management understands the 
existing risk and takes action to reduce it to an acceptable level; 
−  Risk transferred – when the organization management understands the 
existing risk and passes it to the 3rd party, which is responsible for risk 
management or compensation in a worst-case scenario.  
According to that, the Mitigation strategy (Eq. 2.13) could be defined as: 
𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀_𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 −𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀,   𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 
∆𝑇𝑇(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝑇𝑇(𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗)
∗ ?̅?𝑊  ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻                                            
0,   𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 
∆𝑇𝑇(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝑇𝑇(𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗)
∗ ?̅?𝑊  ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴                                   
𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠,   𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 
∆𝑇𝑇(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝑇𝑇(𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗)
∗ ?̅?𝑊  > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴                     
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 − 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀, 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 
∆𝑇𝑇(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝑇𝑇(𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗)
∗ ?̅?𝑊  > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻   
,  
  (2.13) 
where RA is an organization willing to handle the existing risk, ∆𝑇𝑇(𝑉𝑉) – Amount 
of security incidents during defined time tin, 𝑇𝑇(𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗) – Amount of impacted systems, 
lj – asset impacted by a security incident, j – asset number, ?̅?𝑊 – Impact average, 
𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 – Cost of metrics control operations, which could involve 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙 and 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 for additional specific tools, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 – Cost of insurance, according to the 
signed off contract with the 3rd party (insurance company). Risk appetite and ac-
ceptability of actions costs depends from the organization. And the same cost 
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could be high for one organization and acceptable for another organization. Be-
cause of that, before starting calculating of Mitigation strategy costs, organization 
must define boundaries for action cost, which would be acceptable for organiza-
tion and which would be above organization expectations. 
After confirmation of the risk mitigation strategy, the chosen control has to 
be implemented. This process is directly linked to the Security measure life cycle 
approach. In the proposed calculation (Eq. 2.14), two main tasks were identified: 
Action implementation costs and Control operation costs. Implementation costs 
are related to the time, needed to implement the chosen actions. For calculation 
simplicity, time could not be longer than one year. Otherwise, it would be prob-
lematic to calculate Return on investment values. 
 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) + 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, (2.14) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) is action implementation costs and 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴is Con-
trol operation costs. 
This part of our equation (Eq. 2.15.) depends on additional sub-steps related 
to hardware and software procurements and their deployment costs. Environment 
purchase could be evaluated as one time cost frozen in time, and deployment costs 
are connected to the deployment project. Environment definition includes hard-
ware, software and any other technical components required for system or solution 
business as usual activities. According to this, Action implementation costs could 
be calculated in the following way: 
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) =  𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 + 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡), (2.15) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 – are hardware and software procurement costs and 
𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) – are project deployment costs. 
It needs to be mentioned that the same hardware and software could be used 
to ensure more than one information security control. In that case, Control imple-
mentation costs must be calculated only once. Any other controls should not be 
involved in the calculation, except the situation, when the existing control was 
amended, and such amendment costs were not calculated previously. 
Deployment project costs could be divided into three main groups: 
− Personnel who are performing such deployment actions. Technically it 
could be a team or even a whole department who will be deploying it; 
− Costs for configuration, which could be implemented by the 3rd party as 
a one-time contract cost; 
− Costs related to personnel training and awareness, before letting them use 
a new system. Training/ Learning or Awareness sessions could be imple-
mented internally or performed by external systems.   
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 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖, (2.12) 
where Vulnerabilityi is the vulnerability identified for asset i, Threati is the threat 
identified for asset i, Impacti is impact recognized for asset i.  
Mitigation strategy depends on management risk appetite and information 
about historical issues, something that has happened to specific critical assets in 
the past. Historical data could be gathered by the organization individually, or it 
could be statistical data characteristic of a particular area (financial, infrastructure 
or government organization). 
Usually, four main mitigation strategies are defined: 
−  Risk accepted – when the organization management understands the 
existing risk but because of the low probability of negative events or be-
cause of the high price of mitigation controls decides not to take any ac-
tions to reduce it; 
−  Risk avoided – when the organization management understands the 
existing risk and decides to remove the risk source;  
−  Risk remediated – when the organization management understands the 
existing risk and takes action to reduce it to an acceptable level; 
−  Risk transferred – when the organization management understands the 
existing risk and passes it to the 3rd party, which is responsible for risk 
management or compensation in a worst-case scenario.  
According to that, the Mitigation strategy (Eq. 2.13) could be defined as: 
𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀_𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 −𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀,   𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 
∆𝑇𝑇(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝑇𝑇(𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗)
∗ ?̅?𝑊  ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻                                            
0,   𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 
∆𝑇𝑇(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝑇𝑇(𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗)
∗ ?̅?𝑊  ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴                                   
𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠,   𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 
∆𝑇𝑇(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝑇𝑇(𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗)
∗ ?̅?𝑊  > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴                     
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 − 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀, 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 
∆𝑇𝑇(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝑇𝑇(𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗)
∗ ?̅?𝑊  > 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻   
,  
  (2.13) 
where RA is an organization willing to handle the existing risk, ∆𝑇𝑇(𝑉𝑉) – Amount 
of security incidents during defined time tin, 𝑇𝑇(𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗) – Amount of impacted systems, 
lj – asset impacted by a security incident, j – asset number, ?̅?𝑊 – Impact average, 
𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 – Cost of metrics control operations, which could involve 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙 and 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 for additional specific tools, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 – Cost of insurance, according to the 
signed off contract with the 3rd party (insurance company). Risk appetite and ac-
ceptability of actions costs depends from the organization. And the same cost 
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could be high for one organization and acceptable for another organization. Be-
cause of that, before starting calculating of Mitigation strategy costs, organization 
must define boundaries for action cost, which would be acceptable for organiza-
tion and which would be above organization expectations. 
After confirmation of the risk mitigation strategy, the chosen control has to 
be implemented. This process is directly linked to the Security measure life cycle 
approach. In the proposed calculation (Eq. 2.14), two main tasks were identified: 
Action implementation costs and Control operation costs. Implementation costs 
are related to the time, needed to implement the chosen actions. For calculation 
simplicity, time could not be longer than one year. Otherwise, it would be prob-
lematic to calculate Return on investment values. 
 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) + 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, (2.14) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) is action implementation costs and 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴is Con-
trol operation costs. 
This part of our equation (Eq. 2.15.) depends on additional sub-steps related 
to hardware and software procurements and their deployment costs. Environment 
purchase could be evaluated as one time cost frozen in time, and deployment costs 
are connected to the deployment project. Environment definition includes hard-
ware, software and any other technical components required for system or solution 
business as usual activities. According to this, Action implementation costs could 
be calculated in the following way: 
 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) =  𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 + 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡), (2.15) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 – are hardware and software procurement costs and 
𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) – are project deployment costs. 
It needs to be mentioned that the same hardware and software could be used 
to ensure more than one information security control. In that case, Control imple-
mentation costs must be calculated only once. Any other controls should not be 
involved in the calculation, except the situation, when the existing control was 
amended, and such amendment costs were not calculated previously. 
Deployment project costs could be divided into three main groups: 
− Personnel who are performing such deployment actions. Technically it 
could be a team or even a whole department who will be deploying it; 
− Costs for configuration, which could be implemented by the 3rd party as 
a one-time contract cost; 
− Costs related to personnel training and awareness, before letting them use 
a new system. Training/ Learning or Awareness sessions could be imple-
mented internally or performed by external systems.   
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Such an approach allows us to calculate the Deployment costs as following 
in (Eq. 2.16): 
𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑
𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,          (2.16) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 is the Organization’s employee costs, which are defined by 
equation (Eq. 2.6),  𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 – Configuration costs, 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 – Train-
ing/Awareness costs. 
Operation costs are continuous costs that apply to control during the whole 
life cycle. These costs also include Environment support costs. Very often, organ-
izations are signing the Support agreements with hardware and software vendors 
trying to ensure the security and functionality of hardware and software in use.  
However, the use of hardware and software also requires an organization to safe-
guard its internal maintenance. For that purpose, often, internal resources are used. 
And the last part is related to the amendments implemented on existing solutions 
(hardware or software), defined as Other services. Such modifications could in-
volve the implementation of new functionality, changes in process workflow and 
others.  
Operation costs could be calculated according to the equation (Eq. 2.17):  
𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑_𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑
𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃, (2.17) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑_𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 is Environment support costs, 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 – Organiza-
tion employee costs, which are defined by Eq. 2.6, 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃 – cost of addi-
tional services needed for effective control functioning. 
Provided calculations are industry and organization size independent, and are 
oriented on information security implementation aspects, rather than on specific 
of different applicability scopes. 
2.1.3. Proposed Method Verification Experiment 
A modelling experiment was performed to  verify the applicability and 
effectiveness of the proposed information security costs evaluation method. Due 
to the advantage of the proposed control-based approach, calculations were sim-
ulated for one specific IT Security requirement. During the experiment, infor-
mation security costs were evaluated for two abstract companies ACME and 
EMCA, that are generally used for such modelling tasks. Both companies being 
modelled were implementing Logging and Monitoring control, required by ISO 
27001 and PCI DSS standards. The starting modelling conditions are presented in 
Table 2.1. 
Information security costs for Logging and monitoring control implementa-
tion was also calculated by five existing methods provided above.  
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Table 2.1. ACME and EMCA organizations initial configuration (Created by author) 
ACME EMCA 
ACME implementation is not 
aligned\certified by any IT Security docu-
ment. However, some Security areas (e.g., 
Logical Access management) are 
adequately covered by the organization. 
ACME Complexity level = 3, 
ACME has complex information systems, 
which are used for data management and 
interchange with 3rd parties.  
ACME maturity level = 2 “Repeata-
ble”. Some processes in the organization 
are implemented. However, they are 
weakly documented. 
The same 3rd party performed a risk 
assessment and penetration testing for 
both systems in scope. 
ACME has 342 employees and 5 
main departments (Management board; 
HR; Finance; IT support; Developers)  
Consultant hour rate – 30 € 
Employee hour rate – 11 € 
EMCA organization is already certi-
fied and is aligned with ISO 27001 stand-
ard; however, wants to be aligned with 
PCI DSS standard. 
EMCA Complexity level = 3, 
EMCA has complex information systems, 
which are used for data management and 
interchange with 3rd parties.  
EMCA maturity level = 4 “Man-
aged”. Main processes are fully managed, 
which means they are documented, moni-
tored and are fully under the day by day 
control. 
The same 3rd party performed a risk 
assessment and penetration testing for 
both systems in scope. 
EMCA has 245 employees and five 
departments (Management board; HR; Fi-
nance; IT support; Developers) 
Consultant hour rate – 30 € 
Employee hour rate – 11 € 
 
Information security implementation costs for both organizations were 
calculated according to the proposed methodology. Calculation results are 
presented in Table 2.2, where the calculation equation is provided along with re-
lated comments on each step. Detailed calculation is given in Annex A. 
Table 2.2. Cost of information security implementation of ACME and EMCA organiza-
tions (Created by author):  
Formula ACME EMCA 
Information security implementation costs 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
= 𝜑𝜑(𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
+ ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠))
𝑐𝑐
𝑆𝑆=1
 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 =
1.5 ∗ (1977 + 
246.4) = 
3355.1 € 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
= 0.75
∗ (1815.56
+ 3671.4)
= 𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒. 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 €  
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Such an approach allows us to calculate the Deployment costs as following 
in (Eq. 2.16): 
𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑
𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐/𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,          (2.16) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 is the Organization’s employee costs, which are defined by 
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𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑_𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
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mation security costs were evaluated for two abstract companies ACME and 
EMCA, that are generally used for such modelling tasks. Both companies being 
modelled were implementing Logging and Monitoring control, required by ISO 
27001 and PCI DSS standards. The starting modelling conditions are presented in 
Table 2.1. 
Information security costs for Logging and monitoring control implementa-
tion was also calculated by five existing methods provided above.  
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Table 2.1. ACME and EMCA organizations initial configuration (Created by author) 
ACME EMCA 
ACME implementation is not 
aligned\certified by any IT Security docu-
ment. However, some Security areas (e.g., 
Logical Access management) are 
adequately covered by the organization. 
ACME Complexity level = 3, 
ACME has complex information systems, 
which are used for data management and 
interchange with 3rd parties.  
ACME maturity level = 2 “Repeata-
ble”. Some processes in the organization 
are implemented. However, they are 
weakly documented. 
The same 3rd party performed a risk 
assessment and penetration testing for 
both systems in scope. 
ACME has 342 employees and 5 
main departments (Management board; 
HR; Finance; IT support; Developers)  
Consultant hour rate – 30 € 
Employee hour rate – 11 € 
EMCA organization is already certi-
fied and is aligned with ISO 27001 stand-
ard; however, wants to be aligned with 
PCI DSS standard. 
EMCA Complexity level = 3, 
EMCA has complex information systems, 
which are used for data management and 
interchange with 3rd parties.  
EMCA maturity level = 4 “Man-
aged”. Main processes are fully managed, 
which means they are documented, moni-
tored and are fully under the day by day 
control. 
The same 3rd party performed a risk 
assessment and penetration testing for 
both systems in scope. 
EMCA has 245 employees and five 
departments (Management board; HR; Fi-
nance; IT support; Developers) 
Consultant hour rate – 30 € 
Employee hour rate – 11 € 
 
Information security implementation costs for both organizations were 
calculated according to the proposed methodology. Calculation results are 
presented in Table 2.2, where the calculation equation is provided along with re-
lated comments on each step. Detailed calculation is given in Annex A. 
Table 2.2. Cost of information security implementation of ACME and EMCA organiza-
tions (Created by author):  
Formula ACME EMCA 
Information security implementation costs 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
= 𝜑𝜑(𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
+ ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠))
𝑐𝑐
𝑆𝑆=1
 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 =
1.5 ∗ (1977 + 
246.4) = 
3355.1 € 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
= 0.75
∗ (1815.56
+ 3671.4)
= 𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒. 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 €  
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Given methods were evaluated by comparing calculation time for initial iter-
ation; methods calculation time, when security requirements of the new document 
were added to the calculation scope; possibility to integrate new security docu-
ment; possibility to re-use previous calculation results. Second criteria allow us to 
evaluate methods re-usability and quality of links with existing or new security 
documents. 
Calculation, according to The Balance sheet oriented approach took approx-
imately the same amount of time as the new method (~ 1 hour to gather infor-
mation and calculate control implementation cost). Cost calculations for ACME 
organization were easy and effective because the organization did not have any 
controls in place and tried to implement new controls from scratch. Cost 
calculations for EMCA were complicated because in this case, both the cost of 
existing controls and the cost of additional actions had to be identified. It should 
be noted that from the Security point of view, document mapping was performed 
manually. It means that each new document would require from us additional doc-
ument and requirements mapping actions, which are growing exponentially with 
the number of mapped documents. 
The Security measure life-cycle approach required 40 minutes to perform 
calculations. However, risk analysis costs and procedural controls implementation 
costs identification was complicated. It has to be mentioned that this method let 
easily re-use results from previous calculations, so the calculation for EMCA or-
ganization, which tried to be aligned with second IT Security document, was per-
formed quicker than for ACME organization. 
IT-Security process-oriented approach takes 1.5 hours to perform calcula-
tions. The most complicated part was risk calculation because it required to have 
historical data about the incidents related to this control. Another identified issue 
is that the calculated risk does not have any correlation with mitigation controls. 
From a security point of view, it means that is not clear why one or another deci-
sion was made.   
The ISO/IEC 27001 method made it possible to calculate information secu-
rity costs in 35 minutes. However, the calculations revealed that it was difficult to 
identify control implementation expenses related to such areas as organization and 
people. It should be mentioned that this method proves to be very useful during 
calculation for EMCA organization. The method closely aligned to ISO/IEC 
27001 standard, which covers practically all information security areas and be-
cause of that could be easily mapped with PCI DSS standard requirements. 
The Information Security Management System – Layer approach was low 
effective for single control calculation. It took 1.75 hours to calculate Logging 
and Monitoring control costs according to this method. Besides, it has to be men-
tioned that some important areas such as Architecture and concepts were ignored 
2. CONTROLS-BASED APPROACH FOR INFORMATION SECURITY DOCUMENTS... 67 
 
 
during single control calculation because their calculation required the 
involvement of other system costs, which was out of scope for our experiment. 
A newly proposed method has one weak point, compared to the existing 
methods – it is based on a complicated calculation. However, even such compli-
cated calculation took only twice as long as the quickest cost calculation method. 
Besides, it should be noted that the calculation is complicated just for the first 
time. During the second cost evaluation, a large part of the results obtained during 
previously performed calculations could be reused due to their control orientation. 
It means that previous calculation results could be easily reused if needed. 
As far as the advantages of this method are concerned, it could be mentioned 
that this method t is control oriented, and as such is fully aligned with the existing 
Security documents and procedures and could cover all needed information secu-
rity aspects. 
According to Yolles (Yolles 1999), viability systems are complex actor sys-
tems which can survive under change through adoption. The same viability crite-
ria could be applied to the proposed method. Our experiment, with the 
implementation of a single security requirement/control in 2 different 
organizations, proved that this method could be effectively applied for the organ-
izations with varying levels of complexity and maturity. According to demand, it 
could be used to verify any current Information security document implementa-
tion costs, as soon as a list of Security requirements/controls related to this docu-
ment is defined.     
The proposed method could be most effectively used with specific tools or 
solutions, which would make it possible to map two or more information security 
document. In that case, after the first evaluation, the organization would be able 
to clearly identify which controls or areas in their organization are not secured or 
aligned with security document, and according to calculation results from previ-
ous evaluation to predict how much it will cost them. Such effects could be 
achieved by using IT Security document automation tools. 
For verification of the proposed method and 5 security cost evaluation meth-
ods presented in Chapter 1, we used the Cooke’s classical model (Cooke 1991). 
Cooke’s classical model (Cooke 1991) builds a weighted expert probability as-
sessment combination based on the proper scoring rule theory, where good cali-
bration and low entropy are the main factors. This model elicits quantiles from the 
experts’ distributions.  These scores are calculated based on the experts’ answers 
to the specific seed questions. A seed question is a specific type of question, for 
which the correct answer is known at the time of analysis and is used for evalua-
tion of the experts’ knowledge. 
The calibration score shows the deviation of the respondent’s evaluation 
scores from the true values of the known seed questions. These questions require 
66 2. CONTROLS-BASED APPROACH FOR INFORMATION SECURITY DOCUMENTS... 
 
 
Given methods were evaluated by comparing calculation time for initial iter-
ation; methods calculation time, when security requirements of the new document 
were added to the calculation scope; possibility to integrate new security docu-
ment; possibility to re-use previous calculation results. Second criteria allow us to 
evaluate methods re-usability and quality of links with existing or new security 
documents. 
Calculation, according to The Balance sheet oriented approach took approx-
imately the same amount of time as the new method (~ 1 hour to gather infor-
mation and calculate control implementation cost). Cost calculations for ACME 
organization were easy and effective because the organization did not have any 
controls in place and tried to implement new controls from scratch. Cost 
calculations for EMCA were complicated because in this case, both the cost of 
existing controls and the cost of additional actions had to be identified. It should 
be noted that from the Security point of view, document mapping was performed 
manually. It means that each new document would require from us additional doc-
ument and requirements mapping actions, which are growing exponentially with 
the number of mapped documents. 
The Security measure life-cycle approach required 40 minutes to perform 
calculations. However, risk analysis costs and procedural controls implementation 
costs identification was complicated. It has to be mentioned that this method let 
easily re-use results from previous calculations, so the calculation for EMCA or-
ganization, which tried to be aligned with second IT Security document, was per-
formed quicker than for ACME organization. 
IT-Security process-oriented approach takes 1.5 hours to perform calcula-
tions. The most complicated part was risk calculation because it required to have 
historical data about the incidents related to this control. Another identified issue 
is that the calculated risk does not have any correlation with mitigation controls. 
From a security point of view, it means that is not clear why one or another deci-
sion was made.   
The ISO/IEC 27001 method made it possible to calculate information secu-
rity costs in 35 minutes. However, the calculations revealed that it was difficult to 
identify control implementation expenses related to such areas as organization and 
people. It should be mentioned that this method proves to be very useful during 
calculation for EMCA organization. The method closely aligned to ISO/IEC 
27001 standard, which covers practically all information security areas and be-
cause of that could be easily mapped with PCI DSS standard requirements. 
The Information Security Management System – Layer approach was low 
effective for single control calculation. It took 1.75 hours to calculate Logging 
and Monitoring control costs according to this method. Besides, it has to be men-
tioned that some important areas such as Architecture and concepts were ignored 
2. CONTROLS-BASED APPROACH FOR INFORMATION SECURITY DOCUMENTS... 67 
 
 
during single control calculation because their calculation required the 
involvement of other system costs, which was out of scope for our experiment. 
A newly proposed method has one weak point, compared to the existing 
methods – it is based on a complicated calculation. However, even such compli-
cated calculation took only twice as long as the quickest cost calculation method. 
Besides, it should be noted that the calculation is complicated just for the first 
time. During the second cost evaluation, a large part of the results obtained during 
previously performed calculations could be reused due to their control orientation. 
It means that previous calculation results could be easily reused if needed. 
As far as the advantages of this method are concerned, it could be mentioned 
that this method t is control oriented, and as such is fully aligned with the existing 
Security documents and procedures and could cover all needed information secu-
rity aspects. 
According to Yolles (Yolles 1999), viability systems are complex actor sys-
tems which can survive under change through adoption. The same viability crite-
ria could be applied to the proposed method. Our experiment, with the 
implementation of a single security requirement/control in 2 different 
organizations, proved that this method could be effectively applied for the organ-
izations with varying levels of complexity and maturity. According to demand, it 
could be used to verify any current Information security document implementa-
tion costs, as soon as a list of Security requirements/controls related to this docu-
ment is defined.     
The proposed method could be most effectively used with specific tools or 
solutions, which would make it possible to map two or more information security 
document. In that case, after the first evaluation, the organization would be able 
to clearly identify which controls or areas in their organization are not secured or 
aligned with security document, and according to calculation results from previ-
ous evaluation to predict how much it will cost them. Such effects could be 
achieved by using IT Security document automation tools. 
For verification of the proposed method and 5 security cost evaluation meth-
ods presented in Chapter 1, we used the Cooke’s classical model (Cooke 1991). 
Cooke’s classical model (Cooke 1991) builds a weighted expert probability as-
sessment combination based on the proper scoring rule theory, where good cali-
bration and low entropy are the main factors. This model elicits quantiles from the 
experts’ distributions.  These scores are calculated based on the experts’ answers 
to the specific seed questions. A seed question is a specific type of question, for 
which the correct answer is known at the time of analysis and is used for evalua-
tion of the experts’ knowledge. 
The calibration score shows the deviation of the respondent’s evaluation 
scores from the true values of the known seed questions. These questions require 
68 2. CONTROLS-BASED APPROACH FOR INFORMATION SECURITY DOCUMENTS... 
 
 
the respondents to specify a probability distribution to describe an uncertain con-
tinuous variable that is divided into a number of ranges. For this calibration, it is 
divided into four ranges with the dividers being 5th, 50th and 95th quantile values 
based on (Cooke 2008). Let s = s1, …, sn be a probability distribution and assum-
ing pi > 0, i = [1; 4]; then the relative information of s with respect to p is (Cooke 
1991): 
 𝐼𝐼(𝑠𝑠, 𝑝𝑝) = ∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
4
𝑖𝑖=1 . (2.18) 
I(s, p) is an index of the information learned if it was believed that p was 
correct but subsequently learnt that s is correct. 
A set of experts e = 1, …, E assesses probabilities of each uncertain event. 
They assign the corresponding indicator functions to one of B probability bins that 
are associated with a distribution over the possible outcomes. These bins are de-
scribed by the probability pb of occurrence, in the range of [0; 1], b = 1, …, B. 
Based on the observed values and the assignments, weights, we are deter-
mined for each expert. The weights have to satisfy the following: we ≥ 0 and         
Σwe = 1. The weight we are defined for each expert individually.  
Let nb be a number of variables assigned to b, sb – the sample distribution of 
variables in bin b and N – the sum of the variables nb and H(pb) – the probability 
vector. Then the average response entropy is: 
 𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒(𝑙𝑙) =
1
𝑁𝑁
∑𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏 𝐻𝐻(𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏). (2.19) 
The calibration score is: 
 𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒) = 1 − 𝜒𝜒𝐵𝐵2[∑2𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼(𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏, 𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏)]. (2.20) 
If the expert sample distribution realizations are drawn independently from a 
distribution with quantiles as stated by the expert, then the likelihood ratio statistic 
2NI(s, p) is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square variable with 3 degrees of 
freedom (Cooke 2008). Then (2.7) becomes: 
 𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒) = 1 − 𝜒𝜒32(2𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼(𝑠𝑠, 𝑝𝑝)). (2.21) 
As opposed to the entropy, the information score is the second variable for 
the scoring. In distribution, the information is the distribution concentration de-
gree. Concentration or dis-concentration is measured relative to some other distri-
bution. The information is expressed as: 
 𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒(𝑙𝑙) =
1
𝑁𝑁
∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1 .  (2.22) 
Expert assessment combination is called a decision maker. “Good expertise” 
is considered to have good calibration and good information. Weights are associ-
ated with rewarding the “good expertise” in the process of decision making. 
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If the expert calibration score is above the set threshold, the weight of the 
expert e is the multiplication of calibration and information scores: 
 𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼(𝑒𝑒) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒)𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛). (2.23) 
Otherwise, the weight is set to zero. The threshold is set at the optimal posi-
tion that is described as the highest possible weight of a virtual expert (Sommestad 
et al. 2011). 
The seed questions are required to be very well validated and fall for the same 
domain of which the unknown variables are. These seed questions serve as an 
expert performance evaluation mechanism leading to weighing the importance of 
individual expert’s opinion to the whole dataset The robustness of the weighting 
is highly dependable on the number of seeds used. Based on (Cooke 1991) eleven 
questions is enough to recognize a substantial difference in calibration. These 
questions include both – overall knowledge about information security (questions 
from 1 to 21) and specific questions about information security documents (ques-
tions from 22 to 25) The known answer values of known questions are taken from 
the information security reports developed by such well-known security players 
as PwC, Verizon, Ernst and Young, Ponemon institute and others Questions from 
22 to 25 are taken from ISO 27001 standard, GDPR regulation, PCI DSS standard 
and NIST best practices.  
The seed questions of the survey are presented in the Annex B Table A.2. 
The quality of expert knowledge is to be expressed by the weights that are to be 
assigned to the experts, depending on their knowledge. The quality of knowledge 
is assessed using the Cooke’s expert elicitation method and the expert input cor-
relation to the known facts in Annex B Table A.2. 
To collect the required information – a set of experts of the domain is se-
lected, and their expertise acquired. Based on the method, three main metrics are 
acquired – the calibration score, mean relative total and the weight of an expert. 
The weights are then normalized so that the sum of the weights equals 1. The 
results of these calculations are presented in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3. Weights of expert assessments (Created by author) 
Id Calibration Mean relative   
total 
Unnormalized 
weight 
Normalized 
wight we 
E1 0.00476 2.072 0.00986 0.2597 
E2 0.00277 2.108 0.00583 0.1535 
E3 0.00264 2.111 0.00558 0.1468 
E4 0.00264 2.112 0.00558 0.1469 
E5 0.00264 2.107 0.00557 0.1466 
E6 0.00218 2.116 0 0 
E7 0.00264 2.105 0.00556 0.1464 
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ated with rewarding the “good expertise” in the process of decision making. 
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If the expert calibration score is above the set threshold, the weight of the 
expert e is the multiplication of calibration and information scores: 
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from 1 to 21) and specific questions about information security documents (ques-
tions from 22 to 25) The known answer values of known questions are taken from 
the information security reports developed by such well-known security players 
as PwC, Verizon, Ernst and Young, Ponemon institute and others Questions from 
22 to 25 are taken from ISO 27001 standard, GDPR regulation, PCI DSS standard 
and NIST best practices.  
The seed questions of the survey are presented in the Annex B Table A.2. 
The quality of expert knowledge is to be expressed by the weights that are to be 
assigned to the experts, depending on their knowledge. The quality of knowledge 
is assessed using the Cooke’s expert elicitation method and the expert input cor-
relation to the known facts in Annex B Table A.2. 
To collect the required information – a set of experts of the domain is se-
lected, and their expertise acquired. Based on the method, three main metrics are 
acquired – the calibration score, mean relative total and the weight of an expert. 
The weights are then normalized so that the sum of the weights equals 1. The 
results of these calculations are presented in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3. Weights of expert assessments (Created by author) 
Id Calibration Mean relative   
total 
Unnormalized 
weight 
Normalized 
wight we 
E1 0.00476 2.072 0.00986 0.2597 
E2 0.00277 2.108 0.00583 0.1535 
E3 0.00264 2.111 0.00558 0.1468 
E4 0.00264 2.112 0.00558 0.1469 
E5 0.00264 2.107 0.00557 0.1466 
E6 0.00218 2.116 0 0 
E7 0.00264 2.105 0.00556 0.1464 
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 After verification of expert knowledge, we left 5 experts, who asked to eval-
uate given 5 cost evaluation methods according to 5 criteria provided by us. Two 
worst evaluation results were eliminated. Each factor was evaluated in the scale 
from 1 to 10, where 1 shows that the method does not satisfy the requirement, and 
10 shows that it entirely fills it. Averages of expert evaluations were used as qual-
itative values for each criterion (Table 2.4). Graphical presentation for comparison 
results is presented in Fig. 2.1. 
Table 2.4. Information security costs implementation methods evaluation (Created by 
author) 
Cost evaluation method 
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The Balance Sheet Oriented ap-
proach 9.6 3.4 5.6 3.6 7.4 29.6 
The Security measure life-cycle ap-
proach 6.8 6.4 7.2 5.8 8.6 34.8 
IT-security process oriented ap-
proach 5.2 7.6 7.8 8.8 8.2 37.6 
The ISO/IEC 27001 oriented ap-
proach 6.4 9.4 4.2 9.6 7.6 37.2 
The Information security Manage-
ment System – Layers approach 3.8 9 3.8 9.6 7.4 33.6 
 
The results obtained highlight the fact that each technique has its weak points. 
The best effect was achieved by IT-Security process-oriented approach. However, 
senior management might find it difficult to understand this method. Furthermore, 
reusing it for another IT Security document implementation could be an issue. 
However, this approach allows covering all Information security areas, starting 
from operational controls and finishing with technical risk mitigation controls im-
plementation.  
Other methods had some disadvantages, which do not let them be effectively 
used for new Information security document requirements implementation pur-
pose. 
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Fig. 2.1. Information security costs implementation methods comparison results         
(Created by author) 
The main identified obstacles are:  
− Issues with covering organizational controls related to information secu-
rity; 
− Too narrow or too wide view on security control cost evaluation;  
− Problems to separate controls between different categories of costs. 
 
To verify the new method against an already existing method, the same five 
criteria were used. Verification was performed by the same 5 experts. Table 2.5 
presents information security consultant evaluation results for the newly proposed 
method: 
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Table 2.5. Evaluation of the proposed method against existing security cost evaluation 
methods (Created by author) 
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Proposed 
method 8.2 9.6 2.4 9.6 8.8 38.6 
 
Achieved results were compared with information security costs evaluation re-
sults, calculated and presented in table 2.6. In comparison with existing Infor-
mation security costs implementation methods, the proposed method is most ef-
fective in Links with existing Information security standards and Information 
security aspects coverage areas.  
Table 2.6. Evaluation of the proposed method against existing security cost evaluation 
methods (Created by author) 
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 The proposed method has the highest overall result. However all experts high-
lighted calculation complexity and complicated initial information gathering. Ex-
perts highlighted strong connections with Existing Security standards. IT Security 
process-oriented method, showed similar results as the main disadvantage was 
mentioned intelligibility to the management.   
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2.2. Improvement of Security Costs Evaluation 
Process by Using Data Automatically Captured from 
Business Process Model and Notation also        
Event-driven Process Chain Models 
At least four main calculations components (asset analysis; incident impact; con-
trol implementation and control operation), presented in our control-based 
security implementation cost verification method, directly depend on organiza-
tion’s business processes and elements which are participating in them. If these 
elements are correctly defined in the business process diagrams, it could help with 
automating the identification of an organization’s critical data assets. These assets 
(and their environment) could be integrated automatically in our security costs 
evaluation process.  
To identify the most effective diagrams, evaluation criteria must be defined. 
Two criteria were chosen from a set used by Aldin et al. (Aldin and de Cesare 
2009). The other three criteria, proposed by the author, are not so important for 
business process techniques integration to security cost evaluation process. The 
3rd criteria was offered by us and used to evaluate data presented by business pro-
cess techniques. Our evaluation will be based on: 
− Availability of details needed for security cost evaluation.  From the pro-
posed security cost evaluation method point of view, it is very important 
to identify hardware and software, which are participating in critical busi-
ness processes. Also, it is important to define the key stakeholders or or-
ganization employees who are implementing the business processes and 
data, which is used in the operations. Thus, the business process diagram 
should have the possibility to present details about the components men-
tioned above. 
− Ease-of-use. This criterion helps us to understand the extent, to which the 
business stakeholders who do not have specialist knowledge of the tech-
nique could be ready to apply the business process model technique. It is 
important because business process diagrams will be developed by differ-
ent types of specialists and will need to have a sufficient level of details 
about components used to ensure this process. 
− Understandability. This criterion helps us to understand the extent to 
which the business stakeholders who do not have specialist knowledge of 
the technique could understand the business process model technique. The 
argument for choosing this criterion is the same as for the previous one. 
In the first chapter, Business process modelling methods (i.e., BPMN, EPC, 
Flowchart, and Data Flow Chart) were presented and evaluated against these three 
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criteria. BPMN and EPC were identified as the most effective because they pro-
vide more information needed for security cost evaluation. 
In the first chapter, Business process modelling methods (i.e., BPMN, EPC, 
Flowchart, Data Flow Chart and UML activity diagram) were presented and eval-
uated against these three criteria. BPMN and EPC were identified as the most 
effective because they provide more information needed for security cost evalua-
tion. UML activity diagram wasn’t chosen for the further experiment because  
Cibran provided a way for translating BPMN models into UML activities (Cibran 
2009). In addition comparison performed by Geambasu does not offer evidence 
that exists differences in modelling using BPMN and UML 2.0 Activity Diagrams 
from the point of view of end-user readability (Geambasu 2012). 
To verify these models as the sources for initial input for the implementation 
costs evaluation method, the same simulation as the one performed during verifi-
cation of the security costs evaluation method itself was used. For the experiment, 
an abstract organization ACME and implementation of logging and monitoring 
control (mandatory according to all IT security documents) processes were taken.  
Fig. 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate information they could provide and the type of 
missing information.  
 
 
Fig. 2.2. Part of the Logging and Monitoring process Business Process Model and      
Notation Diagram (Created by author) 
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It is necessary to mention that some diagram components can provide the 
only piece of needed information, and some elements are participating in the eval-
uation; however, they are not directly related to the control implementation costs. 
 
 
Fig. 2.3. Part of the Logging and Monitoring process Event-driven Process Chain        
Diagram (Created by author) 
Provided example showing only part of the Logging and Monitoring process. 
This process is starting from the event, that organization do not have defined Log-
ging and Monitoring requirements. This event initiates “Identify Logging and 
Monitoring requirements” function. Given function is executed by Service owner 
and is based on two documents “Internal policies” and “External policies”. These 
two documents describe Logging and Monitoring requirements. Function “Iden-
tify logging and monitoring requirements” could initiate one of 2 possible events. 
In the cases, when organization do not know, which events must be gathered ini-
tiated “Events which must be gathered are unknown” and in the cases, when log-
ging and monitoring events are known initiated event “Events which need to be 
gathered are identified”. This decision is made by applying operator XOR (Exclu-
sive OR). XOR operator allows splitting one control flow into at least two 
branches. Event “Events which must be gathered are unknown” initiate function 
“Declare Logging and Monitoring requirements” owned by Service owner.  
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To present a variety in our analysis, four classes were used: provide all 
needed information (Full), provide part of the required information (Partial), 
required information does not directly link with control implementation (Not 
linked), and does not provide the required information (Missing). Table 2.6 
summarises our results. 
The analysis shows that the possibility to use business process diagrams for 
security controls implementation directly depends on the level of details provided. 
Some parts of the cost evaluation method calculation are out of the scope since 
they are related to the organization itself and could not be identified from separate 
business processes diagrams. Other calculations are connected to the risk assess-
ment process, which is used to determine the actual risk. 
Table 2.6. Analysis of the cost method components from the business process            
perspective (Created by author) 
The cost evaluation 
method component BPMN and EPC Comments 
Complexity and 
maturity coefficient Not linked 
This component is common for the whole 
organization, and from the separate control 
evaluation point of view, it could be 
ignored. 
Assets analysis Partial 
Fig. 2.1 and 2.2 allow the identification of 
primary stakeholders and infrastructure 
participating in the process, but it does not 
provide enough information on software 
and hardware details. 
Vulnerability analy-
sis Partial 
Lack of hardware and software details. 
Lack of information on organization proce-
dures and policies. Automation is not pos-
sible. 
Threats analysis Missing 
A security consultant performs this part of 
cost evaluation; thus, the diagram does not 
have this information.  
Impact analysis Partial 
Diagram provides details on assets; 
however, it could not provide information 
about losses. 
Penetration testing Missing 
This activity is optional and should not be 
present in business as a usual process un-
less the yearly test is planned. 
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The cost evaluation 
method component BPMN and EPC Comments 
Gap analysis Partial 
Our diagrams can provide a part of the 
needed details on infrastructure. However, 
the list of applied security requirements is 
out of scope. 
Control criticality 
coefficient Not linked 
Risk identification is a result of risk assess-
ment activities, which are out of scope for 
us. 
Mitigation strategy Not linked 
Mitigation strategy, from the business pro-
cess point of view, is not directly related to 
the business process flow. 
Environment pur-
chase (Action im-
plementation) 
Partial 
Business process flow allows identification 
of environment, which is needed to ensure 
process; however, lack of details does not 
allow to define hardware or software. 
Implementation 
team (Deployment   
Action implementa-
tion) 
Full 
Business process diagram allows us to 
identify units which will be participating in 
a new environment implementation pro-
cess.  
Configuration tasks 
(Deployment – Ac-
tion implementa-
tion) 
Partial 
Business process diagram does not provide 
enough details on hardware and software 
configurations, because of that, it could be 
challenging to identify costs related to 
these activities. 
Training/Aware-
ness (Deployment – 
Action implementa-
tion) 
Partial 
Information on infrastructure and main 
stakeholders could help in identifying miss-
ing training, but lack of details does not al-
low us to ensure, that all needed training is 
recognized. 
Supporting team 
(Operation activi-
ties) 
Full 
The business process allows us to identify 
all main stakeholders and their functions in 
the defined business process flow. 
Environment sup-
port (Operation ac-
tivities) 
Partial 
The business process allows us to identify 
infrastructure which will be used; however,  
lack of details does not allow to determine 
the level of support that will be needed and 
its price. 
Other services (Op-
eration activities) Partial 
This component is optional and will not be 
presented in all business processes. 
 
End of the Table 2.6 
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us. 
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cess point of view, is not directly related to 
the business process flow. 
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chase (Action im-
plementation) 
Partial 
Business process flow allows identification 
of environment, which is needed to ensure 
process; however, lack of details does not 
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Implementation 
team (Deployment   
Action implementa-
tion) 
Full 
Business process diagram allows us to 
identify units which will be participating in 
a new environment implementation pro-
cess.  
Configuration tasks 
(Deployment – Ac-
tion implementa-
tion) 
Partial 
Business process diagram does not provide 
enough details on hardware and software 
configurations, because of that, it could be 
challenging to identify costs related to 
these activities. 
Training/Aware-
ness (Deployment – 
Action implementa-
tion) 
Partial 
Information on infrastructure and main 
stakeholders could help in identifying miss-
ing training, but lack of details does not al-
low us to ensure, that all needed training is 
recognized. 
Supporting team 
(Operation activi-
ties) 
Full 
The business process allows us to identify 
all main stakeholders and their functions in 
the defined business process flow. 
Environment sup-
port (Operation ac-
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Partial 
The business process allows us to identify 
infrastructure which will be used; however,  
lack of details does not allow to determine 
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its price. 
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This component is optional and will not be 
presented in all business processes. 
 
End of the Table 2.6 
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It has to be mentioned that the business process can provide a part of the 
information for risk assessment, while other components, such as threat and vul-
nerability assessments, could not be linked to business processes. The high-level 
process design is presented in Fig. 2.4: 
 
 
Fig. 2.4. Business process model data integration with the cost evaluation method    
(Created by author) 
The analysis of existing business process modelling tools has shown that all 
of them can store data process in a portable format, which is close to XML or can 
be converted to the XML format. Such an opportunity allows us to automate the 
process. 
For the Logging and Monitoring processes provided in Fig. 2.1 and Fig. 2.2 
improved data extraction allowed automatically extract data about process service 
owner, environment (hardware and software) under the logging and monitoring 
scope and procedures/documents which define logging and monitoring require-
ments. In our experiment were used such tools as Microsoft Visio for business 
process diagram presentation and conversion to the XML;  Microsoft Excel for 
the calculation. Data accumulation step without involved in our experiment and 
data verification was performed manually   
The initial file of a business process diagram is generated by one of business 
process modelling tools (in our experiment, Microsoft Vision was used). The gen-
erated data is transferred to a separate layer, where file data was converted to the 
XML format. Then the generated XML files are assigned to the middleware ap-
plication. This application should help to extract and collect data needed for the 
security costs evaluation. Data sources could be different, starting from business 
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process models, security documents, and finishing with ontologies 
(Ramanauskaite, Olifer, et al. 2013). As a middleware layer, Web-services solu-
tions could be used. In our experiment, we used as a middleware layer the tech-
niques, which allowed us to import data to Excel format. This data later on was 
used for security control cost calculations. Additional information required for 
calculations was entered into the XLSX spreadsheet manually. 
It should be noted that in the principle diagram, the additional component 
“Data conversion verification” is used. In our experiment, this verification was 
done manually, by reviewing converted data. However, from the automation point 
of view, this process should be independent of the manual review. 
The last component is the calculation process. In our experiment, the 
Microsoft Excel application was used for this purpose. Data from the business 
process model was imported to an Excel spreadsheet with the help of open source 
tools. After that, Microsoft Excel was used to calculate security cost for Logging 
and Monitoring control. 
The proposed approach for automatic data gathering from business processes 
and gathered data integration to security cost evaluation process was verified in 
the experiment, which was performed in the ACME organization. The cost eval-
uation was performed for the Logging and Monitoring control system. The mid-
dleware components were replaced with open source conversion and import tools. 
To simplify the experiment, verification and additional data entry were performed 
manually. Need to be mentioned, that BPMN already has connections with secu-
rity ontologies and has developed BPMN-security extensions (Maines,                     
et al. 2015).  
The performed experiment has proven that the approach could be used to 
gather initial information needed for security cost evaluation. However, several 
gaps need to be handled to make this approach more effective. The main issues 
identified by the experiment are as follows: 
− A lack of details in the business process models. However, this vital in-
formation was not presented in the business process model developed by 
the business process owners by default; 
− A lack of details on the environment or activities costs. It is essential to 
know the number of person-months and respective price to estimate the 
cost. This issue could be solved by performing additional mapping 
against vendors’ prices or data supplied by the human resources (in the 
case of internal resources used); 
− A lack of details related to the organizational (policies, procedures, guide-
lines) controls, which are in place in the organization; 
− A manual approach for a part of activities that require further automation 
or application using more sophisticated tools.  
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During the experiment, the following valuable features of the method pro-
posed were confirmed: 
− An approach allows us to collect initial information needed for security 
requirements cost implementation evaluation from sources, which are 
well understood by the business owners. The use of the XML format al-
lows us to easily integrate the proposed model with other input systems 
needed for cost evaluation methods if their data is presented in a compat-
ible format. In the future implementation, WebServices could be used to 
integrate the existing solution with the security ontology or other valua-
ble sources of information;  
− The approach can automate the cost evaluation method because a massive 
amount of data and calculation could be done without operator interfer-
ence. It is still critically important to automate the data verification pro-
cess, which would allow us to ensure that data from different sources 
were imported without any errors. 
2.2. Conclusions of Chapter 2 
1. The proposed approach is security controls oriented and incorporates 
decision making and decision implementation costs. Complexity and 
Maturity level, incorporated in the calculations, allows applying the 
calculation to a broad set of organizations, characterized by a different 
level of systems and process complexity. Orientation to separate 
controls makes it possible to incorporate new security document 
without the need to re-calculate previous results. 
2. The performed experiments have shown that although the first 
calculation is time-consuming (more then 1 hour) and requires a large 
amount of information (up to 17 formulas with up to 32 different 
components), every next calculation for a newly added control or 
security document reuses data from the previous calculation and takes 
more than 50% less time. Information re-usage reduce amount of 
information needed for furher calculation up to 70%.  
3. The amendments suggested enable data import from the Business 
Process Model and Notation diagram also Event-driven Process chain 
diagram. Some calculation components weren’t presented in the 
business processes diagram (up to 32%). The research revealed that 
11 (68%) of 16 components used for Logging and Monitoring cost 
evaluation of are presented in the business processes.  
 
81 
 
3 
 
Automation of Harmonization, 
Analysis and Evaluation of 
Information Security Requirements   
As it was highlighted, organizations are forced to seek compliance with a set of 
multiple security documents. The proposed security cost implementation method 
would let us calculate the cost of specific security control or document. However, 
it would not be able to identify mandatory requirements applicable to the 
organization. To solve this problem, there needs to be an approach defined which 
would enable the harmonization of a set of various security documents. Further 
analysis would allow identifying a list of requirements, which are applicable to 
the organization, from the set of requirements of multiple security documents.  
This Chapter describes the harmonization technique, which was chosen for 
multiple security documents linking and visualization of the linking result. Re-
garding the fact that existing security ontologies (A. Herzog, G. Decker and            
S. Fenz) are not oriented to security controls implementation and do not cover a 
large amount of existing security documents requirements, a new ontology has 
been proposed. The new ontology is based on COBIT v5, allowing to increase the 
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number of security requirements covered by the new ontology. For effective anal-
ysis of a harmonized set of security documents, graph-based and Chord diagram-
based visualizations were proposed.  
A harmonized set of security documents explains how various security doc-
uments requirements are linked and covered. However, it does not allow to iden-
tify the Minimum Security Baseline. Thus, a new graph theory optimization algo-
rithms-based approach was proposed. Vertex cover algorithms and subgraph 
isomorphism property allow removing duplicated requirements and generating 
Minimum Security Baseline from the graph of a harmonized set of security docu-
ments. Furthermore, subgraph isomorphism property makes it possible to identify 
similar structures in the different graphs and is used for verification of 
organization implemented controls against Minimum Security Baseline.  
The proposed methods and results were published in international journals 
and presented in international conferences. The new COBIT v5 based ontology 
was published in (Ramanauskaite, Goranin, et al. 2013) and (Ramanauskaite, 
Olifer, et al. 2013). The proposed Minimum Security Baseline identification 
method was published in (Olifer, Goranin and Cenys, et al. 2019). 
3.1. Security Ontology for Adaptive Mapping of 
Security Documents 
As was summarized in Chapter 1 of this thesis, S. Fenz’s and A. Herzog’s ontol-
ogies have low-security document coverage and because of that do not allow to 
effectively link multiple security documents. At the same time, adaptive mapping 
as harmonization technique proves that a unified security framework would ena-
ble to develop a flexible structure, which could be easily amended upon demands. 
Harmonization through adaptive mapping requires having the base, which 
would be oriented to the security controls and allow covering as many security 
areas as possible. Existing security documents are not fit for the purpose because 
they define security requirements with a different level of details and cover dif-
ferent security aspects.       
3.1.1. Security Ontology for Adaptive Mapping of Security 
Documents 
Because of that, a new general-purpose security ontology, which would extend 
these two ontologies and would be more suitable for adaptive mapping of security 
documents, was proposed. 
The proposed ontology consists of five high-level classes in Fig. 3.1: 
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− Asset; 
− Countermeasure; 
− Organization; 
− Threat;  
− Vulnerability. 
These five classes are the most basic in the security area and are detailed at 
lower levels. 
AssetOrganization
Vulnerability
CountermeasureThreat
exploits
exists in
mitigate
eliminate
exists in
has
uses or have
 
Fig. 3.1. The top-level structure of the proposed Security ontology (Created by author) 
Asset class describes both tangible and intangible assets an organization can 
have. In proposed ontology. This class is described more appropriately than other 
security ontologies are adding more information on the usable data by the organ-
ization, location and other equipment, owned or used in the company and related 
to organization’s security. The intangible asset is divided into Data and Software, 
while the inner structure describes various types of data and software. The tangi-
ble assets are structured into subclasses of Movable and Unmovable assets               
in Fig. 3.2. Immovable assets describe the location and building concepts and the 
main elements, which can be found in it. Movable assets are structured into four 
subclasses: alarm systems and detectors; furniture; IT components; utilities. These 
four categories allow the creation of more links to security documents by defining 
what kind of assets are related to specific controls (what is at risk, what has a 
vulnerability, etc.). 
Countermeasure and Threat classes are described pretty well in A. Herzog’s 
ontology. Therefore, minor changes were made to it, and a similar structure and 
components to A. Herzog’s ontology were used. 
The need for more organizational concepts arose during the mapping of se-
curity documents, according to A. Herzog’s and S. Fenz’s security ontologies. 
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These two ontologies have a poor description of organization structure and poli-
cies, while the companies’ information security policy is the most important to 
ensure its security. As subclasses of the organization, Department, Personnel and 
Policy concepts were distinguished (see Fig. 3.3). Precise control description of 
security documents can be achieved if links to confident executor are be made. 
Therefore, the Department and Personnel classes were added and detailed to dis-
tinguish plausible types of departments and positions within it. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2. The basic hierarchy of asset concept (Created by author) 
Therefore, the COBIT 5 framework (ISACA 2013) was adopted into our on-
tology, by defining IT policy class as organization policy subclass, where all CO-
BIT 5 ideas are detailed.  The COBIT 5 framework guarantees the intuitive use of 
an ontology to those who are familiar with the COBIT framework. Meanwhile, to 
propose multiple views and ways to find the necessary concepts in the ontology, 
more subclasses were added to Policy class (see Fig. 3.3). These classes should 
present more general policies of the organization. However, most of them have 
relations to classes of IT policy class (COBIT 5 framework). 
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Fig. 3.3. The basic hierarchy of organization concept (Created by author) 
Vulnerability class was not properly detailed in A. Herzog’s (Herzog, 
Shahmehri and Duma 2007) and S. Fenz’s (Fenz 2010) ontologies as well. S. Fenz 
provides a list of vulnerabilities describing individuals with no structure, while    
A. Herzog describes basic types of vulnerabilities. Therefore, vulnerability class 
was extended by dividing it into Code vulnerabilities, Configuration vulnerabili-
ties, Design vulnerabilities, Policy vulnerabilities and Transfer vulnerabilities    
(see Fig. 3.4). Those classes are detailed to reflect the basic security vulnerabili-
ties. However, they are more structured than in S. Fenz’s ontology, to make them 
more intuitive and more straightforward for visualization. 
 
 
Fig. 3.4. The basic hierarchy of vulnerability concept (Created by author) 
To use this ontology as a basis for adaptive mapping of security documents, 
a clear and intuitive ontology structure has to be maintained (Fig. 3.5).  
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To use this ontology as a basis for adaptive mapping of security documents, 
a clear and intuitive ontology structure has to be maintained (Fig. 3.5).  
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The tree structure of the ontology was optimised. Therefore it currently has 
1795 classes, an average depth of the class tree is 6.5 (maximum value of the depth 
of class tree was equal to 9), and an average branching factor of the class tree is 
4.8 (has from 1 to 18 subclasses). Such a structure is more viewable in a tree 
structure and should be more intuitive for ontology users (see Fig. 3.6). Ontology 
consistency was verified by Protege 5.5 Reasoner plug-in Pellet 2.2. It is an 
automatic tool, which allows analyzing ontology characteristics seeking to evalu-
ate classes, object property, data property, individuals. Identified inconsistency 
issue was amended on the fly during the ontology development phase. 
 
 
Fig. 3.6. Structure fragment of proposed security ontology and adaptive mapping data in 
Adaptive Mapping of Security Document (created tool for adaptive mapping of security 
document) (Created by author) 
While structure optimisation of new security ontology is more important to 
ensure user-friendly usage and understanding, the new concepts allowed better 
coverage of security documents. A direct list of controls was not provided, and a 
similar ontology structure was used for document mapping as in A. Herzog’s on-
tology. Therefore, security document mapping to this ontology has to be done by 
defining more than one link to ontology. This mapping property is useful to 
analyse and map security concepts according to different documents. 
ISO27001(ISO/IEC:27001 2013), PCI DSS (PCI 2016), ISSA 5173 
(Information Systems Security Association 2011) and NISTIR 7621 (NISTIR 
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ate classes, object property, data property, individuals. Identified inconsistency 
issue was amended on the fly during the ontology development phase. 
 
 
Fig. 3.6. Structure fragment of proposed security ontology and adaptive mapping data in 
Adaptive Mapping of Security Document (created tool for adaptive mapping of security 
document) (Created by author) 
While structure optimisation of new security ontology is more important to 
ensure user-friendly usage and understanding, the new concepts allowed better 
coverage of security documents. A direct list of controls was not provided, and a 
similar ontology structure was used for document mapping as in A. Herzog’s on-
tology. Therefore, security document mapping to this ontology has to be done by 
defining more than one link to ontology. This mapping property is useful to 
analyse and map security concepts according to different documents. 
ISO27001(ISO/IEC:27001 2013), PCI DSS (PCI 2016), ISSA 5173 
(Information Systems Security Association 2011) and NISTIR 7621 (NISTIR 
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7621 2016) security standards were specified and mapped to the new security on-
tology to evaluate its suitability to link security standards. 80% of ISO27001, 
100% of PCI DSS, ISSA 5173 and NISTIR 7621 standards were mapped to the 
ontology (see Table 3.1), by using adaptive mapping through ontology. 
The 100% mapping of ISO27001 standard was not achieved because 
particular security standard requirements (like security properties of the operating 
system being used, etc.) were not mapped to high-level components of our ontol-
ogy. 
Table 3.1. Amount and percentage of ontology entities mapped with security requirements 
of the standards (Covered) and amount and percentage of security requirements of the 
standard mapped to the ontology (Covers) (Created by author) 
Standard 
Ontology / Standard coverage 
Proposed ontology 
Covered Covers 
ISO27001 130/1795 (7%) 
107/133 
(80%) 
PCI DSS 132/1795 (7%) 
165/165 
(100%) 
ISSA 5173 15/1795 (1%) 
12/12 
(100%) 
NISTIR 
7621 
19/1795 
(1%) 
10/10 
(100%) 
 
The ontology in question and mapping of the above four security standards 
to it can be used to generate adaptive maps between any of the two mapped secu-
rity standards, or an integrated standard can be created with the use of any set of 
the mapped security standards without the necessity of directly  mapping two se-
curity standards. As our proposed security ontology can cover a more substantial 
part of concepts in the analyzed security standards (the average coverage of these 
4 security standards is 92%, while S. Fenz’s average coverage of these security 
standards is 27%, A. Herzog’s  –  20%), the adaptive mapping of security stand-
ards will be more precise by applying it as a basis ontology (Table 3.1). However, 
the ontology does not cover all standards by 100%. Therefore it should be im-
proved to get an even bigger precision of adaptive mapping. 
3.1.2. Visualization of Mapped Security Documents  
From the list of visualization methods analysed in Chapter 1 of this thesis for Se-
curity ontology representation, the tree (a specific kind of graph) structure was 
proposed. Such an approach allows us to represent the concepts of the document 
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and to display inheritance links to describe only the main structure. Other 
connections could be presented through node notation and analysed by viewing 
detailed information of a specific node. 
Some node notation modifications are proposed to make the document tree 
more representative for viewing the mapped documents: 
− The width of stroke for a node defines how many documents have an an-
alogue for this control (the number of mapped documents, and not the 
number of mapped nodes in other documents). 
− The pattern of stroke for a node defines what type of match the node has 
with the nodes of other documents (if the node of a different document 
partially matches the node – the value is 1; if the node of a different doc-
ument fully matches the node – the value is 2; if the node of a different 
document is redundant – the value is 3): 
 The length of the dash defines the maximum match value. 
 The length of space defines the minimum match value. 
Additional information, such as a full description of the node, details of con-
trols matching, etc. should be represented separately for each of the nodes. A small 
example of integrated security document tree notation usage is presented in         
Fig. 3.7. It can be noticed that nodes A-1, A-2, A-9, A-3, A-10 and A-7 have no 
matches in other documents while nodes A-4, A-11, A-5 and A-8 have one match, 
whereas  nodes A-6 and A 12 have two matches with different documents. The 
width of a node stroke can retrieve this information.  
 
 
Fig. 3.7. Example of proposed security document mapping visualization, using graph 
structure (Created by author) 
Graph-based visualization of the security documents with a large number of 
components is complicated because the graph requires a lot of space to present all 
of them. Besides, other disadvantages of this visualization are that only one doc-
ument structure can be viewed at once (the user chooses which document should 
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ards will be more precise by applying it as a basis ontology (Table 3.1). However, 
the ontology does not cover all standards by 100%. Therefore it should be im-
proved to get an even bigger precision of adaptive mapping. 
3.1.2. Visualization of Mapped Security Documents  
From the list of visualization methods analysed in Chapter 1 of this thesis for Se-
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and to display inheritance links to describe only the main structure. Other 
connections could be presented through node notation and analysed by viewing 
detailed information of a specific node. 
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more representative for viewing the mapped documents: 
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with the nodes of other documents (if the node of a different document 
partially matches the node – the value is 1; if the node of a different doc-
ument fully matches the node – the value is 2; if the node of a different 
document is redundant – the value is 3): 
 The length of the dash defines the maximum match value. 
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Additional information, such as a full description of the node, details of con-
trols matching, etc. should be represented separately for each of the nodes. A small 
example of integrated security document tree notation usage is presented in         
Fig. 3.7. It can be noticed that nodes A-1, A-2, A-9, A-3, A-10 and A-7 have no 
matches in other documents while nodes A-4, A-11, A-5 and A-8 have one match, 
whereas  nodes A-6 and A 12 have two matches with different documents. The 
width of a node stroke can retrieve this information.  
 
 
Fig. 3.7. Example of proposed security document mapping visualization, using graph 
structure (Created by author) 
Graph-based visualization of the security documents with a large number of 
components is complicated because the graph requires a lot of space to present all 
of them. Besides, other disadvantages of this visualization are that only one doc-
ument structure can be viewed at once (the user chooses which document should 
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be displayed). Therefore, the mapping of only one document to other documents 
can be displayed, and there will be no full information about how different docu-
ments are mapped to each other. 
To achieve full mapping information visualization with Chord diagram, it is 
better to use centric charts. They are more appropriate, as all document nodes can 
be viewed at once. A large number of links between nodes identified are grouped 
to increase the abstraction level. However, information that is more detailed can 
be extracted, including interactive explanations, highlights, etc. The biggest dis-
advantage of this type of mapped document visualization is the lack of document 
structure presentation. However, the visualization was improved by adding the 
document structures in the outer border of the circle. It increases the size of the 
diagram. However, both full mapping information and document structures can 
be visualized at the same time, see Fig. 3.8. 
 
 
Fig. 3.8. Example of the Chord diagram for security document mapping visualization 
(Created by author) 
Proposed visualization instances were verified by applying the System 
Usability Scale. The System Usability Scale provides a reliable tool for measuring 
usability. It consists of a 10 item questionnaire with five response options for 
respondents; from Strongly agree (5 points) to Strongly disagree (1 point).  
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Originally created by John Brooke in 1986, it used to evaluate a wide variety of 
products and services, including hardware, software, mobile devices, websites and 
applications. Visualization instances were verified by the same 7 Information 
Security experts, who participated in the evaluation of Information cost methods. 
According to the System Usability Scale verification method, systems which 
collect more than 80.3 are defined as “Excellent”, between 68 and 80.3 are defined 
as “Good”, systems which collect 68 are defined as “Average”, between 51 and 
68 are defined as “Poor”, and below 51 are “Awful”. Experts results are presented 
in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. The System Usability Scale verification results  (Created by author) 
Expert Chord diagram Graph representation 
E1 75 67.5 
E2 78 78 
E3 73 63 
E4 80 88 
E5 70 70 
E6 78 83 
E7 80 53 
Average 76.29 71.79 
 
As we can see from given results, both values are between 68 and 80.3, and 
it means, that both proposed instances could be defined as “Good”. However need 
to be mentioned, that Chord diagram visualization gathered higher score and ac-
cording to the experts are more usable, than graph representation. However, graph 
representation allows providing detailed information about each requirement and 
its links with other security documents requirements. 
3.1.3. Method Evaluation Results 
A general comparison of G. Denker’s (Denker, Kagalb and Finin 2005), A. Her-
zog’s (Herzog, Shahmehri and Duma 2007) and S. Fenz ’s (Fenz, Ontology-based 
Generation of IT-Security Metrics 2010) security ontologies has shown the neces-
sity of user-friendly ontology structure – all three ontologies have classes, with 
more than 25 subclasses in them. Such ontology could be challenging to use for 
visual presentation or quick knowledge search. 
The OntoMetric methodology allows a more precise judgment of security 
ontologies rather than general comparison because it enables an evaluation of the 
content of compared ontologies. However, the evaluation marks are very depend-
able on the evaluator’s opinion and requirements for the ontology. Assessment of 
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sity of user-friendly ontology structure – all three ontologies have classes, with 
more than 25 subclasses in them. Such ontology could be challenging to use for 
visual presentation or quick knowledge search. 
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ontologies rather than general comparison because it enables an evaluation of the 
content of compared ontologies. However, the evaluation marks are very depend-
able on the evaluator’s opinion and requirements for the ontology. Assessment of 
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ontologies’ ability to be mapped to security documents is a more suitable meas-
urement to choose the basis of the ontology for adaptive mapping of security doc-
uments compared to OntoMetric (Lozano-Tello and Gomez-Perez 2004). 
To evaluate ontologies’ suitability to map different security documents, per-
centage of concepts in security standards (ISO 27001 (ISO/IEC:27001 2013), PCI 
DSS (PCI 2016), ISSA 5173 (Information Systems Security Association 2011) 
and NISTIR 7621 (NISTIR 7621 2016)), which can be mapped to security ontol-
ogy, was compared. This research revealed there are no security ontologies that 
would be able to map at least 50% of the analysed security documents. This fact 
implies the necessity of a new or modified ontology which could be used to 
present larger parts of knowledge, used in security documents. 
A new security ontology was proposed. The new ontology was developed by 
integrating concepts of COBIT framework (ISACA 2013) and integrating part of 
classes of A. Herzog’s and S. Fenz’s ontologies. The new ontology increased the 
coverage of security documents. Using this security ontology, from 80% to 100% 
of the analysed security standards (ISO 27001, PCI DSS, ISSA 5173 and NISTR 
7621) can be mapped to it. This percentage can be increased even more with the 
addition of more specific (related to payment cards, law and standard require-
ments, etc.) concepts to this ontology. The proposed security ontology has a more 
balanced tree structure as well, which increases its visualization possibilities. 
Both of the proposed visualization methods were implemented in our adap-
tive mapping of security standard (hereinafter – AMSS) tool where four standards 
(ISO 27001, PCI DSS, ISSA 5173 and NISTIR 7621) were mapped using the 
proposed security ontology. The use of both of these documents mapping 
visualization methods showed that: 
− A chord diagram is very helpful when the main trends in document simi-
larities have to be estimated or summarised as the width of mapping links 
illustrates how often specific control is mapped to other controls. Fur-
thermore, this visualization method helps to identify unmapped controls 
as “blank areas” with no mapping connections are seen. 
− The improvement of Chord diagram to add the hierarchy of document 
nodes was useful, as now the Chord diagram can provide almost the same 
information as a graph structure diagram. 
− Graph structure visualization is more suitable when one security docu-
ment has to be analyzed, and the information is needed on how controls 
of this document match control in another document, what type of 
matching exists between those two nodes, etc. 
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3.2. The Proposed Method on MSB Identification 
and Verification Against Deployed Controls 
The previously proposed adaptive mapping method (Ramanauskaite, Olifer,           
et al. 2013) was valid for an understanding of the overall security requirements 
and visualization of their connections but could not be used for MSB identifica-
tion. It was proved in (Olifer et al. 2017) and (Olifer, Goranin and Janulevicius, 
et al. 2017), where security requirements implementation cost evaluation through 
control-based method was proposed, that security controls and security document 
requirements presentation as nodes and their connections as a link between nodes 
is effective. 
Minimum Security baseline identification for the set of security documents, 
require to implement a few steps. The first step requires to harmonize set of dif-
ferent security documents to define a list of all requirements applicable for the 
organization. Security ontology and adaptive mapping through it allows adding a 
new security document, without the need to review previous harmonization re-
sults. The second step requires to analyze a set of security requirements from dif-
ferent security documents and identify unique requirements. This step could be 
implemented by applying graph theory properties (Johna and Wilscy 2015). 
For MSB identification, information security documents presentation as un-
directed graphs, when the graph is defined as a pair of sets (V, E), where V is the 
set of vertices and E is the set of edges, formed by pairs of vertices, were proposed. 
In our case, security requirements are graph nodes, and edges between graph 
nodes show the links between these requirements. When two or more information 
security documents have to be mapped, a new graph is created by establishing 
relationships between the corresponding requirements of these documents. Previ-
ously created graphs of information security documents will be the subgraphs of 
a newly created graph. For simplicity purposes, a restriction was defined that if 
requirements of different documents are linked, i.e. has edges between vertexes, 
then they define the same requirement and duplicate each other, although in reality 
requirements can be not entirely identical and could define a security requirement 
with a different level of detail. MSB identification requires removing duplicated 
requirements from the new graph by applying Vertex cover algorithms. After 
identification of MSB, it could be compared how controls implemented by the 
organization are aligned with it. The controls implemented by an organization can 
also be presented as a graph. This graph can be compared with previously identi-
fied MSB graph to verify matches between them. 
Vertex cover algorithm and Graph isomorphism property was described in 
Chapter 1 of the thesis.  
The methods presented below help to  solve two different problems: MSB 
identification and MSB verification against controls implemented by the 
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identification and MSB verification against controls implemented by the 
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organization.The method is based on graph theory and graph optimisation algo-
rithms (Vertex cover and Subgraph isomorphism).   
3.2.1. Minimum Security Baseline Identification 
For MSB identification, the use of Vertex cover algorithm is proposed. It is used 
for amending the created mapping graph, by removing from its specific vertexes. 
However, it needs to be ensured that only duplicated requirements are removed. 
Two options exist to achieve that:   
− to apply minimum weighted vertex cover algorithms to ensure that the 
critical requirements having lower value  are presented in a newly gener-
ated graph;  
− to use the selected minimum vertex cover algorithm with additional rules 
to ensure that higher level security requirements are not  overwritten by 
lower-level requirements, and requirements without direct connections 
with another document are not removed. 
The second option was selected for implementation for simplicity reasons. 
The following rules were specified to ensure prioritisation of specific require-
ments: 
− Restriction to remove requirements having a connection to parent vertex, 
but no links to other documents. To achieve that, additional null vertex 
to such vertex will be added. 
− Additional evaluation of removed vertexes. It is important to ensure that 
vertexes without a direct connection to other security documents are not 
removed from the graph. Vertexes must be restored manually if they 
were removed. 
 
 
Fig. 3.9. Schematic Minimum security baseline identification method representation 
(Created by author) 
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The method is formed of 4 the main steps (schematic method representation 
is provided on Fig. 3.10): 
− represent information security documents’ requirements to be mapped as 
separate graphs; 
− generate a new graph by linking requirements of N subgraphs (represent-
ing different information security documents); 
− add the vertex to the vertexes with a single edge; 
− apply the Minimum Vertex Cover algorithm. 
Table 3.3. Minimum security baseline identification method action description         
(Created by author) 
Action 
No. 
Description 
I Documents’ requirements are presented hierarchically. 
If vertexes have edges between them, this means that the requirements are 
identical.  
Differentiation by coverage level is out of scope for this method feasibility 
verification.  
For our purpose, link directions are not important. 
II Generated graph is reviewed, and temporary vertexes are added. Additional 
vertexes are added to the graph to ensure that the Minimum vertex cover 
algorithm does not remove existing vertexes, which do not have direct con-
nections with other security documents.  
III The mapping graph is represented as an adjacency matrix for technical pro-
cessing by a vertex cover algorithm. 
IV Vertex cover algorithm is applied. The result is presented in the form of 
rows.  
Since the assumption that duplicated vertexes are identical, and removal of 
any vertex would provide a suitable result, this leads to the situation when 
several similar solutions (several rows) can be generated. 
V Vertexes without a direct connection to other documents that were removed 
from the mapping graph are restored (the process is currently manual).  
Because of a different level of detail in various documents, the future ap-
proach could make use of additional criteria, which would allow removing 
vertexes, with a specified level of detail.  
 
The proposed algorithm was also presented in pseudocode form (see              
Table 3.4). Below provided code explain all algorithms steps and actions: 
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Table 3.4. Minimum security baseline identification method algorithm                      
(Created by author) 
Algorithm 
algorithm Minimum Security Baseline identification methodologies is 
 input: Security documents set, 
  Security documents mapping schema 
 output: Minimum Security Baseline graph-based G(V, E) 
 
for each Security documents in Security documents set do 
  convert security requirement to the graph vertexes Gi(V,E), 
  convert relationships between requirements to the graph edges Gi(V,E) 
 
if Security documents mapping schema wasn’t used, then 
 link graph Gi(V,E) vertex to graph Gi+1(V,E) vertex according to Security docu-
ments mapping schema 
else Initial graph G(V,E) generation is finished  
 
for each vertex in Initial graph do  
 if Initial graph vertex Gi(V,E) has one edge, then  
  create new vertex and link new vertex with Gi(V,E) 
 else check next vertex 
 
convert Initial graph to the graph adjacency matrix 
 
apply vertex cover algorithm to the graph adjacency matrix 
 C = ∅ 
 E’=G.E 
  
 while E'≠∅: 
  let (u,v) be an arbitrary edge of E’ 
  C = C ∪ {u, v}  
  remove from E’ every edge incident on either u or v 
 return C 
 
for each value VRi in vertex cover algorithm result set 
 if VRi ϶ G(V, E) then  
leave it in the G(V, E). 
 else remove vertex and all its edges from G(V, E) 
 
review Minimum Security Baseline graph G(V, E) 
 if inconsistency spotted, then  
add missed vertexes and their edges 
 
return G(V, E) 
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After Vertex cover algorithm is applied, it needs to be ensured that vertexes 
having no direct connection to other documents and thus removed from the graph 
are restored. The outcome of this process will be the MSB graph. 
The formal MSB identification method described with the help of the 
Business Process Model, and Notation diagram is presented in Fig. 3.10. 
In Table 3.3 a detailed description of actions defined in Fig. 3.10 is provided. 
The proposed method has 5 main steps, which cover 3 main phases: Preparation, 
Implementation and Post-verification. 
3.2.2. Minimum Security Baseline Verification Against        
Deployed Controls 
When the MSB graph is identified in the next step, graph vertexes (MSB 
requirements) verification against controls already deployed by the organization 
is performed. As stated earlier, subgraph isomorphism algorithms are used for that 
task. In our case, it is not significantly important which subgraph isomorphism 
algorithm will be used since our primary goal is to perform a feasibility study of 
such an approach and its practical applicability. 
In this step, controls implemented by the organization are presented as a 
graph (further Deployed Control Graph or DCG), which is compared with the re-
ceived MSB graph to verify alignment of requirements matches.  
It is important to mention that the DCG graph may have stand-alone vertexes, 
i.e., not be connected with any other vertexes, which is usually caused by incon-
sistency while developing the information security management system (ISMS). 
Because of that, it is necessary to ensure that all controls (even stand-alone) are 
verified. It is achieved by introducing two additional conditions: 
For simplicity reasons, while implementing a subgraph isomorphism algo-
rithm, any other vertex verification properties (e.g. name matching or properties 
matching) will be used. Further verification could potentially make the approach 
more effective. However, it is not so important during this stage when just method 
feasibility is evaluated. 
Due to the fact, that DCG graph could have stand-alone vertexes or small 
subgraphs separate parts of the DCG graph must be compared against the MSB 
graph. 
The formal MSB verification against deployed controls method description 
with the help of the BPMN diagram is presented in Fig. 3.11. 
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In Table 3.5. a detailed description of the Minimum Security baseline graph 
verification against deployed controls actions defined in Fig. 3.11. is provided. 
Table 3.5. Description of Minimum Security baseline graph verification against                
deployed controls (Created by author) 
Action 
No. 
Description 
I This action includes two main activities:  
 Information gathering about controls deployed;  
 Presentation of information gathered in the form of a graph.  
Information gathering could be done manually or by automation tools that 
can process BPMN or EPC diagrams.  
The generated graph may have stand-alone vertexes, i.e. not be connected 
with any other vertexes, 
The process of identifying links between controls in the organization is 
complicated. It could be accelerated if it is known that the organization is 
compliant with one or another security document. 
II MSB and DCG graphs (or their representation form such as adjacency 
matrix or table) are imported to the graph processing tool, and the 
subgraph isomorphism algorithm is executed. 
If the DCG graph has stand-alone vertexes or small subgraphs, subgraph 
isomorphism algorithm is executed for each of them separately. 
III Since a stand-alone vertex is isomorphic to any vertex of MSB, additional 
verification based on a specified criterion (e.g. semantic similarity) 
should be used. 
Error verification can be done automatically, by applying additional veri-
fication criteria and re-executing subgraph isomorphism algorithm against 
subgraph or manually by a security specialist. 
IV Controls required by MSB but not present in DCG are identified. 
 
The formal method of minimum security baseline verification against de-
ployed controls described with the help of the Business Process Model, and 
Notation diagram is presented in Fig. 3.11 
In Table 3.5, a detailed description of actions defined in Fig. 3.11 is provided. 
The proposed method has 4 main steps, which cover 3 main phases: Preparation, 
Implementation and Post-verification. 
The proposed algorithm was also presented in pseudocode form in the             
Table 3.6.  
Below provided code explain all algorithms steps and actions: 
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Table 3.6. Minimum Security baseline graph verification against deployed controls al-
gorithm (Created by author) 
Algorithm 
algorithm Verification method of compliance of organization controls is 
 input: list of controls implemented by the organization, 
             Minimum Security Baseline graph GMSB(V, E) 
 output: List of missed Minimum Security Baseline requirements L 
 
transform controls implemented by the organization to the graph GOC(V,E) 
 
for each vertex and edges in  GMSB(V, E) and GOC(V,E) do 
 procedure match(s) 
   input: an intermediate state s; the initial state s0 has M(s0) = Ø 
  output: the mapping between the two graphs 
 
  if  M(s) covers all the nodes of GMSB(V, E) then 
   output: M(s) 
  else compute the set P(s) of the pairs candidate for inclusion in M(s) 
          for each p in P(s) do 
              if the feasibility rules succeed for the inclusion of p in M(s) then 
                   compute the state s´ obtained by adding p to M(s) 
               call match(s) 
Restore data structures 
 return match(s) 
 
if warnings or errors > 0 then 
 review warnings and errors; 
 amend GOC(V, E); 
 re-execute Subgraph isomorphism algorithm 
 
for each vertex in match(s) do 
if match(s)  ϶ GMSB(V, E) then  
remove vertex and all it edges from the GMSB(V, E). 
 else leave vertex in the GMSB(V, E) 
 
rename GMSB(V, E) to List of missed Minimum Security Baseline requirements L 
return L 
 
The method concept was tested experimentally to prove its feasibility for 
real-life applications. The test results are presented and discussed in the “Method 
Experimental Testing Results and Discussion” section. 
100 3. AUTOMATION OF HARMONIZATION, ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION … 
 
In Table 3.5. a detailed description of the Minimum Security baseline graph 
verification against deployed controls actions defined in Fig. 3.11. is provided. 
Table 3.5. Description of Minimum Security baseline graph verification against                
deployed controls (Created by author) 
Action 
No. 
Description 
I This action includes two main activities:  
 Information gathering about controls deployed;  
 Presentation of information gathered in the form of a graph.  
Information gathering could be done manually or by automation tools that 
can process BPMN or EPC diagrams.  
The generated graph may have stand-alone vertexes, i.e. not be connected 
with any other vertexes, 
The process of identifying links between controls in the organization is 
complicated. It could be accelerated if it is known that the organization is 
compliant with one or another security document. 
II MSB and DCG graphs (or their representation form such as adjacency 
matrix or table) are imported to the graph processing tool, and the 
subgraph isomorphism algorithm is executed. 
If the DCG graph has stand-alone vertexes or small subgraphs, subgraph 
isomorphism algorithm is executed for each of them separately. 
III Since a stand-alone vertex is isomorphic to any vertex of MSB, additional 
verification based on a specified criterion (e.g. semantic similarity) 
should be used. 
Error verification can be done automatically, by applying additional veri-
fication criteria and re-executing subgraph isomorphism algorithm against 
subgraph or manually by a security specialist. 
IV Controls required by MSB but not present in DCG are identified. 
 
The formal method of minimum security baseline verification against de-
ployed controls described with the help of the Business Process Model, and 
Notation diagram is presented in Fig. 3.11 
In Table 3.5, a detailed description of actions defined in Fig. 3.11 is provided. 
The proposed method has 4 main steps, which cover 3 main phases: Preparation, 
Implementation and Post-verification. 
The proposed algorithm was also presented in pseudocode form in the             
Table 3.6.  
Below provided code explain all algorithms steps and actions: 
3. AUTOMATION OF HARMONIZATION, ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION … 101 
 
Table 3.6. Minimum Security baseline graph verification against deployed controls al-
gorithm (Created by author) 
Algorithm 
algorithm Verification method of compliance of organization controls is 
 input: list of controls implemented by the organization, 
             Minimum Security Baseline graph GMSB(V, E) 
 output: List of missed Minimum Security Baseline requirements L 
 
transform controls implemented by the organization to the graph GOC(V,E) 
 
for each vertex and edges in  GMSB(V, E) and GOC(V,E) do 
 procedure match(s) 
   input: an intermediate state s; the initial state s0 has M(s0) = Ø 
  output: the mapping between the two graphs 
 
  if  M(s) covers all the nodes of GMSB(V, E) then 
   output: M(s) 
  else compute the set P(s) of the pairs candidate for inclusion in M(s) 
          for each p in P(s) do 
              if the feasibility rules succeed for the inclusion of p in M(s) then 
                   compute the state s´ obtained by adding p to M(s) 
               call match(s) 
Restore data structures 
 return match(s) 
 
if warnings or errors > 0 then 
 review warnings and errors; 
 amend GOC(V, E); 
 re-execute Subgraph isomorphism algorithm 
 
for each vertex in match(s) do 
if match(s)  ϶ GMSB(V, E) then  
remove vertex and all it edges from the GMSB(V, E). 
 else leave vertex in the GMSB(V, E) 
 
rename GMSB(V, E) to List of missed Minimum Security Baseline requirements L 
return L 
 
The method concept was tested experimentally to prove its feasibility for 
real-life applications. The test results are presented and discussed in the “Method 
Experimental Testing Results and Discussion” section. 
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3.2.3. Experimental Method Verification Results  
Three regulating documents were selected for mapping: ISO27002 (ISO/IEC 
27002 2013), PCI DSS (PCI 2016) and a newly introduced GDPR (EU regulation 
2016). Mapping (see Fig. 3.12) was based on the HITRUST CSF 9.1 framework 
(HITRUST 2018), which provides a table-based mapping of the majority of mod-
ern information security documents and other regulating documents. 
 
 
Fig. 3.12. GDPR–ISO27002–PCI DSS mapping (partial view) (HITRUST 2018) 
Each of the security documents (ISO27002, PCI DSS, GDPR) was presented 
as a graph (sample presented in Fig. 3.13). Cytoscape 3.6.1 application was used 
for graph visualization.  
 
   
 a)  b)  c) 
Fig. 3.13. Security document graph (partial view) generated with Cytoscape help      
(Created by author): a) ISO27002 standard, b) PCI DSS standard, c) GDPR regulation 
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Later, mapping of separately generated graphs from HITRUST CSF 9.1 
framework (HITRUST 2018) was performed, although other mapping methods, 
like the expert-based approach, could be applied. The resulting graph (Fig. 3.14) 
had 1267 vertexes (150 related to ISO27002 standard, 264 vertexes associated 
with PCI DSS standard and 853 to GDPR) and 2512 edges. 
Null vertexes were added to ensure that vertexes that do not have direct 
connections with other documents are not removed. Addition of null vertexes has 
increased the size of the mapping graph by 463 vertexes. 
The mapping graph was converted to the adjacency matrix by Cytoscape 
plug-in “AdjExporter”. The resulting matrix (Fig. 3.15) was saved in *.adj file. 
 
  
 
Fig. 3.15. Matrix view of adjacency matrix for the mapping graph generated with 
TreeView help (Created by author.   
Part A of Fig. 3.15 presents a small part of the generated adjacency matrix, 
and part B presents the whole matrix. Black dots on the screen provide infor-
mation on graph components and connections between them. Part B view was 
created by an open source TreeView 3.0 Java application. 
After the adjacency matrix is created, the vertex cover algorithm is applied. 
For our purpose, a C++ application developed by A. Dharwadker (Dharwadker 
2011) and implementing his proposed vertex cover algorithm, was used. The 
application requires specifying the desired size k of the resulting vertex cover. In 
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our case, k was defined as equal to 2 to find all possible vertex covers. The result 
of vertex cover search is provided in a *.txt file and includes information on the 
minimum amount of vertexes and provides the list of all vertexes involved in a 
found vertex cover (Fig. 3.16). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.16. List of potential vertex cover (Partial view) (Created by author) 
Since all obtained vertex covers with the minimum number of vertexes are 
equivalent, any of them can be selected for further processing. Based on the 
chosen vertex cover, unnecessary vertexes are removed from the mapping graph 
with the help of Cytoscape application. As can be seen, the number of vertexes 
can be significantly reduced (from 1267 vertexes in the initial graph to 322 ver-
texes). The resulting MSB graph is presented in Fig. 3.17. 
 
 
Fig. 3.17. Minimum security baseline graph generated with Cytoscape help               
(Created by author) 
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For MSB verification against controls already deployed by the organization, 
an abstract organization ACME Corporation – was taken. It was assumed that it 
has already implemented Logging and monitoring and Backup requirements. The 
DCG graph for ACME Corporation was created in Cytoscape tool (Fig. 3.18). 
Cytoscape tools are used by researchers for visualizing complex networks and 
integrating these networks with any type of attribute data (Franz, et al. 2016). This 
tool is widely used in biology (Truong, Tran and Kwon 2016) and bioinformatics 
(Larsen and Baumbach 2017) . 
For identifying subgraph isomorphism between the received MSB graph and 
created DCG graph for ACME Corporation, Cytoscape plug-in “CyIsomorphism” 
was used. For isomorphism properties identification CyIsomoprhism plug-in is 
using VF++ algorithm (Juttneri and Madaras 2018). 
 
 
Fig. 3.18. Deployed controls graph for ACME Corporation generated with Cytoscape 
help (Created by author) 
The DCG graph is evaluated against MSB graph to identify pattern similarity. 
Only information about vertexes and their connections was used in our experiment 
and because of that, Cytoscape was able to find more than one potential alignment. 
Use of the additional criteria would allow it to solve this issue. Cytoscape appli-
cation has the possibility to work with weighted graphs; however for simplifica-
tion purpose in our experiment, all vertexes have the same weight. In our case, the 
manual review of adjustments was performed. The final result of DCG verifica-
tion against MSB is provided in Fig. 3.19. 
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Fig. 3.19. Identified isomorphic parts of Minimum security baseline and Deployed    
controls graph generated with CyIsomorphism help (Created by author) 
The controls already deployed by ACME Corporation are shown on MSB in 
yellow colour. As can be seen, the presentation of MSB in the form of the graph 
provides a valuable tool for a security officer for evaluating the current state of 
ISMS. 
3.3. Conclusions of Chapter 3 
1. For harmonisation of a set of security documents, adaptive mapping 
has been chosen, which allows integrating new documents without 
the need to re-evaluate previous results. Validation of the proposed 
ontology has shown that it covers more than 90% of controls of used 
4 standards.  
2. For a harmonized set of security document analysis and their 
complexity management, several visualisation tools have been used. 
Chord diagram based approach has been chosen for graphical 
representation of the affinity of different documents. The graph-based 
approach is used to present detailed information about the percentage 
of matching level between different document requirements and 
relations. System Usability Scale verification reveal, that both 
appraoches (76.29 and 71.79) are usable.  
3. The graph theory based method has been proposed for identifying the 
minimum set of mandatory security requirements out of the set of 
harmonized regulatory documents. The proposed methods have been  
experimentally validated with a set of harmonized security documents 
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tool is widely used in biology (Truong, Tran and Kwon 2016) and bioinformatics 
(Larsen and Baumbach 2017) . 
For identifying subgraph isomorphism between the received MSB graph and 
created DCG graph for ACME Corporation, Cytoscape plug-in “CyIsomorphism” 
was used. For isomorphism properties identification CyIsomoprhism plug-in is 
using VF++ algorithm (Juttneri and Madaras 2018). 
 
 
Fig. 3.18. Deployed controls graph for ACME Corporation generated with Cytoscape 
help (Created by author) 
The DCG graph is evaluated against MSB graph to identify pattern similarity. 
Only information about vertexes and their connections was used in our experiment 
and because of that, Cytoscape was able to find more than one potential alignment. 
Use of the additional criteria would allow it to solve this issue. Cytoscape appli-
cation has the possibility to work with weighted graphs; however for simplifica-
tion purpose in our experiment, all vertexes have the same weight. In our case, the 
manual review of adjustments was performed. The final result of DCG verifica-
tion against MSB is provided in Fig. 3.19. 
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Fig. 3.19. Identified isomorphic parts of Minimum security baseline and Deployed    
controls graph generated with CyIsomorphism help (Created by author) 
The controls already deployed by ACME Corporation are shown on MSB in 
yellow colour. As can be seen, the presentation of MSB in the form of the graph 
provides a valuable tool for a security officer for evaluating the current state of 
ISMS. 
3.3. Conclusions of Chapter 3 
1. For harmonisation of a set of security documents, adaptive mapping 
has been chosen, which allows integrating new documents without 
the need to re-evaluate previous results. Validation of the proposed 
ontology has shown that it covers more than 90% of controls of used 
4 standards.  
2. For a harmonized set of security document analysis and their 
complexity management, several visualisation tools have been used. 
Chord diagram based approach has been chosen for graphical 
representation of the affinity of different documents. The graph-based 
approach is used to present detailed information about the percentage 
of matching level between different document requirements and 
relations. System Usability Scale verification reveal, that both 
appraoches (76.29 and 71.79) are usable.  
3. The graph theory based method has been proposed for identifying the 
minimum set of mandatory security requirements out of the set of 
harmonized regulatory documents. The proposed methods have been  
experimentally validated with a set of harmonized security documents 
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and regulations (ISO 27001, PCI DSS and GDPR). The proposed 
method allows reducing the original graph (1276 vertexes) of 
harmonized security regulating documents by 74.76%. Such results 
are achieved by removing duplicated requirements. 
4. The subgraph isomorphism based method has been proposed for 
comparing of organization’s implemented controls against Minimum 
Security Baseline. Experiment prove, that method is able to identify 
similar patterns, however in current state do not verify nodes weight. 
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General Conclusions 
1. The analysis performed has revealed that existing methods for security doc-
uments requirements harmonization are not flexible and can be used only 
with a limited number of documents, while companies are facing the 
increasing pressure for the deployment of multiple regulatory documents. 
The following unsolved issues in the area were identified:  
1.1. Implementation of numerous security documents or other governing 
documents leads to a potential situation of deploying overlapping or 
contradictory controls, thus causing unnecessary expenditures on 
duplicated security controls and compliance issues.  
1.2. The existing security implementation costs calculation methods are 
not oriented to security controls implementation of multiple security 
documents, do not evaluate the complexity and maturity levels, have 
complicated calculations process, weak security aspects coverage and 
a complicated process of new data integration.  
1.3. Existing security document harmonization approaches require re-
developing of the harmonized set and are time-consuming, except 
adaptive mapping methods. The attempts made to implement adaptive 
mapping and automate the process of information security documents 
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harmonization via existing ontologies was unsuccessful since used 
ontologies used were oriented to solve other tasks and didn’t ensure 
quality link with the requirements of security documents. 
2. The control-based security implementation costs evaluation method was 
proposed. The proposed approach is security controls oriented, i.e. controls 
can be directly linked with security regulating documents requirements. 
The method introduces the complexity and maturity levels into the 
calculation process. The proposed method was validated in several test 
scenarios. The performed experiments have shown that although the first 
calculation is time-consuming, every next calculation for a newly added 
document already reuses data from the previous calculation and thus takes 
much less time (up to 50%) and require smaller amount of new information 
(up to 32%) . To reduce the calculation time, the method improvement, 
based on automated data gathering from BPMN and EPC process diagrams, 
was proposed.  
3. The COBIT v5 based ontology was proposed as a basis for adaptive 
harmonization of information security documents. Validation of the 
proposed ontology has shown that it covers more than 90% of controls of 
the set of 4 harmonized documents. For managing the complexity of 
harmonized regulating documents and their relations, several visualisation 
tools were used. System Usability Scale (76.29 and 71.79) reveal that both 
visualization are usable and representing needed information. 
4. The graph theory based method for identifying the minimum set of 
mandatory security requirements out of the set of harmonized regulating 
documents was proposed. The method utilizes a representation of security 
documents, harmonized through ontology, in the form of graph. A vertex 
cover algorithm are used for removing duplicated requirements. The 
method also includes the possibility for comparing the obtained MSB graph 
against already deployed controls, by utilizing subgraph isomorphism 
property for similar structures identification. The proposed method 
verification has  proved the applicability of this practical method for 
Minimum Security Baseline identification and allowed to reduce the 
number of vertices in the original graph by 74.76%. 
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Summary in Lithuanian 
Įvadas 
 
Problemos formulavimas 
 
Didėjant kibernetinių atakų kiekiui, valstybės ir komercinės organizacijos taiko vis 
griežtesnius reikalavimus informacijos ir asmens duomenų apsaugai. Vienas geresnių 
būdų tai pasiekti yra realizuoti reikalavimus ir taikyti priemones, kurios yra aprašytos 
informacijos saugos dokumentuose. Atsižvelgiant į tai, organizacijai yra labai svarbu 
pasirinkti rizikos mažinimo priemones, kurios garantuotų reikiamą apsaugos lygį ir būtų 
efektyvios kaštų vertinimo prasme.  
Esant dabartinėms rinkos sąlygoms ir siekiant įgauti komercinį pranašumą, organi-
zacijos yra priverstos atitikti daugiau negu vieno dokumento reikalavimams. Finansinės 
organizacijos, kurios dirba su mokėjimo sistemomis, privalo atitikti PCI DSS standarto 
reikalavimus bei Bendro duomenų apsaugos reglamento reikalavimus, jei organizacija 
veikia Europos Sąjungoje. Ši situacija dar labiau komplikuojasi, atsižvelgiant į tai, kad 
egzistuoja skirtingos metodikos, aprašančios būdus atitikti nustatytiems reikalavimams.  
Šiuo metu dokumentų susiejimui plačiai naudojamos harmonizavimo metodikos, 
kurios vėliau naudojamos vizualizuojant gautus rezultatus. Tačiau privalomų reikalavimų 
nustatymui reikia ekspertinių žinių ir atskiro harmonizuotos informacijos įvertinimo.  
Siekiant automatizuoti skirtingų saugos dokumentų reikalavimų harmonizavimą ir jų 
rezultatų analizę, buvo pasiūlytas adaptyvus susiejimas ir analizė naudojant grafų teorijos 
algoritmus ir savybes. Saugumo reikalavimai pristatomi, kaip grafo viršūnės, o ryšiai tarp 
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organizacijos, kurios dirba su mokėjimo sistemomis, privalo atitikti PCI DSS standarto 
reikalavimus bei Bendro duomenų apsaugos reglamento reikalavimus, jei organizacija 
veikia Europos Sąjungoje. Ši situacija dar labiau komplikuojasi, atsižvelgiant į tai, kad 
egzistuoja skirtingos metodikos, aprašančios būdus atitikti nustatytiems reikalavimams.  
Šiuo metu dokumentų susiejimui plačiai naudojamos harmonizavimo metodikos, 
kurios vėliau naudojamos vizualizuojant gautus rezultatus. Tačiau privalomų reikalavimų 
nustatymui reikia ekspertinių žinių ir atskiro harmonizuotos informacijos įvertinimo.  
Siekiant automatizuoti skirtingų saugos dokumentų reikalavimų harmonizavimą ir jų 
rezultatų analizę, buvo pasiūlytas adaptyvus susiejimas ir analizė naudojant grafų teorijos 
algoritmus ir savybes. Saugumo reikalavimai pristatomi, kaip grafo viršūnės, o ryšiai tarp 
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jų pristatomi, kaip grafo briaunos. Toks saugos dokumentų atvaizdavimo būdas leidžia 
besidubliuojančių reikalavimų ir trūkstamų reikalavimų paieškai pritaikyti Viršūnių dan-
gos radimo (angl. Vertex cover) ir kitus grafų teorijos optimizavimo algoritmus.  
 
Darbo aktualumas 
 
Mokslininkai labiau orientuojasi į specifinių saugumo užtikrinimo klausimų sprendimus, 
ir mažiau dėmesio skiria problemoms susijusioms su informacijos saugos priemonių įgy-
vendinimu atsižvelgiant į organizacijoje egzistuojančius procesus. Platesnis požiūris į in-
formacijos saugą leidžia užtikrinti efektyvesnę organizacijos apsaugą, tačiau reikalauja 
daugiau resursų ir didina informacijos apsaugos sistemos kompleksiškumą.  
Tam, kad suvaldyti šiuos iššūkius Informacijos saugos specialistas privalo suprasti 
skirtingų saugą reglamentuojančių dokumentų reikalavimus, kurie yra taikomi organiza-
cijos sistemoms bei nustatymui efektyviausių būdų, kurie taikomi reikalavimų įgyvendi-
nimui. Automatinis kelių dokumentų susiejimas su tolimesniu nustatymu minimalių sau-
gos gairių ir jų palyginimu su organizacijoje įgyvendintomis saugos priemonėmis, leistų 
sumažinti subjektyvumo lygį bei padidinti informacijos analizę ir jos pritaikymo efekty-
vumą. Informacijos saugos dokumentų bei jų harmonizavimo rezultatų atvaizdavimas 
grafų pavidalu su tolimesniu grafų teorijos optimizavimo algoritmo taikymu, leistų auto-
matizuoti informacijos saugos dokumentų analizės procesą.     
 
Tyrimo objektas  
 
Pagrindinis šio tyrimo objektas yra informacijos saugos dokumentų reikalavimų harmo-
nizavimo ir analizės metodas. 
  
Darbo tikslas 
 
Disertacijos tikslas – padėti identifikuoti minimalius saugos reikalavimus, kai yra įgyven-
dinami kelių informacijos saugą reguliuojančių dokumentų nustatyti reikalavimai.  
 
Darbo uždaviniai 
 
Nustatyto darbo tikslo pasiekimui, būtina išspręsti žemiau pateiktus darbo tikslus: 
1. Atlikti informacijos saugos dokumentų ir juose nustatytų saugumo reikalavimų 
analizę ir nustatyti informacijos saugos dokumentų ir jų reikalavimų harmoni-
zavimo, analizės bei įvertinimo metodikas.  
2. Sukurti informacijos saugos standartų reikalavimų įgyvendinimo kaštų verti-
nimo metodiką.   
3. Sukurti metodiką automatizuotam informacijos saugos dokumentų ir jų reikala-
vimų harmonizavimui, analizei ir įvertinimui.  
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4. Atlikti eksperimentinius tyrimus, siekiant įvertinti sukurtas metodikas, įskaitant 
minimalių saugos gairių nustatymą ir įvertinimą, bei gautus rezultatus palyginti 
su organizacijoje įgyvendintomis saugumo priemonėmis.  
 
Tyrimų metodika 
 
Tiriant darbo objektą, buvo pasirinkti žemiau aprašyti tyrimo metodai: 
− Teorinis (analizės ir sintezės) tyrimas atliktas siekiant nustatyti problemos spren-
dimo strategiją.  
− Klasifikavimas: Literatūroje pateiktų metodikų, privalumų ir trūkumų apibendri-
nimas, siekiant išgryninti disertacijos tyrimo objekto bei darbo tikslą.  
− Patirtis: Problemos sprendimas grindžiamas moksliniais tyrimais bei kitų moks-
lininkų įžvalgomis bei patirtimi.  
− Eksperimentas: Suformuota hipotezė patvirtinta eksperimentiniu tyrimu. 
− Įvertinimas: Išvados pateiktos atsižvelgiant į tyrimo metu surinktus išanalizuotus 
ir išaiškintus duomenis.  
 
Darbo mokslinis naujumas 
 
Darbo mokslinis naujumas pagrįstas šiais rezultatais: 
1. Sukurtas informacijos saugos dokumentų reikalavimų įgyvendinimo kaštų     
įvertinimo metodas, kuris orientuotas į saugos priemonių įgyvendinimo pro-
cesą, todėl leidžia detaliai įvertinti visus kaštus susijusius su informacijos 
saugos priemonėmis bei jų įtaką bendram organizacijos saugumui.  
2. Sukurtas minimalių saugos gairių nustatymo metodas. Šis metodas leidžia 
įvertinti kelių informacijos saugos dokumentų reikalavimus, pateiktus 
harmonizuotu pavidalu, ir pritaikant grafų teorijos viršūnių dangos radimo 
algoritmus suformuoti minimalias saugos gaires, pašalinant 
besidubliuojančius reikalavimus. 
3. Sukurtas organizacijos įgyvendintų saugos reikalavimų įvertinimo metodas, 
kuris grafų izomorfizmo savybės pagalba, leidžia palyginti organizacijoje 
įgyvendintas saugos priemones su nustatytomis minimaliomis saugos 
gairėmis.  
 
Darbo rezultatų praktinė reikšmė 
 
Disertacijos pasiūlytų metodų teorinė ir praktinė svarba pasižymi jų pritaikomumu nuolat 
besikeičiančioje informacijos saugos užtikrinimo srityje, kuri apima technologinius, orga-
nizacinius bei fizinius informacijos saugos užtikrinimo aspektus. 
 Pasiūlyti metodai apima: saugos priemonių įgyvendinimo kaštų įvertinimo metodą; 
saugos dokumentų harmonizavimo metodą, naudojantį adaptyvų susiejimą per ontologiją; 
128 SUMMARY IN LITHUANIAN 
 
jų pristatomi, kaip grafo briaunos. Toks saugos dokumentų atvaizdavimo būdas leidžia 
besidubliuojančių reikalavimų ir trūkstamų reikalavimų paieškai pritaikyti Viršūnių dan-
gos radimo (angl. Vertex cover) ir kitus grafų teorijos optimizavimo algoritmus.  
 
Darbo aktualumas 
 
Mokslininkai labiau orientuojasi į specifinių saugumo užtikrinimo klausimų sprendimus, 
ir mažiau dėmesio skiria problemoms susijusioms su informacijos saugos priemonių įgy-
vendinimu atsižvelgiant į organizacijoje egzistuojančius procesus. Platesnis požiūris į in-
formacijos saugą leidžia užtikrinti efektyvesnę organizacijos apsaugą, tačiau reikalauja 
daugiau resursų ir didina informacijos apsaugos sistemos kompleksiškumą.  
Tam, kad suvaldyti šiuos iššūkius Informacijos saugos specialistas privalo suprasti 
skirtingų saugą reglamentuojančių dokumentų reikalavimus, kurie yra taikomi organiza-
cijos sistemoms bei nustatymui efektyviausių būdų, kurie taikomi reikalavimų įgyvendi-
nimui. Automatinis kelių dokumentų susiejimas su tolimesniu nustatymu minimalių sau-
gos gairių ir jų palyginimu su organizacijoje įgyvendintomis saugos priemonėmis, leistų 
sumažinti subjektyvumo lygį bei padidinti informacijos analizę ir jos pritaikymo efekty-
vumą. Informacijos saugos dokumentų bei jų harmonizavimo rezultatų atvaizdavimas 
grafų pavidalu su tolimesniu grafų teorijos optimizavimo algoritmo taikymu, leistų auto-
matizuoti informacijos saugos dokumentų analizės procesą.     
 
Tyrimo objektas  
 
Pagrindinis šio tyrimo objektas yra informacijos saugos dokumentų reikalavimų harmo-
nizavimo ir analizės metodas. 
  
Darbo tikslas 
 
Disertacijos tikslas – padėti identifikuoti minimalius saugos reikalavimus, kai yra įgyven-
dinami kelių informacijos saugą reguliuojančių dokumentų nustatyti reikalavimai.  
 
Darbo uždaviniai 
 
Nustatyto darbo tikslo pasiekimui, būtina išspręsti žemiau pateiktus darbo tikslus: 
1. Atlikti informacijos saugos dokumentų ir juose nustatytų saugumo reikalavimų 
analizę ir nustatyti informacijos saugos dokumentų ir jų reikalavimų harmoni-
zavimo, analizės bei įvertinimo metodikas.  
2. Sukurti informacijos saugos standartų reikalavimų įgyvendinimo kaštų verti-
nimo metodiką.   
3. Sukurti metodiką automatizuotam informacijos saugos dokumentų ir jų reikala-
vimų harmonizavimui, analizei ir įvertinimui.  
SUMMARY IN LITHUANIAN 129 
 
4. Atlikti eksperimentinius tyrimus, siekiant įvertinti sukurtas metodikas, įskaitant 
minimalių saugos gairių nustatymą ir įvertinimą, bei gautus rezultatus palyginti 
su organizacijoje įgyvendintomis saugumo priemonėmis.  
 
Tyrimų metodika 
 
Tiriant darbo objektą, buvo pasirinkti žemiau aprašyti tyrimo metodai: 
− Teorinis (analizės ir sintezės) tyrimas atliktas siekiant nustatyti problemos spren-
dimo strategiją.  
− Klasifikavimas: Literatūroje pateiktų metodikų, privalumų ir trūkumų apibendri-
nimas, siekiant išgryninti disertacijos tyrimo objekto bei darbo tikslą.  
− Patirtis: Problemos sprendimas grindžiamas moksliniais tyrimais bei kitų moks-
lininkų įžvalgomis bei patirtimi.  
− Eksperimentas: Suformuota hipotezė patvirtinta eksperimentiniu tyrimu. 
− Įvertinimas: Išvados pateiktos atsižvelgiant į tyrimo metu surinktus išanalizuotus 
ir išaiškintus duomenis.  
 
Darbo mokslinis naujumas 
 
Darbo mokslinis naujumas pagrįstas šiais rezultatais: 
1. Sukurtas informacijos saugos dokumentų reikalavimų įgyvendinimo kaštų     
įvertinimo metodas, kuris orientuotas į saugos priemonių įgyvendinimo pro-
cesą, todėl leidžia detaliai įvertinti visus kaštus susijusius su informacijos 
saugos priemonėmis bei jų įtaką bendram organizacijos saugumui.  
2. Sukurtas minimalių saugos gairių nustatymo metodas. Šis metodas leidžia 
įvertinti kelių informacijos saugos dokumentų reikalavimus, pateiktus 
harmonizuotu pavidalu, ir pritaikant grafų teorijos viršūnių dangos radimo 
algoritmus suformuoti minimalias saugos gaires, pašalinant 
besidubliuojančius reikalavimus. 
3. Sukurtas organizacijos įgyvendintų saugos reikalavimų įvertinimo metodas, 
kuris grafų izomorfizmo savybės pagalba, leidžia palyginti organizacijoje 
įgyvendintas saugos priemones su nustatytomis minimaliomis saugos 
gairėmis.  
 
Darbo rezultatų praktinė reikšmė 
 
Disertacijos pasiūlytų metodų teorinė ir praktinė svarba pasižymi jų pritaikomumu nuolat 
besikeičiančioje informacijos saugos užtikrinimo srityje, kuri apima technologinius, orga-
nizacinius bei fizinius informacijos saugos užtikrinimo aspektus. 
 Pasiūlyti metodai apima: saugos priemonių įgyvendinimo kaštų įvertinimo metodą; 
saugos dokumentų harmonizavimo metodą, naudojantį adaptyvų susiejimą per ontologiją; 
130 SUMMARY IN LITHUANIAN 
 
minimalaus saugos gairių identifikavimo metodą, pritaikant grafų teorijos optimizavimo 
algoritmus, rodo tarpdisciplininį žinių pritaikymą, kai problemos sprendimui naudojami 
informatikos inžinerijos technikos ir metodai bei pritaikomos informacijos saugos vady-
bos procesai ir žinios. Unikaliu galima pavadinti minimalaus saugos gairių nustatymo au-
tomatizavimo metodą, kai informacijos saugos dokumentų ir reikalavimų analizei naudo-
jami gerai žinomi grafų teorijos optimizavimo algoritmai, tokie kaip viršūnių dangos 
radimo algoritmas bei grafų izomorfizmo savybės.  
Sukurtas vizualizavimo įrankis, gali būti naudojamas saugos dokumentų reikalavimų 
ryšių bei tarpusavio priklausomybių atvaizdavimui. Pasiūlytas kaštų vertinimo metodas 
leistų organizacijoms efektyviai valdyti kaštus susijusius su informacijos saugos įgyven-
dinimu. 
Dalis disertacijos atliktų tyrimų buvo finansuojama ir įgyvendinant „Virtualizavimo, 
vizualizavimo ir saugos e. paslaugų technologijų kūrimas ir tyrimai“ projektą. Projektas 
buvo įgyvendinamas 2012–2014 mm. Projekto kodas: VP1-3.1-ŠMM-08-K-01-012.  
 
Ginamieji teiginiai 
 
Išanalizavus tyrimo metu nustatytą informaciją ir įvertinus darbo tikslus bei uždavinius 
buvo suformuluoti žemiau pateikti ginamieji teiginiai:  
1. Kaštų įvertinimas, atliekant skaičiavimus privalo atsižvelgti į įmonės brandos 
lygį bei organizacijos sistemų kompleksiškumą. 
2. Adaptyvus susiejimas su ontologija, paremtas žinomomis metodikomis arba 
dokumentais, leidžia susieti kelis saugą reglamentuojančius dokumentus ir jų 
reikalavimus, neatlikus anksčiau pasiektų rezultatų pakartotinio vertinimo. 
3. Minimalių saugos gairių nustatymas, nagrinėjant harmonizuotą, kelių susietų 
informacijos saugos dokumentų atvaizdą, gali būti automatizuotas taikant 
grafų teorijos viršūnių dangos radimo algoritmus ir grafų izomorfizmo savy-
bes.  
 
Darbo rezultatų aprobavimas 
 
Disertacijos tema paskelbtas 8 mokslinės publikacijos, iš kurių: 3 publikuotos žurnaluose, 
kurie yra įtraukti į Clarivate Analytics (buv. Thomson Reuters) Web of Science duomenų 
bazę, 5 – mokslinių konferencijų pranešimų rinkiniuose. Moksliniai rezultatai buvo pris-
tatyti 3 mokslinėse konferencijose: 
− Business Process Management konferencija 2017: Business Process Manage-
ment Workshops. 2017 m. rugsėjo 10–11 d., Barselona, Ispanija,  
− Electrical, Electronic and Information Sciences (eStream): proceedings of the 
2015 open conference. 2015 m. balandžio 21 d., Vilnius, Lietuva.  
− 2nd International conference on Information Technology and Science (ICITS 
2014). 2014 m. kovo 27–28 d., Šanchajus, Kinija. 
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Disertacijos struktūra 
 
Disertacija yra sudaryta iš įvado, trijų pagrindinių skyrių, bendrųjų išvadų, literatūros šal-
tinių sąrašo, disertacijos autoriaus publikacijų sąrašo bei santraukos lietuvių kalba. Diser-
tacijos apimtis: 138 puslapiai, 35 paveikslai ir 22 lentelės. 
 
1. Informacijos saugos reikalavimų harmonizavimo,  
analizės ir įvertinimo metodai 
 
Šiame skyriuje apžvelgiami esami informacijos saugos dokumentų bei jų reikalavimų har-
monizavimo, analizės ir įvertinimo metodai ir jų aspektai. Taip pat šiame skyriuje apibrė-
žiamos saugos reikalavimų įgyvendinimo kaštų metodikos. 
 Pastaruoju metu organizacijos ir jų vadovai vis labiau supranta informacijos ir duo-
menų apsaugos įtaką jų veiklai. Tai sąlygoja išoriniai faktoriai, tokie kaip išorinių regu-
liatorių, tokių kaip BDAR (angl. GDPR) reglamento arba PCI DSS standarto, reikalavi-
mai, bei vidiniai faktoriai, tokie kaip noras gauti konkurencinį pranašumą. Vienas iš būdų 
tai pasiekti – įgyvendinti reikalavimus aprašytus informacijos saugą reglamentuojan-
čiuose dokumentuose.  
Nagrinėjant informacijos saugą reglamentuojančius dokumentus, galima išskirti 4 
pagrindinius tipus: Informacijos saugos tarptautiniai standartai (ISO27000 serijos standar-
tai, PCI DSS standartas, FIPS standartas); Informacijos saugą reglamentuojantys aktai 
(FISMA, HIPAA, SOX); Įstatymai ir metodologijos (GDPR, COBIT, COSO); Informaci-
jos saugos specialios publikacijos (NIST SP 800-53, NISTIR 7621). Reikėtų pastebėti, 
kad kai kurie informacijos saugą reglamentuojantys dokumentai yra taikomi, tik tam tik-
rose srityse arba reglamentuojantys tam tikrus informacijos saugos aspektus. Tyrimo metu 
buvo nustatyta, kad dažnai organizacijos reikalauja atitikti daugiau negu vieno informaci-
jos saugos dokumento reikalavimams, tokiu atveju labai svarbu nustatyti, kaip vieno 
dokumento reikalavimai koreliuoja su kito saugos dokumento reikalavimais. 
Išspręsti šią dilemą gali padėti dokumentų harmonizavimo būdai. Mokslininkai išski-
ria 4 pagrindinius harmonizavimo būdus: semantinis suderinamumas, susiejimas, adapty-
vus susiejimas ir integracija. Informacijos saugos srityje plačiausiai paplitęs susiejimo har-
monizavimo būdas, kuris taikomas siekiant palyginti tarpusavyje kelis informacijos 
saugos dokumentus. Dažniausiai jis yra taikomas susieti 2 informacijos saugos 
dokumentus, retais atvejais jis gali būti panaudotas susieti 3 arba daugiau dokumentų. 
Pagrindinis šio harmonizavimo metodo trūkumas, kad naujo dokumento pridėjimas reika-
lauja atlikti naujo dokumento susiejimą su jau susietais dokumentais. Išspręsti šią prob-
lemą padeda adaptyvus susiejimas, kuris leidžia panaudoti vieną dokumentą, kaip susie-
jimo pagrindą ir visus kitus dokumentus sieti per jį. 
Taikant adaptyvų susiejimą labai svarbu nustatyti susiejimo pagrindo dokumentą. Šis 
dokumentas turėtų plačiai padengti visas galimas informacijos saugos sritis, bei apimti 
kitus organizacijos procesus. Vienas iš būdų taikyti šiam procesui saugumo ontologijas. 
Šiuo metu egzistuoja kelios saugos ontologijos, tačiau jų formavimo principai yra skir-
tingi. F. Massacci ontologija orientuota į saugumo reikalavimus, J. Undercoffer orientuota 
į kompiuterines atakas. Detaliausias saugumo ontologijas pasiūlė A. Herzog ir S. Fenz.  
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kurie yra įtraukti į Clarivate Analytics (buv. Thomson Reuters) Web of Science duomenų 
bazę, 5 – mokslinių konferencijų pranešimų rinkiniuose. Moksliniai rezultatai buvo pris-
tatyti 3 mokslinėse konferencijose: 
− Business Process Management konferencija 2017: Business Process Manage-
ment Workshops. 2017 m. rugsėjo 10–11 d., Barselona, Ispanija,  
− Electrical, Electronic and Information Sciences (eStream): proceedings of the 
2015 open conference. 2015 m. balandžio 21 d., Vilnius, Lietuva.  
− 2nd International conference on Information Technology and Science (ICITS 
2014). 2014 m. kovo 27–28 d., Šanchajus, Kinija. 
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Disertacijos struktūra 
 
Disertacija yra sudaryta iš įvado, trijų pagrindinių skyrių, bendrųjų išvadų, literatūros šal-
tinių sąrašo, disertacijos autoriaus publikacijų sąrašo bei santraukos lietuvių kalba. Diser-
tacijos apimtis: 138 puslapiai, 35 paveikslai ir 22 lentelės. 
 
1. Informacijos saugos reikalavimų harmonizavimo,  
analizės ir įvertinimo metodai 
 
Šiame skyriuje apžvelgiami esami informacijos saugos dokumentų bei jų reikalavimų har-
monizavimo, analizės ir įvertinimo metodai ir jų aspektai. Taip pat šiame skyriuje apibrė-
žiamos saugos reikalavimų įgyvendinimo kaštų metodikos. 
 Pastaruoju metu organizacijos ir jų vadovai vis labiau supranta informacijos ir duo-
menų apsaugos įtaką jų veiklai. Tai sąlygoja išoriniai faktoriai, tokie kaip išorinių regu-
liatorių, tokių kaip BDAR (angl. GDPR) reglamento arba PCI DSS standarto, reikalavi-
mai, bei vidiniai faktoriai, tokie kaip noras gauti konkurencinį pranašumą. Vienas iš būdų 
tai pasiekti – įgyvendinti reikalavimus aprašytus informacijos saugą reglamentuojan-
čiuose dokumentuose.  
Nagrinėjant informacijos saugą reglamentuojančius dokumentus, galima išskirti 4 
pagrindinius tipus: Informacijos saugos tarptautiniai standartai (ISO27000 serijos standar-
tai, PCI DSS standartas, FIPS standartas); Informacijos saugą reglamentuojantys aktai 
(FISMA, HIPAA, SOX); Įstatymai ir metodologijos (GDPR, COBIT, COSO); Informaci-
jos saugos specialios publikacijos (NIST SP 800-53, NISTIR 7621). Reikėtų pastebėti, 
kad kai kurie informacijos saugą reglamentuojantys dokumentai yra taikomi, tik tam tik-
rose srityse arba reglamentuojantys tam tikrus informacijos saugos aspektus. Tyrimo metu 
buvo nustatyta, kad dažnai organizacijos reikalauja atitikti daugiau negu vieno informaci-
jos saugos dokumento reikalavimams, tokiu atveju labai svarbu nustatyti, kaip vieno 
dokumento reikalavimai koreliuoja su kito saugos dokumento reikalavimais. 
Išspręsti šią dilemą gali padėti dokumentų harmonizavimo būdai. Mokslininkai išski-
ria 4 pagrindinius harmonizavimo būdus: semantinis suderinamumas, susiejimas, adapty-
vus susiejimas ir integracija. Informacijos saugos srityje plačiausiai paplitęs susiejimo har-
monizavimo būdas, kuris taikomas siekiant palyginti tarpusavyje kelis informacijos 
saugos dokumentus. Dažniausiai jis yra taikomas susieti 2 informacijos saugos 
dokumentus, retais atvejais jis gali būti panaudotas susieti 3 arba daugiau dokumentų. 
Pagrindinis šio harmonizavimo metodo trūkumas, kad naujo dokumento pridėjimas reika-
lauja atlikti naujo dokumento susiejimą su jau susietais dokumentais. Išspręsti šią prob-
lemą padeda adaptyvus susiejimas, kuris leidžia panaudoti vieną dokumentą, kaip susie-
jimo pagrindą ir visus kitus dokumentus sieti per jį. 
Taikant adaptyvų susiejimą labai svarbu nustatyti susiejimo pagrindo dokumentą. Šis 
dokumentas turėtų plačiai padengti visas galimas informacijos saugos sritis, bei apimti 
kitus organizacijos procesus. Vienas iš būdų taikyti šiam procesui saugumo ontologijas. 
Šiuo metu egzistuoja kelios saugos ontologijos, tačiau jų formavimo principai yra skir-
tingi. F. Massacci ontologija orientuota į saugumo reikalavimus, J. Undercoffer orientuota 
į kompiuterines atakas. Detaliausias saugumo ontologijas pasiūlė A. Herzog ir S. Fenz.  
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A. Herzog ontologija nukreiptą į informacijos saugos sritis, tuo metu kai S. Fenz ontolo-
gija orientuota į ISO27001 ir Grundschutz informacijos saugos standartų konceptus. Ta-
čiau tyrimo metu buvo nustatyta, kad minėtos ontologijos negali efektyviai susieti kelių 
informacijos saugos dokumentų ir nėra tinkamos naudoti kaip pagrindas adaptyviam su-
siejimui. 
Tyrimo metu buvo išanalizuotos galimybės susiejimo rezultatus atvaizduoti grafiniu 
pavidalu. Tam buvo įvertinti esami būdai, tokie kaip 2.5D, 3D,  HeatMap bei Chord diag-
ramos. Buvo nustatyta, kad išanalizuoti būdai gali atvaizduoti bendrą susiejimo informa-
ciją, tačiau negali pateikti detalios informacijos apie informacijos saugos reikalavimų tar-
pusavio ryšio bei jų padengiamumo lygį. 
Nagrinėjant informacijos saugos įgyvendinimo procesus, buvo nustatyta, kad organi-
zacijoms labai svarbu užtikrinti, kad realizuojamos saugos priemonės būtų efektyvios bei 
ekonomiškai naudingos. Tai yra ypač svarbu, kaip organizacijos bando įgyvendinti dau-
giau negu vieną informacijos saugos dokumentą bei juose aprašytus reikalavimus. Tyrimo 
metu buvo nustatyta, kad daugumos kaštų vertinimo metodai yra taikomi investicijų grą-
žos vertinimui arba rizikos mažinimo vertinimui ir nėra taikomi saugumo priemonių įgy-
vendinimo procesų vertinimui. 
Organizacijoms, siekiančioms įgyvendinti kelių dokumentų reikalavimus svarbu nus-
tatyti būtinus saugos reikalavimus, aprašytus dokumentuose, kuriems jie stengėsi atitikti 
ir palyginti jau įgyvendintas saugos priemones su nustatytomis vertinimo metu. Ankščiau 
aprašyta saugos ontologija leidžia susieti informacijos saugos dokumentus, tačiau nelei-
džia vienareikšmiškai nustatyti būtinus minimalius saugos reikalavimus. Norint pasiekti 
šį tikslą galima taikyti grafų teorijos optimizavimo algoritmus, tokius kaip viršūnių dangos 
radimą bei panaudoti grafų izomorfizmo savybes.      
 
2. Informacijos saugos dokumentų reikalavimų  
įgyvendinimo kaštų vertinimo metodas, orientuotas į  
saugos priemonių realizavimo procesą 
 
Literatūros bei esamų mokslinių tyrimų analizės metu buvo nustatyta, kad kaštų vertinimo 
metodikos yra orientuotos į investicijų grąžą arba kaštų vertinimą per rizikų suvaldymo 
prizmę. Kalbant apie Informacijos saugos kaštų įvertinimą išskiriami penki pagrindiniai 
būdai, kurie atsižvelgia į: organizacijos balansą; saugumo priemonių gyvavimo ciklą; in-
formacinių technologijų saugumo procesus; ISO 27001 standartą bei informacijos saugos 
valdymo sistemos sritį.  
 Tyrimas parodė, kad egzistuojantys būdai turi savo privalumus ir trūkumus. Vienas 
iš trūkumų pastebėtas visuose metoduose yra susijęs su sudėtingais metodų pritaikymais, 
naujo dokumento saugos priemonių įgyvendinimo kaštų vertinimui. Siekiant įvertinti ati-
tikimą naujam dokumentui visus skaičiavimus reikės pakartoti iš naujo. Taip pat buvo 
pastebėta, kad esami būdai, išskyrus skirtus ISO27001 ir Informacijos saugos valdymo 
sistemos sričiai, nėra tiesiogiai koreliuojami su informacijos saugos reikalavimus regu-
liuojančiais dokumentais. Bet ir paminėti 2 būdai yra orientuoti į vieną informacijos sau-
gos standartą – ISO 27001. 
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Atsižvelgiant į tai ir įvertinus mūsų tikslą, saugos reikalavimų įgyvendinimą organi-
zacijose, kurios siekia atitikti daugiau negu vienam informacijos saugos dokumentui, buvo 
pasiūlytas naujas informacijos saugos įgyvendinimo kaštų įvertinimo būdas, orientuotas į 
detalų saugos priemonių įgyvendinimo procesą. 
Pasiūlytas metodas į skaičiavimus įtraukia du pagrindinius procesus: 
 Rizikos įvertinimą; 
 Saugos priemonių įgyvendinimą. 
Toks požiūris leidžia detaliai įvertinti visus saugos įgyvendinimo kaštų aspektus. Sie-
kiant užtikrinti, kad pasiūlytas kaštų įvertinimas galėtų būti taikomas skirtingų dydžių or-
ganizacijoms papildomai buvo įvestas brandos lygio bei sistemų kompleksiškumo koefi-
cientas 𝜑𝜑 ir pagrindinė kaštų vertinimo formulė priėmė tokį pavidalą: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝜑𝜑(𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖
(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠))𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆=1 ,           (S2.1) 
 
čia 𝜑𝜑 – brandos lygio bei sistemų kompleksiškumo koeficientas; 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆  – Rizi-
kos įvertinimo kaštai; 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) – Saugos priemonių    
įgyvendinimo kaštai.   
 Siekiant apskaičiuoti rizikos įvertinimo kaštus reikėtų įvertinti visų rizikos procesų 
sudedamąsias dalis ir tai mes galim padaryti pritaikius tokią formulę: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 = 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 +
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡(𝑁𝑁) +  𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 ,                                  (S2.2)  
 
čia 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 – Kritinio turto įvertinimo kaštai, 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 – Pažei-
džiamumo vertinimo kaštai, 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 – Grėsmių analizės kaštai, 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 – 
Trūkumų analizės kaštai ir 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡(𝑁𝑁) – Saugos tyrimų kaštai, kur N yra ana-
lizuojamų sistemų kiekis, 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 – Žalos įvertinimo kaštai. 
Saugos priemonių įgyvendinimui buvo pasiūlyta taikyti tokius skaičiavimus: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∑ (𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆
𝑎𝑎
𝑆𝑆=1 (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)),     (S2.3) 
 
čia 𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) – saugos priemonės svarbumo koeficientas, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  – yra rizi-
kos mažinimo strategijos kaštai ir 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  – yra rizikos mažinimo veiksmų kaštai. Reikėtų 
pastebėti, kad kiekviena rizikos mažinimo strategija (rizikos išvengimas, rizikos mažini-
mas, rizikos perdavimas ir rizikos priėmimas) turi savo sudėtingus skaičiavimus, susiju-
sius su statistiniais duomenimis ir rizikos priėmimo apetito nustatymais.  
Atlikus eksperimentą buvo nustatyta, kad pasiūlytas metodas leidžia atlikti detalesnę 
kaštų analizę, tačiau pirminiam skaičiavimui reikalauja didelio kiekio duomenų. Ir net     
esant tokiems apribojimams eksperimento rezultatai parodė, kad pasiūlytas būdas pirmi-
niam skaičiavimui pareikalavo 2 kartus daugiau laiko, negu egzistuojantys kaštų        įver-
tinimo būdai, tačiau visa informacija buvo renkama pirmą kartą.  
Siekiant patobulinti ir automatizuoti kaštų įvertinimo metodą, buvo pasiūlytas auto-
matinis duomenų surinkimas iš verslo procesų diagramų, jau egzistuojančių organizaci-
joje.  
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A. Herzog ontologija nukreiptą į informacijos saugos sritis, tuo metu kai S. Fenz ontolo-
gija orientuota į ISO27001 ir Grundschutz informacijos saugos standartų konceptus. Ta-
čiau tyrimo metu buvo nustatyta, kad minėtos ontologijos negali efektyviai susieti kelių 
informacijos saugos dokumentų ir nėra tinkamos naudoti kaip pagrindas adaptyviam su-
siejimui. 
Tyrimo metu buvo išanalizuotos galimybės susiejimo rezultatus atvaizduoti grafiniu 
pavidalu. Tam buvo įvertinti esami būdai, tokie kaip 2.5D, 3D,  HeatMap bei Chord diag-
ramos. Buvo nustatyta, kad išanalizuoti būdai gali atvaizduoti bendrą susiejimo informa-
ciją, tačiau negali pateikti detalios informacijos apie informacijos saugos reikalavimų tar-
pusavio ryšio bei jų padengiamumo lygį. 
Nagrinėjant informacijos saugos įgyvendinimo procesus, buvo nustatyta, kad organi-
zacijoms labai svarbu užtikrinti, kad realizuojamos saugos priemonės būtų efektyvios bei 
ekonomiškai naudingos. Tai yra ypač svarbu, kaip organizacijos bando įgyvendinti dau-
giau negu vieną informacijos saugos dokumentą bei juose aprašytus reikalavimus. Tyrimo 
metu buvo nustatyta, kad daugumos kaštų vertinimo metodai yra taikomi investicijų grą-
žos vertinimui arba rizikos mažinimo vertinimui ir nėra taikomi saugumo priemonių įgy-
vendinimo procesų vertinimui. 
Organizacijoms, siekiančioms įgyvendinti kelių dokumentų reikalavimus svarbu nus-
tatyti būtinus saugos reikalavimus, aprašytus dokumentuose, kuriems jie stengėsi atitikti 
ir palyginti jau įgyvendintas saugos priemones su nustatytomis vertinimo metu. Ankščiau 
aprašyta saugos ontologija leidžia susieti informacijos saugos dokumentus, tačiau nelei-
džia vienareikšmiškai nustatyti būtinus minimalius saugos reikalavimus. Norint pasiekti 
šį tikslą galima taikyti grafų teorijos optimizavimo algoritmus, tokius kaip viršūnių dangos 
radimą bei panaudoti grafų izomorfizmo savybes.      
 
2. Informacijos saugos dokumentų reikalavimų  
įgyvendinimo kaštų vertinimo metodas, orientuotas į  
saugos priemonių realizavimo procesą 
 
Literatūros bei esamų mokslinių tyrimų analizės metu buvo nustatyta, kad kaštų vertinimo 
metodikos yra orientuotos į investicijų grąžą arba kaštų vertinimą per rizikų suvaldymo 
prizmę. Kalbant apie Informacijos saugos kaštų įvertinimą išskiriami penki pagrindiniai 
būdai, kurie atsižvelgia į: organizacijos balansą; saugumo priemonių gyvavimo ciklą; in-
formacinių technologijų saugumo procesus; ISO 27001 standartą bei informacijos saugos 
valdymo sistemos sritį.  
 Tyrimas parodė, kad egzistuojantys būdai turi savo privalumus ir trūkumus. Vienas 
iš trūkumų pastebėtas visuose metoduose yra susijęs su sudėtingais metodų pritaikymais, 
naujo dokumento saugos priemonių įgyvendinimo kaštų vertinimui. Siekiant įvertinti ati-
tikimą naujam dokumentui visus skaičiavimus reikės pakartoti iš naujo. Taip pat buvo 
pastebėta, kad esami būdai, išskyrus skirtus ISO27001 ir Informacijos saugos valdymo 
sistemos sričiai, nėra tiesiogiai koreliuojami su informacijos saugos reikalavimus regu-
liuojančiais dokumentais. Bet ir paminėti 2 būdai yra orientuoti į vieną informacijos sau-
gos standartą – ISO 27001. 
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Atsižvelgiant į tai ir įvertinus mūsų tikslą, saugos reikalavimų įgyvendinimą organi-
zacijose, kurios siekia atitikti daugiau negu vienam informacijos saugos dokumentui, buvo 
pasiūlytas naujas informacijos saugos įgyvendinimo kaštų įvertinimo būdas, orientuotas į 
detalų saugos priemonių įgyvendinimo procesą. 
Pasiūlytas metodas į skaičiavimus įtraukia du pagrindinius procesus: 
 Rizikos įvertinimą; 
 Saugos priemonių įgyvendinimą. 
Toks požiūris leidžia detaliai įvertinti visus saugos įgyvendinimo kaštų aspektus. Sie-
kiant užtikrinti, kad pasiūlytas kaštų įvertinimas galėtų būti taikomas skirtingų dydžių or-
ganizacijoms papildomai buvo įvestas brandos lygio bei sistemų kompleksiškumo koefi-
cientas 𝜑𝜑 ir pagrindinė kaštų vertinimo formulė priėmė tokį pavidalą: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝜑𝜑(𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖
(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠))𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆=1 ,           (S2.1) 
 
čia 𝜑𝜑 – brandos lygio bei sistemų kompleksiškumo koeficientas; 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆  – Rizi-
kos įvertinimo kaštai; 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) – Saugos priemonių    
įgyvendinimo kaštai.   
 Siekiant apskaičiuoti rizikos įvertinimo kaštus reikėtų įvertinti visų rizikos procesų 
sudedamąsias dalis ir tai mes galim padaryti pritaikius tokią formulę: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 = 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 +
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡(𝑁𝑁) +  𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 ,                                  (S2.2)  
 
čia 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 – Kritinio turto įvertinimo kaštai, 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 – Pažei-
džiamumo vertinimo kaštai, 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 – Grėsmių analizės kaštai, 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 – 
Trūkumų analizės kaštai ir 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡(𝑁𝑁) – Saugos tyrimų kaštai, kur N yra ana-
lizuojamų sistemų kiekis, 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 – Žalos įvertinimo kaštai. 
Saugos priemonių įgyvendinimui buvo pasiūlyta taikyti tokius skaičiavimus: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = ∑ (𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆
𝑎𝑎
𝑆𝑆=1 (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) ∗ (𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)),     (S2.3) 
 
čia 𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆) – saugos priemonės svarbumo koeficientas, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  – yra rizi-
kos mažinimo strategijos kaštai ir 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  – yra rizikos mažinimo veiksmų kaštai. Reikėtų 
pastebėti, kad kiekviena rizikos mažinimo strategija (rizikos išvengimas, rizikos mažini-
mas, rizikos perdavimas ir rizikos priėmimas) turi savo sudėtingus skaičiavimus, susiju-
sius su statistiniais duomenimis ir rizikos priėmimo apetito nustatymais.  
Atlikus eksperimentą buvo nustatyta, kad pasiūlytas metodas leidžia atlikti detalesnę 
kaštų analizę, tačiau pirminiam skaičiavimui reikalauja didelio kiekio duomenų. Ir net     
esant tokiems apribojimams eksperimento rezultatai parodė, kad pasiūlytas būdas pirmi-
niam skaičiavimui pareikalavo 2 kartus daugiau laiko, negu egzistuojantys kaštų        įver-
tinimo būdai, tačiau visa informacija buvo renkama pirmą kartą.  
Siekiant patobulinti ir automatizuoti kaštų įvertinimo metodą, buvo pasiūlytas auto-
matinis duomenų surinkimas iš verslo procesų diagramų, jau egzistuojančių organizaci-
joje.  
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S2.1 pav. Verslo procesų modelio integravimas su saugos kaštų įvertinimo metodu 
 
Tyrimo metu buvo išanalizuotos verslo procesų diagramos ir juose pateikiama infor-
macija, tolimesniam tyrimui buvo pasirinktos BPMN ir EPC diagramos. Nagrinėjant šias 
diagramas buvo įvertinta jų pateikiamos informacijos detalizacijos lygis bei kaštų skaičia-
vime naudojamų komponentų padengiamumas. Buvo nustatyta, kad ne visi komponentai 
(pvz. brandos lygio bei sistemos kompleksiškumo koeficientas bei saugos tyrimo kaštų 
įvertinimas) yra atvaizduojami verslo procesuose, o kai kurie komponentai pateikia tik 
dalinę informaciją reikalingą skaičiavimams.  
 Atliktas eksperimentas parodė, kad pasiūlytas būdas leidžia automatizuoti reikiamos 
informacijos surinkimą (S2.1 pav.), tačiau siekiant padidinti jo efektyvumą reikėtų papil-
dyti egzistuojančius verslo procesus, pateikiant daugiau papildomos informacijos apie 
verslo procesų komponentus.  
 
3. Informacijos saugos reikalavimų harmonizavimo,  
analizės ir įvertinimo automatizavimas 
 
Organizacijoms siekiant įgyvendinti kelių informacijos saugos dokumentų reikalavimus, 
svarbu suprasti, kaip reikalavimai yra tarpusavyje susieti. Literatūros analizės metu buvo 
išnagrinėti skirtingi harmonizavimo būdai, tačiau jų taikymas sprendžiant uždavinius kur 
reikia susieti daugiau negu du informacijos saugos dokumentus yra sudėtingas.  
Atsižvelgiant į tai, buvo pasirinktas adaptyvaus susiejimo metodas per vieną bendrą 
saugą reglamentuojantį dokumentą arba metodiką. Siekiant užtikrinti kokybišką ir efek-
tyvų susiejimą pasirinktas pagrindas turi būti kuo platesnis ir padengti visas saugumo sri-
tis. Įvertinus saugos dokumentus bei ontologijas, buvo nustatyta, kad esami dokumentai 
bei ontologijos negalės tai padaryti kokybiškai. Iš saugos dokumentų geriausiai tiktų 
ISO27001 standartas, tačiau jis visiškai neatsižvelgia į kitus organizacijos procesus, kurie 
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irgi gali įtakoti saugos užtikrinimą. Įvertinus egzistuojančias ontologijas, buvo nustatyta, 
kad jos daugumoje yra siaurai orientuotos, ko pasekoje kai kurie specifiniai skirtingų 
dokumentų reikalavimai gali nerasti reikiamo atitikmens ontologijoje.  
Įvertinus šitas problemas buvo nuspręsta pasiūlyti ontologiją, kurios pagrindu būtų 
dokumentas arba metodika apimanti visas informacijos saugos užtikrinimo sritis bei lei-
džianti lengvai integruotis su kitais įmonės procesais, tai pat ontologija turi išnaudoti eg-
zistuojančių ontologijų privalumus. Buvo nuspręsta, kad ontologija aprašys 5 pagrindines 
informacijos saugos klases: Turtas, Saugos priemonės, Organizacija, Grėsmės ir Pažei-
džiamumai (S3.1 pav.). Kaip ontologijos pagrindas buvo paimta COBT v5 metodika, lei-
džianti aprašyti visus organizacijoje esančius informacinių technologijų bei organizacijos 
valdymo procesus, įskaitant ir informacijos saugos užtikrinimą. Informacijos saugos už-
tikrinimo sritis buvo aprašyta detaliai, tuo metu kai kiti procesai buvo pateikti abstrakčiai. 
Tačiau reikalui esant jie gali būti detalizuoti. 
TurtasOrganizacija
Pažeidžiamumas
Rizikos mažinimo 
priemonė
Grėsmės
išnaudoja
yra
mažino
pašalina
yra
turi
taiko arba turi
 
S3.1 pav. Saugumo ontologijos schema 
 
Pasiūlyta ontologija buvo susieta su tais pačiais dokumentais, kurie buvo naudojami 
S. Fenz ir A. Herzog ontologijų nagrinėjimui. Įvertinimo rezultatai, rodo, kad nauja onto-
logija leidžia geriau susieti dokumentų reikalavimus su ontologija, ko pasekoje mes ga-
lime pasiekti tikslesnius rezultatus, vertinant skirtingų saugos dokumentų tarpusavio pa-
dengiamumą, naudojant susiejimą per ontologiją (S3.1 lentelė). 
 
S3.1 lentelė. Standartų ir ontologijų palyginimas 
Standartas 
Ontologijos / Standarto padengiamumas 
S. Fenz A. Herzog Pasiūlyta ontologija 
Covered Covers Covered Covers Covered Covers 
ISO27001 35/311 (11 %) 
23/133 
(17 %) 
26/460 
(6 %) 
19/133 
(14 %) 
130/1795 
(7 %) 
107/133 
(80 %) 
PCI DSS 42/311 (14 %) 
48/165 
(29 %) 
25/460 
(5 %) 
32/165 
(19 %) 
132/1795 
(7 %) 
165/165 
(100 %) 
ISSA 5173 31/311 (10 %) 
7/12 
(58 %) 
29/460 
(6 %) 
6/12 
(50 %) 
15/1795 
(1 %) 
12/12 
(100 %) 
NISTIR 7621 14/311 (5 %) 
8/10 
(80 %) 
21/460 
(5 %) 
8/10 
(80 %) 
19/1795 
(1 %) 
10/10 
(100 %) 
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S2.1 pav. Verslo procesų modelio integravimas su saugos kaštų įvertinimo metodu 
 
Tyrimo metu buvo išanalizuotos verslo procesų diagramos ir juose pateikiama infor-
macija, tolimesniam tyrimui buvo pasirinktos BPMN ir EPC diagramos. Nagrinėjant šias 
diagramas buvo įvertinta jų pateikiamos informacijos detalizacijos lygis bei kaštų skaičia-
vime naudojamų komponentų padengiamumas. Buvo nustatyta, kad ne visi komponentai 
(pvz. brandos lygio bei sistemos kompleksiškumo koeficientas bei saugos tyrimo kaštų 
įvertinimas) yra atvaizduojami verslo procesuose, o kai kurie komponentai pateikia tik 
dalinę informaciją reikalingą skaičiavimams.  
 Atliktas eksperimentas parodė, kad pasiūlytas būdas leidžia automatizuoti reikiamos 
informacijos surinkimą (S2.1 pav.), tačiau siekiant padidinti jo efektyvumą reikėtų papil-
dyti egzistuojančius verslo procesus, pateikiant daugiau papildomos informacijos apie 
verslo procesų komponentus.  
 
3. Informacijos saugos reikalavimų harmonizavimo,  
analizės ir įvertinimo automatizavimas 
 
Organizacijoms siekiant įgyvendinti kelių informacijos saugos dokumentų reikalavimus, 
svarbu suprasti, kaip reikalavimai yra tarpusavyje susieti. Literatūros analizės metu buvo 
išnagrinėti skirtingi harmonizavimo būdai, tačiau jų taikymas sprendžiant uždavinius kur 
reikia susieti daugiau negu du informacijos saugos dokumentus yra sudėtingas.  
Atsižvelgiant į tai, buvo pasirinktas adaptyvaus susiejimo metodas per vieną bendrą 
saugą reglamentuojantį dokumentą arba metodiką. Siekiant užtikrinti kokybišką ir efek-
tyvų susiejimą pasirinktas pagrindas turi būti kuo platesnis ir padengti visas saugumo sri-
tis. Įvertinus saugos dokumentus bei ontologijas, buvo nustatyta, kad esami dokumentai 
bei ontologijos negalės tai padaryti kokybiškai. Iš saugos dokumentų geriausiai tiktų 
ISO27001 standartas, tačiau jis visiškai neatsižvelgia į kitus organizacijos procesus, kurie 
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irgi gali įtakoti saugos užtikrinimą. Įvertinus egzistuojančias ontologijas, buvo nustatyta, 
kad jos daugumoje yra siaurai orientuotos, ko pasekoje kai kurie specifiniai skirtingų 
dokumentų reikalavimai gali nerasti reikiamo atitikmens ontologijoje.  
Įvertinus šitas problemas buvo nuspręsta pasiūlyti ontologiją, kurios pagrindu būtų 
dokumentas arba metodika apimanti visas informacijos saugos užtikrinimo sritis bei lei-
džianti lengvai integruotis su kitais įmonės procesais, tai pat ontologija turi išnaudoti eg-
zistuojančių ontologijų privalumus. Buvo nuspręsta, kad ontologija aprašys 5 pagrindines 
informacijos saugos klases: Turtas, Saugos priemonės, Organizacija, Grėsmės ir Pažei-
džiamumai (S3.1 pav.). Kaip ontologijos pagrindas buvo paimta COBT v5 metodika, lei-
džianti aprašyti visus organizacijoje esančius informacinių technologijų bei organizacijos 
valdymo procesus, įskaitant ir informacijos saugos užtikrinimą. Informacijos saugos už-
tikrinimo sritis buvo aprašyta detaliai, tuo metu kai kiti procesai buvo pateikti abstrakčiai. 
Tačiau reikalui esant jie gali būti detalizuoti. 
TurtasOrganizacija
Pažeidžiamumas
Rizikos mažinimo 
priemonė
Grėsmės
išnaudoja
yra
mažino
pašalina
yra
turi
taiko arba turi
 
S3.1 pav. Saugumo ontologijos schema 
 
Pasiūlyta ontologija buvo susieta su tais pačiais dokumentais, kurie buvo naudojami 
S. Fenz ir A. Herzog ontologijų nagrinėjimui. Įvertinimo rezultatai, rodo, kad nauja onto-
logija leidžia geriau susieti dokumentų reikalavimus su ontologija, ko pasekoje mes ga-
lime pasiekti tikslesnius rezultatus, vertinant skirtingų saugos dokumentų tarpusavio pa-
dengiamumą, naudojant susiejimą per ontologiją (S3.1 lentelė). 
 
S3.1 lentelė. Standartų ir ontologijų palyginimas 
Standartas 
Ontologijos / Standarto padengiamumas 
S. Fenz A. Herzog Pasiūlyta ontologija 
Covered Covers Covered Covers Covered Covers 
ISO27001 35/311 (11 %) 
23/133 
(17 %) 
26/460 
(6 %) 
19/133 
(14 %) 
130/1795 
(7 %) 
107/133 
(80 %) 
PCI DSS 42/311 (14 %) 
48/165 
(29 %) 
25/460 
(5 %) 
32/165 
(19 %) 
132/1795 
(7 %) 
165/165 
(100 %) 
ISSA 5173 31/311 (10 %) 
7/12 
(58 %) 
29/460 
(6 %) 
6/12 
(50 %) 
15/1795 
(1 %) 
12/12 
(100 %) 
NISTIR 7621 14/311 (5 %) 
8/10 
(80 %) 
21/460 
(5 %) 
8/10 
(80 %) 
19/1795 
(1 %) 
10/10 
(100 %) 
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Standartiniai vizualizavimo būdai neleido vienareikšmiškai nustatyti kaip vieno 
dokumento saugos reikalavimas koreliuoja su kito dokumento analogišku reikalavimu. 
Siekiant patobulinti informacijos vizualizavimą buvo pasiūlytas susiejimo padengiamumo 
atvaizdavimas grafo pagalba (S3.2 pav.), kur kiekvienas reikalavimas yra grafo viršūnė. 
Viršūnės linijos storumas ir forma leidžia grafiniu pavidalu pateikti informaciją apie pa-
dengiamumą, kur linijos nebuvimas rodo, kad kituose dokumentuose, tokio reikalavimo 
nėra, o linijos storumas bei tarpai tarp linijos nurodo padengiamumo lygį. Detalesnę in-
formaciją galima gauti peržiūrėjus viršūnės detalesnę informaciją. Pilnam adaptyvaus su-
siejimo atvaizdavimui buvo panaudota Chord diagrama. 
      
 
 
S3.2 pav. Adaptyvaus susiejimo atvaizdavimo būdas 
 
Adaptyvus susiejimas leidžia apjungti daugiau negu du informacijos saugos 
dokumentus, tačiau neleidžia greitai ir efektyviai nustatyti minimalių būtinų reikalavimų 
aprašytų keliuose dokumentuose, bei palyginti jų su organizacijos įgyvendintomis saugos 
priemonėmis. 
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Kaimynystės
matrica
Minimal ios saugos gairės
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gairių generavimas 
Minimal ios saugos gairės
 
 
S3.3 pav. Minimalių saugos gairių identifikavimo metodas 
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Siekiant išspręsti šią problemą mes siūlome panaudoti grafų teoriją ir jos optimiza-
vimo algoritmus. Minimalių saugos gairių nustatymui siūloma naudoti Viršūnių dangos 
radimo algoritmą, leidžiantį adaptyvaus susiejimo pagalba susietus dokumentus atvaiz-
duoti kaip grafą ir pritaikius algoritmą pašalinti visus besidubliuojančius reikalavimus, 
taip paliekant tik minimalias saugos gaires. Metodo schema aprašyta aukščiau pateiktoje 
BPMN diagramoje (S3.3 pav.). 
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S3.4 pav. Būdas įgyvendintų saugos priemonių palyginimui su Minimaliomis saugos gairėmis. 
 
Identifikavus Minimalias saugos gaires, pritaikant grafų izomorfizmo savybes galima 
palyginti, kaip organizacijoje įgyvendintos saugos priemonės atitinka minimaliems sau-
gos reikalavimams (S3.4 pav.). 
Šiam eksperimentui buvo naudojamas HITRUST CSF 9,1 metodikos susiejimas, ko 
pasekoje buvo gautas grafas su 1267 viršūnėmis ir 2512 briaunomis. Pritaikius pasiūlytą 
metodą, reikalavimų skaičių pavyko sumažinti iki 322 viršūnių. Pritaikius izomorfizmo 
savybes gautas grafas buvo palygintas su organizacijos įgyvendintomis priemonėmis.  
 
Bendrosios išvados 
 
1. Atlikta analizė parodė, kad taikomi saugos dokumentų harmonizacijos būdai 
nėra adaptyvūs ir gali būti taikomi tik ribotam kiekiui dokumentų. Tuo pačiu 
metu įmonės privalo atitikti kelių saugos dokumentų reikalavimams. Tyrimo 
metu buvo nustatytos tokios problemos: 
1.1. Kelių informacijos dokumentų reikalavimų įgyvendinimas leidžia įgyven-
dinti besidubliuojančias arba prieštaraujančias saugos priemones. Tai gali 
vesti prie išaugusių saugos įgyvendinimo kaštų. 
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Standartiniai vizualizavimo būdai neleido vienareikšmiškai nustatyti kaip vieno 
dokumento saugos reikalavimas koreliuoja su kito dokumento analogišku reikalavimu. 
Siekiant patobulinti informacijos vizualizavimą buvo pasiūlytas susiejimo padengiamumo 
atvaizdavimas grafo pagalba (S3.2 pav.), kur kiekvienas reikalavimas yra grafo viršūnė. 
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nėra, o linijos storumas bei tarpai tarp linijos nurodo padengiamumo lygį. Detalesnę in-
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siejimo atvaizdavimui buvo panaudota Chord diagrama. 
      
 
 
S3.2 pav. Adaptyvaus susiejimo atvaizdavimo būdas 
 
Adaptyvus susiejimas leidžia apjungti daugiau negu du informacijos saugos 
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aprašytų keliuose dokumentuose, bei palyginti jų su organizacijos įgyvendintomis saugos 
priemonėmis. 
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S3.3 pav. Minimalių saugos gairių identifikavimo metodas 
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Siekiant išspręsti šią problemą mes siūlome panaudoti grafų teoriją ir jos optimiza-
vimo algoritmus. Minimalių saugos gairių nustatymui siūloma naudoti Viršūnių dangos 
radimo algoritmą, leidžiantį adaptyvaus susiejimo pagalba susietus dokumentus atvaiz-
duoti kaip grafą ir pritaikius algoritmą pašalinti visus besidubliuojančius reikalavimus, 
taip paliekant tik minimalias saugos gaires. Metodo schema aprašyta aukščiau pateiktoje 
BPMN diagramoje (S3.3 pav.). 
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S3.4 pav. Būdas įgyvendintų saugos priemonių palyginimui su Minimaliomis saugos gairėmis. 
 
Identifikavus Minimalias saugos gaires, pritaikant grafų izomorfizmo savybes galima 
palyginti, kaip organizacijoje įgyvendintos saugos priemonės atitinka minimaliems sau-
gos reikalavimams (S3.4 pav.). 
Šiam eksperimentui buvo naudojamas HITRUST CSF 9,1 metodikos susiejimas, ko 
pasekoje buvo gautas grafas su 1267 viršūnėmis ir 2512 briaunomis. Pritaikius pasiūlytą 
metodą, reikalavimų skaičių pavyko sumažinti iki 322 viršūnių. Pritaikius izomorfizmo 
savybes gautas grafas buvo palygintas su organizacijos įgyvendintomis priemonėmis.  
 
Bendrosios išvados 
 
1. Atlikta analizė parodė, kad taikomi saugos dokumentų harmonizacijos būdai 
nėra adaptyvūs ir gali būti taikomi tik ribotam kiekiui dokumentų. Tuo pačiu 
metu įmonės privalo atitikti kelių saugos dokumentų reikalavimams. Tyrimo 
metu buvo nustatytos tokios problemos: 
1.1. Kelių informacijos dokumentų reikalavimų įgyvendinimas leidžia įgyven-
dinti besidubliuojančias arba prieštaraujančias saugos priemones. Tai gali 
vesti prie išaugusių saugos įgyvendinimo kaštų. 
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1.2. Esamos saugos priemonių įgyvendinimo kaštų vertinimo metodikos neat-
sižvelgia į informacijos saugos dokumentus bei neįtraukia organizacijos 
brandos bei sistemų kompleksiškumo koeficientų į skaičiavimus. Dauguma 
taikomų skaičiavimo metodų sudėtingi bei nėra adaptyvūs ir neleidžia rei-
kalui esant lengvai į esamus skaičiavimus įtraukti naujų saugos kompo-
nentų. 
1.3. Esami harmonizacijos metodai leidžia susieti kelis dokumentus, tačiau 
naujų dokumentų įtraukimas į harmonizacijos procesą reikalauja iš naujo 
įvertinti prieš tai buvusius rezultatus. Adaptyvus susiejimas per ontologijas 
parodė, kad egzistuojančios ontologijos buvo sukurtos spręsti kitus uždavi-
nius ir nėra tinkamos saugos dokumentų susiejimui. 
2. Buvo pasiūlyta saugos priemonių įgyvendinimo kaštų skaičiavimo metodika lei-
džianti atsižvelgti į saugos dokumentų reikalavimus. Pateiktas metodas ne tik 
tiesiogiai susietas su informacijos saugos reikalavimais, bet ir integruoja organi-
zacijos brandos ir sistemų sudėtingumo koeficientus į skaičiavimus. Pasiūlytas 
metodas buvo patikrintas atliekant eksperimentinius bandymus. Atlikti testavi-
mai parodė, kad pirmas skaičiavimas reikalauja didelio kiekio duomenų (17 for-
mulių ir 32 skirtingų komponentų) ir daug laiko (vieno proceso kaštų apskaičia-
vimas truko daugiau negu 1 val.), tačiau sekantys skaičiavimai naujiems saugos 
dokumentams yra 50 % greitesni. Skaičiavimo laikas mažėja, nes metodas nau-
doja ankstesnius skaičiavimo rezultatus. Siekiant dar sumažinti skaičiavimo 
laiką, buvo pasiūlytas patobulinimas, leidžiantis dalį skaičiavimams reikalingos 
informacijos išgauti iš verslo procesų diagramų (BPMN ir EPC). 
3. COBIT v5 metodika buvo pasiūlyta kaip pagrindas naujai kuriamai saugos on-
tologijai. Naujos ontologijos analizė parodo, kad ji leidžia padengti daugiau kaip 
90 % su ja susietų keturių saugos dokumentų reikalavimų, naudojamų bandyme. 
Rezultatų atvaizdavimui buvo sukurti vizualizavimo metodai. Chord diagramos 
pagrindu sukurta vizualizacija naudojama saugos dokumentų susiejimo atvaiz-
davimui, o grafais grindžiamas atvaizdavimas naudojamas pateikiant detalesnę 
informaciją apie reikalavimų padengiamumo laipsnius bei pačius reikalavimus. 
4. Buvo pasiūlytas minimalių saugos gairių identifikavimo metodas, kuris leidžia 
analizuoti harmonizuotus dokumentus ir šalinti besidubliuojančius reikalavimus. 
Tai pasiekiama atvaizduojant saugos dokumentų reikalavimus grafų pagalba, 
kur reikalavimai yra viršūnės, o briaunos yra ryšiai tarp reikalavimų. Pritaikius 
viršūnių dangos radimo algoritmą galima pašalinti identiškus reikalavimus ir to-
kiu būdu suformuoti naują grafą turintį tik unikalius reikalavimus iš harmoni-
zuotų dokumentų aibės. Pasiūlytas metodas taip pat leidžia, pritaikius grafų izo-
morfizmo savybes, palyginti organizacijos įgyvendintas saugos priemones su 
minimaliais saugos gairių reikalavimais. Pateiktas metodas buvo patikrintas pri-
taikant viršūnių dangos radimo algoritmą harmonizuotų dokumentų grafo anali-
zei. Grafo viršūnių kiekis buvo sumažintas 74,76 %, pašalinant trijų saugos do-
kumentų besidubliuojančius reikalavimus.    
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tologijai. Naujos ontologijos analizė parodo, kad ji leidžia padengti daugiau kaip 
90 % su ja susietų keturių saugos dokumentų reikalavimų, naudojamų bandyme. 
Rezultatų atvaizdavimui buvo sukurti vizualizavimo metodai. Chord diagramos 
pagrindu sukurta vizualizacija naudojama saugos dokumentų susiejimo atvaiz-
davimui, o grafais grindžiamas atvaizdavimas naudojamas pateikiant detalesnę 
informaciją apie reikalavimų padengiamumo laipsnius bei pačius reikalavimus. 
4. Buvo pasiūlytas minimalių saugos gairių identifikavimo metodas, kuris leidžia 
analizuoti harmonizuotus dokumentus ir šalinti besidubliuojančius reikalavimus. 
Tai pasiekiama atvaizduojant saugos dokumentų reikalavimus grafų pagalba, 
kur reikalavimai yra viršūnės, o briaunos yra ryšiai tarp reikalavimų. Pritaikius 
viršūnių dangos radimo algoritmą galima pašalinti identiškus reikalavimus ir to-
kiu būdu suformuoti naują grafą turintį tik unikalius reikalavimus iš harmoni-
zuotų dokumentų aibės. Pasiūlytas metodas taip pat leidžia, pritaikius grafų izo-
morfizmo savybes, palyginti organizacijos įgyvendintas saugos priemones su 
minimaliais saugos gairių reikalavimais. Pateiktas metodas buvo patikrintas pri-
taikant viršūnių dangos radimo algoritmą harmonizuotų dokumentų grafo anali-
zei. Grafo viršūnių kiekis buvo sumažintas 74,76 %, pašalinant trijų saugos do-
kumentų besidubliuojančius reikalavimus.    
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